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Foreword by the Series Editors
The inspiration for publishing this book has its origins in the early 
stages of my PhD research, a comparative study of British and 
German media and communication policies, at Loughborough 
University. The research relied on a mixture of elite interviews 
and archival records. With regard to the former, my approach was 
to outline key processes and events in British and German media 
and communications policy and to then identify the key figures 
instrumental in shaping the respective developments at crucial 
historical junctures and points in time.1 In 2007, when designing a 
first list of possible informants, my PhD supervisor Peter Golding 
suggested I contact David Elstein, who responded swiftly and 
sent me his Oxford Lectures. I found the lecture series extremely 
useful and still regard it as an authoritative source on the history 
of British broadcasting policy. The lectures were never published 
and I am grateful for having a chance to make them available to a 
wider readership. 
In his seminal work Media and Power James Curran (2000) 
presents British media history as a series of competing narra­
tives.2 David Elstein’s narrative champions individual choice and 
economic freedom. With regard to the funding of the BBC Elstein 
is a strong advocate of subscription, a policy measure advocated 
by some authors affiliated with the Institute of Economic Affairs 
(IEA) since the 1960s (e.g. Caine 1966,1968; Veljanovski and Bishop 
1983).3 David Elstein has made a case for a coherent alternative 
rationale for funding public service content through a contestable 
fund (see e.g. Elstein 1991, 2000, 2005).4 Normative assumptions 
that public service broadcasters create market distortions and 
inefficiencies in the amount of public money spent in creating 
public value underpin his rigorous, at times revisionist, analysis. 
10 This publication has been made possible by the EU Innovation 
Incubator at Leuphana University Lüneburg, a major research­
driven project for regional development with a total volume of 
EUR 98 million running from 2010 to 2015, funded by the European 
Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the State of Lower 
Saxony. The Innovation Incubator is a unique project designed 
to create enduring economic effects in the areas of sustainable 
energy, health, and digital media. Roughly, the Incubator area 
of digital media can be subdivided into three projects con­
cerned with public service broadcasting (Public Service Media 
2.0 Lab), publishing (Hybrid Publishing Lab) and gamification 
(Gamification Lab). These projects develop under the umbrella 
of the Centre for Digital Cultures (CDC), which will persist beyond 
the funding period.5 The flagship project of the Hybrid Publishing 
Lab is meson press, and I would like to thank my meson press 
colleagues Sebastian Mühleis, Marcus Burkhardt and Andreas 
Kirchner for the many hours they invested in this project.
The series Media, Democracy & Political Process was launched 
by members of the Public Service Media 2.0 Lab, namely Volker 
Grassmuck, Christian Heise (Hybrid Publishing Lab), Orkan Torun 
and myself. It sets out to address the impacts of digitisation on 
politics, culture and society and explores how the emergence of 
digital communication affects established modes of policy­mak­
ing and representation as well as socio­cultural values, identities 
and networks. Amongst the questions that publications appear­
ing in the series seek to answer are: What consequences arise 
from the digital shift for traditional political institutions and proc­
esses of decision­making and for the media and communication 
systems in twenty­first century democracies? What new opportu­
nities and risks are posed by digital technologies in terms of civic 
engagement and more transparent and inclusive policy­making 
processes? Which new forms of public sphere, social change and 
cultural techniques are evolving? These and related questions are 
addressed from a variety of perspectives, incorporating historical 
approaches and cross­country comparative research.
11The series seeks to publish original research and contributions by 
experts and practitioners from the fields of politics, civil society, 
non­governmental organisations and regulatory agencies. It 
aims to contribute to the lively discourse on political and social 
implications of digital media technologies while working towards 
models and options for addressing current socio­political and 
­cultural challenges.
Christian Herzog
Endnotes
1   Potschka, Christian. Towards a Market in Broadcasting: Communications Policy 
in the UK and Germany. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, 8.
2  Curran, James. Media and Power. London: Routledge, 2002. 
3  Caine, Sir Sydney. Prices for Primary Producers. London: Institute of Economic 
Affairs, 1966; Caine, Sir Sydney. Paying for TV?. London: Institute for Economic 
Affairs, 1968; Veljanovski, Cento G. and Bishop, William D. Choice by Cable: The 
Economics of a New Era in Television. London: Institute for Economic Affairs, 
1983. 
4  Elstein, David. “Competing with the Public Sector in Broadcasting.” Economic 
Affairs 20, no. 4 (2000): 13–20; Elstein, David. “The James MacTaggart Lecture 
1991. The Future of Television: Market Forces and Social Values.” In Television 
Policy: The MacTaggart Lectures, edited by Bob Franklin, 147–155. Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2005; Elstein, David. “Public Service Broadcasting 
in the Digital Age.” Economic Affairs 25, no. 4 (2005): 68–70.
5  Beyes, Timon, Christian Herzog and Christian Heise. Forthcoming. “Centre for 
Digital Cultures.” In The Sage International Encyclopedia of Mass Media & Society, 
edited by Debra Merskin. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Foreword by the Author
Being invited to publish lectures delivered many years previously 
is a double­edged sword. At one level, it is pleasing for material 
which found only a small audience at the time to be made 
generally available. At another level, the risk of finding one’s old 
judgements to have been overtaken by events or subsequent 
scholarship is a little unnerving.
Fortunately, few people in academia have chosen to compare and 
contrast the unusual British phenomenon of regularly examining 
the broadcasting options faced by society, with major reports 
(if we exclude the more limited inquiry by Lord Hunt) every ten 
to fifteen years after 1945 (Beveridge in 1950, Pilkington in 1962, 
Annan in 1977 and Peacock in 1986). At the time the lectures were 
delivered, in 1999, it was not clear whether a review of the BBC’s 
finances that year, led by economist Gavyn Davies, would be a full 
survey – expanding, as Peacock had, well beyond its limited brief 
– or more like Hunt in its narrow focus. If Davies kept to his brief, I 
fully expected a new major review to be commissioned.
It never happened. Thirty years on, despite massive changes 
in the technology and ecology of broadcasting, no UK govern­
ment has felt the need – as one politician dismissively described 
the process – to pull up the plant in order to examine its roots. 
Instead, the regulator created in the 2003 Communications 
Act, Ofcom, has from time to time reported on public service 
broadcasting (PSB), even as the sector it directly regulates – the 
commercial public service channels, ITV, Channel 4 and Five – 
steadily ran down its PSB supply. Frustratingly, Ofcom has no 
leverage over the BBC, which is responsible for 90% of all PSB 
output. Meanwhile, successive reviews of the BBC’s Charter have 
largely ignored the wider PSB context that the four major reports 
from the post­war years had addressed.
In 2003, at the invitation of the then Shadow Secretary of State 
for Culture, Media and Sport, John Whittingdale, I set up the 
14 Broadcasting Policy Group, which published a report on the 
future of the BBC, “Beyond The Charter,” explicitly placing its 
recommendations in the context of the growing crisis in PSB.1 In 
a surprise appointment after the May 2015 election, Whittingdale 
was given the actual job of Secretary of State. He had, just in 
February, led a House of Commons Select Committee inquiry into 
the future of the BBC. It will be interesting to see what parts of 
that Committee’s report, or indeed the BPG’s report, find their 
way into government policy as the BBC seeks to negotiate a new 
Charter for 2017.
My Oxford Lectures lack the kind of formal apparatus (references, 
footnotes, sources) that academics these days would expect. 
They were written to be delivered and heard, with only the under­
lying reports being assumed to be required reading. If my citing 
of contemporary newspaper and parliamentary responses to 
the reports, without specific references, causes frustration, I can 
only apologise. My own academic training – at Cambridge in the 
early 1960s – required me to write essays that I read out loud to 
my supervisor. In post­academic life, I have given dozens of public 
lectures, many of them “named” (Goodman, Raymond Williams, 
Reed, Swinton, Bernard Simons), including inaugurals as a visiting 
professor at universities, and never attached a single footnote. I 
invite readers of these Oxford Lectures to imagine they are in an 
English Faculty lecture room: no slides, no reading notes, just a 
lectern and a text.
After delivering the six English Faculty lectures in February and 
March of 1999, I was invited back to Oxford by another cross­dis­
ciplinary group to deliver two more: one on the report from the 
committee chaired by Gavyn Davies, published that summer, and 
another on the BBC in the digital age. By contrast with the first 
six, these lectures are much more engaged with the broadcasting 
politics of the moment: although I link back to the themes of the 
earlier lectures, the detailed political twists and turns predomi­
nate. For that, I make no apology.
15When I left Cambridge, I was offered the equivalent of a general 
traineeship at the BBC (although I had acquired a double first in 
History, I was too young, at 19, to be offered an actual traineeship, 
for which the minimum age was 21). I was seconded for a year to 
the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, at Birmingham 
University, under the supervision of Richard Hoggart and Stuart 
Hall, where I wrote a short thesis on the concept of public service 
broadcasting. It was an opportunity to read widely and deeply, 
soon after the publication of the Pilkington Report, which Hog­
gart had so substantially influenced, into the wide variety of ideas 
inside and outside the BBC about the purposes of broadcasting. 
Looking back, not just 16 years to when the Oxford Lectures were 
delivered, but 50 years before that to the time of Beveridge, it is 
impossible not to marvel at the vast changes that have overtaken 
broadcasting since the 1940s, and the earnest debate then over 
whether the BBC’s broadcasting monopoly should be maintained. 
Perhaps a “philosophy” of broadcasting is simply not an option 
in so complex an environment: but how the “great and the good” 
addressed the issues of broadcasting in the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s 
and 1980s, and how their main recommendations failed to be 
implemented, time after time, remains a fascinating phenome­
non, even as those recommendations fade into history.
David Elstein 
July 2015
Endnotes
1.   Broadcasting Policy Group. Beyond the Charter: The BBC after 2006. London: 
Premium Publishing, 2004. https://archive.org/details/BeyondTheCharter.

Introduction
Fifty years ago, the first of the post­war committees of inquiry 
into broadcasting was created. Chaired by Lord Beveridge, it 
addressed the central issue of whether to sustain the BBC’s 
monopoly of radio and television services. All but one of its 
members rejected the various suggestions for ending the 
monopoly. The Labour government broadly agreed. Yet such 
was the procrastination displayed by ministers – both in creating 
the Beveridge Committee and then in responding to its rec­
ommendations – that before the BBC’s Charter (and monopoly) 
could be quietly renewed, the 1951 election dislodged Labour.
Most of the incoming Conservative cabinet were equally well 
disposed to the BBC’s monopoly, but the Beveridge Committee’s 
minority report in favour of breaking the monopoly had been 
written by a Conservative backbencher, J Selwyn Lloyd, who now 
found his arguments strongly supported by a hardworking group 
of sympathizers within the new House of Commons. The cabinet’s 
“fixer”, Lord Woolton, found a seemingly neat solution to the split 
within his own party: radio (the important medium) would remain 
a BBC monopoly, but the sideshow of television would not.
So the pattern was set – of finding a political structure for broad­
casting through the medium of committees of inquiry, and then 
for key recommendations of the committee reports to be over­
taken by the law of unintended consequences.
After 1949, three further committees of inquiry into broadcasting 
were appointed, each taking up to two years to complete its work: 
Pilkington, which reported in 1962; Annan, which reported in 
1977; and Peacock, which reported in 1986. In addition, a 3­man 
committee of inquiry chaired by Lord Hunt conducted a rapid 
six­month survey in 1982 on the impact of cable television on 
broadcasting policy.
If Beveridge, unintentionally, led to the creation of a second tele­
vision channel, Pilkington and Annan were explicitly invited to 
18 adjudicate on the allocation of additional channels, as more spec­
trum was made available for broadcast purposes. Yet the main 
thrust of both reports failed to strike home. 
Pilkington found the ITV service – established in 1955 – so 
deficient that it recommended reducing the franchise holders to 
mere programme suppliers, with the key functions of commis­
sioning, scheduling and airtime­selling undertaken by the ITV 
regulator, the ITA. This might have appealed to the Labour Party, 
at that point still nominally committed to the abolition of ITV. 
However, the Conservative government of the day – even if it 
could stomach Pilkington’s allocation of the third channel to the 
BBC – inevitably resisted a high­minded, socialistic restructuring 
of the whole of ITV so soon after its launch.
Annan’s reversal was more directly a result of political changes. 
Lord Annan had been appointed by Labour before the 1970 
election, was stood down after the Conservatives unexpectedly 
returned to power, and was then re­appointed when Labour re­
captured office. The Annan Report decisively rejected ITV’s bid for 
the fourth available television channel, as a balance against the 
BBC’s two­pronged service. Instead, Annan proposed an Open 
Broadcasting Authority, pursuing an essentially educational mis­
sion. However, yet again, Labour indecision left a policy vacuum, 
which the Conservatives promptly filled once they won the 1979 
election.
The OBA was abandoned. Yet, by a quirk of history, the two new 
Home Office ministers, William Whitelaw and Leon Brittan, also 
abandoned the Conservative manifesto commitment to an ITV2. 
Instead, a high water mark in political and social engineering 
was achieved in the creation of a quasi­commercial alternative 
Channel Four, with a structure uncannily similar to that rec­
ommended by Pilkington in 1962 for ITV.
This was the last fling of cultural policy­making in the field of 
broadcasting. The notion that broadcast spectrum was scarce 
and had to be allocated according to social needs, not market 
19logic, had prevailed long after the age of rationing had ended 
elsewhere in the UK, and with it the assumption that the man 
in Whitehall knows best. Now, technology was to erode the 
scarcity argument, and the two committees of inquiry of the 
1980s adopted a new approach, consumer­driven rather than 
provider­driven.
The Hunt Report of 1982 attempted to counter Annan’s largely 
negative view of cable as a potential medium for pay­television. 
For Annan – as for the broadcast establishment – cable would 
be socially divisive if it diverted programming and revenue 
away from free­to­air television. Hunt urged a liberal regulatory 
regime for cable, and Tory ministers – especially those with a 
technology brief – eagerly embraced its findings. However, yet 
again policy was unexpectedly thrown off course – changes in the 
Treasury treatment of capital allowances stifled cable’s devel­
opment. Ironically, it was only re­kindled by the failure of yet 
another government­sponsored, technologically­driven initiative: 
high­powered satellite television, which was dislodged by a 
medium­powered satellite alternative that finally delivered the 
programming stream so desperately needed for cable’s growth.
Peacock was perhaps the most dramatic example of a committee 
that both broke its political framework and then saw key rec­
ommendations ignored. Set up to report on the financing of the 
BBC, and packed with free­market economists, Peacock defeated 
all expectations by rejecting advertising and sponsorship as 
alternatives to the licence fee, and instead advocating the long 
term replacement of the fee by subscription.
Blithely ignoring its remit, Peacock then addressed commercial 
television, recommending wholesale reform: auctioning of 
ITV licences; separation of Channel Four’s airtime selling from 
ITV’s; and substantial access to ITV’s schedules for indepen­
dent producers. Initially consigned to the long political grass 
as impractical, Peacock prevailed with the cabinet radicals, and 
these key recommendations were all implemented.
20 Yet the pattern of the past prevailed in other ways. The Peacock 
Report’s first recommendation was for a simple device to 
be installed in all new television sets so as to ease the even­
tual introduction of encrypted television services. This was 
never implemented – much to the cost of today’s consumers 
– thanks to a consultant’s report for the Home Office that 
demonstrated (embarrassingly wrongly, as it turned out) why 
subscription funding of television would not work. Another key 
recommendation – for freedom of speech within the law – saw 
Thatcherite economics out­flanked by Thatcherite morality, with 
the creation instead of yet another regulatory watchdog, the 
Broadcasting Standards Council.
Perhaps most surprisingly, the far­sighted Peacock Report failed 
to spot the potential for a fifth terrestrial channel, which emerged 
a mere year later. Nor, indeed, did the immense potential of 
medium­powered satellites register. To that extent, Peacock was 
the most paradoxical of the post­war reports. It dwelt on the dis­
tant future, and so missed the near at hand. 
More importantly, it placed economic issues above social con­
cerns. It valued freedom more highly than political intervention. 
It side­stepped the earnest disquisitions on broadcasting 
philosophy that characterized its predecessors. In effect, it 
put committees of inquiry into broadcasting out of business. If 
technological constraints were disappearing, and if consumers 
could function within an open market, there was less and less 
room or reason for political structuring of broadcasting.
Since 1986, there have indeed been no further major inquiries. 
Into the political vacuum has stepped the language of the 
market. The sixth of these lectures describes the new broad­
casting landscape, where ITV is now run by three businessmen 
with no background in broadcasting, where the BBC is deeply 
engaged in market issues, where brand management is a core 
value at Channel Four, and where the most potent financial force 
in British television did not even exist when Peacock reported. 
21But it will also deal with the improbable re­emergence of political 
engagement in the structure of broadcasting, as evidenced by the 
bi­partisan determination to create a digital terrestrial television 
platform in the UK, in defence of old­style broadcasting (and 
regulation), even in an age when unlimited spectrum should have 
rendered largely redundant any role for the political class.
These six lectures attempt to encompass a period of great 
change, in both politics and broadcasting. In fifty years, 
assumptions about society, about political control of broad­
casting, and about the relationship between viewers as citizens 
and as consumers have all been transformed. They will deal with 
the way in which we are governed as well as the way in which 
broadcasting functions within a mature democracy. They will 
trace a path rich in ironies as well as in issues that are as resonant 
today as fifty years ago.
David Elstein 
Visiting Professor in Broadcast Media, 
University of Oxford, 
Hilary Term 1999.
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Beveridge
23 February 1999
Fifty years ago last month, Herbert Morrison announced the 
setting up of a Committee of Inquiry into Broadcasting. It was 
to be chaired by Sir Cyril Radcliffe. But within a few months, Sir 
Cyril was elevated to the Court of Appeal as Lord Radcliffe. His 
replacement, Lord Beveridge – famed as the father of the Welfare 
State – was appointed in June 1949. 
The BBC was disappointed – Radcliffe had been deputy chairman 
of its General Advisory Council. Indeed, three years later, he 
spoke in a crucial House of Lords debate against the idea of 
commercial television. Yet Beveridge, too, had served on the 
BBC’s General Advisory Council in the 1930s. Certainly, when the 
Beveridge Report was finally published in January 1951, the BBC’s 
chairman, Lord Simon of Wythenshawe, noted that “we regarded 
the Report as a great victory; we assumed that our constitution 
would be continued, substantially unchanged".
Simon’s optimism was understandable: all but one member of 
the Beveridge Committee had upheld the BBC’s monopoly, and 
a majority firmly opposed commercial broadcasting. The White 
24 Paper in response to Beveridge took the same line. Yet barely 
four years later, ITV had been launched – what Lord Annan, in a 
subsequent inquiry into broadcasting, described as “the greatest 
of all changes in the nation’s broadcasting system".
How did this change come about? What does it tell us about the 
process of using committees of inquiry to manage change in 
broadcasting? And is it fair, in judging the reversal suffered by 
Beveridge, to dismiss his Report because “it settled precisely 
nothing” and its practical results were “negligible”, as does the 
official historian of the BBC, Asa Briggs?
In truth, all the post­war committees of inquiry were frustrated 
in large matters or small, either by changes in government or 
lack of support for their recommendations. What this series of 
lectures addresses is how, in the last 50 years, the structure of 
British broadcasting has been shaped by the interplay between 
the overt politics of Westminster and the mediated politics of a 
succession of independent inquiries, of which the first to report 
was Beveridge.
With Beveridge, the gap between intention and outcome was 
the largest, but the influence of the arguments rehearsed in 
its deliberations persisted long after publication. In particular, 
the issue of the BBC monopoly was resolved by Beveridge in 
a manner by no means as clear cut as Lord Simon might have 
wished. Three members of the committee, including Beveridge 
himself, were willing to support advertising on the BBC. And one 
member, the Conservative backbench MP Brigadier Selwyn Lloyd, 
wrote a dissenting opinion which can be read as a blueprint for 
much of what subsequently happened to British broadcasting.
At the time, little notice was taken of this minority report. As 
late as 1952, the BBC’s first post­war head of television, in a book 
assessing the first half century of broadcasting, failed to mention 
Selwyn Lloyd, and consigned his call for the BBC’s monopoly to be 
broken to a single parenthetical sentence.
25But Selwyn Lloyd found an echo amongst the Young Turks in 
his own parliamentary party, who swelled in number after the 
1950 and 1951 elections. When the Labour government collapsed 
before it could implement Beveridge’s majority view, the way 
was open for the minority report to capture the high ground. 
ITV may have been the unintended legacy of Beveridge: but it is 
nonetheless its legacy.
And Beveridge represents more than just a single outcome. It 
set the tone for nearly forty years of such major inquiries, whose 
existence, whose regularity of appointment and whose continuity 
of concerns would take on a larger significance collectively than 
each would have individually. 
For the system of committees of inquiry tells us much about the 
political structure of British broadcasting. It suggests there is an 
ideal method of organising broadcasting, which a group of the 
great and the good will be able to divine. It implies that this is a 
matter for the providers, not the users, of broadcasting to decide. 
It places broadcasting within a political framework, but appears 
to insulate it from direct political control. 
As we shall see from examining each of the post­war inquiries in 
turn, their pre­occupations subtly shift as society changes and 
as more spectrum becomes available. Indeed, each of the first 
three reports – Beveridge, Pilkington and Annan – led directly or 
indirectly to the creation of a new television channel. The last two 
– Hunt and Peacock – by contrast dealt with the implications of an 
end to spectrum scarcity. As that prospect becomes reality and 
as a consumer­driven version of broadcasting progressively dis­
places the provider­driven one, the role for committees of inquiry 
seems superfluous – there has been none since 1986. That too is 
part of the theme of these lectures. 
Yet just as spectrum scarcity – real or imagined – lingered long 
after most other forms of post­war rationing had disappeared, so 
the ideas associated with it prevailed deep into the second half of 
26 the century. Indeed, in my final lecture, I will show there is plenty 
of life left in them still.
The notion that radio spectrum is a scarce public asset, created 
by international agreements, and to be utilised for the public 
good, would have struck a sympathetic echo in the 1920s, when 
public corporations were already in fashion. John Reith’s mes­
sianic version of public service found a warm response as soon as 
he became the first general manager of the British Broadcasting 
Company, which had been set up in 1922 by a group of radio 
manufacturers eager to sell wireless sets. 
Reith himself sat on the first of the four pre­war committees 
dealing with broadcasting, chaired by Sir Frederick Sykes in 1923. 
The Sykes Report urged that broadcasting was such a powerful 
medium, control of it “ought to remain with the state". 
Three years later, the Crawford Report of 1926 recommended that 
the government should purchase all the shares in the BBC, and 
re­constitute it under Royal Charter, with the proviso that day­to­
day operations should remain free of ministerial direction. So the 
Company became a Corporation.
The Charter carried an obligation for political impartiality, but 
that had always been implicit in the Post Office broadcasting 
licence. As the senior Post Office witness to the Sykes Committee 
noted, the pre­Charter BBC could be as partisan as it wished, but 
if so, “I am quite sure that the Licence would never be renewed".
Indeed, the problem lay in the other direction. Reith had already 
shown himself willing in 1926 to throw the BBC’s support behind 
the government in the General Strike, once a hotly contested High 
Court judgement had been handed down ruling the strike illegal. 
His famous syllogism argued that “since the BBC was a national 
institution and since the government in the crisis were acting for 
the people…the BBC was for the government in the crisis too". 
The new arrangements suited Reith perfectly. The Charter 
forbade the BBC to accept advertising or sponsorship on its 
27programmes, so a potential source of commercial conflict with 
the press was avoided. He could now use the BBC’s de facto 
monopoly to pursue the social, cultural and religious purposes of 
broadcasting. As for deciding which politicians would be granted 
access to the airwaves, during the 1930s that could be safely left 
to the party leaders. Churchill was from time to time one of the 
victims of this process.
From 1937, there was an increase in the subvention to the BBC to 
cover the costs of the overseas service that Reith had launched 
five years earlier, so clearly was it seen to be meeting Foreign 
Office objectives. State interests were steadily entrenched, along­
side the BBC itself. 
In truth, that had always been the case. The highest priority 
users of broadcast spectrum were state institutions – defence, 
navigation, emergency services. There are commentators who 
point to the role played by the armed services and the Post 
Office in initially allocating spectrum. They note the convenience 
in terms of monitoring potential subversion of having just one 
broadcast licensee, and also of requiring receiving households to 
have licences – which was certainly not a technical necessity, nor, 
when broadcasting started, the only way of funding the service. 
So although the BBC’s monopoly status was nowhere officially 
enshrined, and the Post Office could always license another 
broadcaster, in practice there was little likelihood of this: 
monopoly was the preferred political and administrative out­
come. In 1935, the Selsdon Committee, almost without thinking, 
allocated television to the BBC, as well as radio. In 1936, the Ulls­
water Committee – chaired, to Reith’s disgust, by an octogenarian 
– renewed the BBC’s Charter for another ten years. It also 
responded to a plea from the BBC’s General Advisory Council, 
signed by Beveridge amongst others, to impose on the radio relay 
services used by many poorer households as an alternative to 
individual wireless sets, a requirement that BBC services take 
precedence over any others, if there were capacity limitations. 
28 A further reflection of the close co­operation between state 
and broadcaster was the willingness of successive governments 
to support the BBC’s campaign against foreign broadcasters 
targeting British listeners, of which the two most prominent were 
Radio Luxembourg and Radio Normandie. So unappealing to 
listeners was programming offered by the BBC on Sundays that 
these stations claimed to attract half as many listeners as the 
BBC itself. The BBC asserted such stations were pirates operating 
illegally – but its clear intention in campaigning against them was 
to block competition, not to uphold the law.
During the war, the BBC identified itself even more closely with 
the national interest. It also discovered that the entertain­
ment shows on its new Forces Network were listened to by far 
more people than the more solemn offerings on its National 
Programme. After the war, these became the Light Programme 
and the Home Service respectively, and were joined in September 
1946 by the austerely cultural Third Programme. 
The change of government in 1945 challenged many old 
assumptions. Yet the BBC found the new administration far 
from hostile. Television was re­started, though resources were 
so scarce that tight limits were placed on capital expenditure. 
A White Paper promised action to “prevent the direction of 
commercial broadcasts to this country from abroad". There were 
expectations of an early and lengthy renewal of the BBC’s Licence 
and Charter. Yet there were some worrying straws in the wind.
Sir Frederick Ogilvie, Reith’s successor as BBC director­general 
wrote to The Times in June 1946 on the day of major Lords debate 
on the future of broadcasting: “a monopoly of broadcasting,” he 
insisted, “is inevitably the negation of freedom".
At the same time in the Commons, Winston Churchill himself 
called for renewal of the BBC’s Charter to be submitted to a 
joint select committee of both houses, and found over 200 
MPs signing his motion to that effect. Churchill’s close ally, the 
wartime Minister of Information Brendan Bracken, warned 
29against “perpetuating a monopoly which will cramp the great 
potentialities of broadcasting".
Under growing pressure, the Labour Government that had 
announced it would renew the Charter for ten years without any 
inquiry, now conceded a five­year extension only, with an inquiry 
at an unspecified date. Three years later – during which time the 
BBC’s monopoly could have been confirmed with little opposition 
– the Beveridge Committee was finally appointed. This cut deeply 
into the subsequent room for manoeuvre by both the BBC and 
the government, with far­reaching consequences.
Beveridge prided himself on chairing the first “thorough” inquiry 
into broadcasting. Sykes, Crawford, Selsdon and Ullswater spent 
on average just six months between appointment and report. 
Their total cost was less than £1,500. The Beveridge Report took 18 
months from appointment to publication, and cost over £15,000. 
The Committee met 62 times, and received 368 submissions.
Of all the evidence Beveridge received, 40% came from the BBC. 
Far from having modified its ambitions or attitudes after Reith’s 
departure in 1938, the BBC of the late 1940s was a supremely self­
confident organisation. It broadcast 37 hours a day of radio on its 
three services, and 4 hours of television. It enjoyed wide popular 
support and an income of over ten million pounds a year. The 
Radio Times sold eight million copies a week.
The Third Programme perhaps epitomised the BBC’s lofty ide­
alism. It attracted just 1% of radio listening. It was designed, said 
the BBC, “to broadcast, without regard to length or difficulty, the 
masterpieces of music, art and letters". Even Reith, in his own 
evidence to Beveridge, thought that the Third Programme was “a 
waste of a precious wavelength”, because “much of its matter is 
too limited in appeal". Beveridge remarked waspishly that “the 
Third Programme, since it began, has lost numbers of audience 
rather than gained them". Mischievously, he noted that although 
“the Charter lists the purposes of broadcasting in order as 
information, education and entertainment, the vast majority of 
30 listeners put these purposes in a different order, with entertain­
ment first".
The BBC was dismissive of populism. For its first fifteen years, 
it turned its back on regular audience research, and it told 
Beveridge of the cardinal principle that research must be a 
servant and never the master of broadcasting. “Even if it revealed 
that a majority of the public were opposed to a policy which was 
being pursued by the BBC in a particular matter, or disliked a 
series of broadcasts which was on the air, that would not in itself 
be considered a valid reason why the policy should be reversed 
or the programmes withdrawn".
A decade later, the Pilkington Committee would plunge happily 
into the argument over whether broadcasters should provide 
what audiences wanted or what was good for them. The more 
cautious Beveridge contented himself with the Reithian dictum 
that programmes should be designed “not to meet but to ante­
date the popular vote".
The BBC’s director­general at this time, Sir William Haley, had a 
much grander vision, of radio serving a pyramid of taste aspiring 
ever upwards. In evidence to Beveridge, the BBC stated its 
conviction “that only within the framework of three alternative 
programmes can its ideal of a public service of broadcasting be 
realised. It is an essential part of the aim to encourage listeners 
to move freely within the framework of the three services so that 
an interest first aroused in the one can be followed up and more 
fully satisfied in another. Only so can the level of taste be raised. 
If the public service of broadcasting is to be effective, it must 
remain a monopoly".
For Reith it boiled down to a simple assertion: only “the brute 
force of monopoly” could deliver the BBC’s social purpose. This 
was the phrase that set Selwyn Lloyd’s teeth on edge – “I am not 
attracted to the idea of compulsory uplift achieved by the brute 
force of monopoly". Selwyn Lloyd was not alone in finding the 
manipulative model of broadcasting unattractive.
31For instance, Beveridge claimed not to understand the attempts 
to thwart foreign radio stations, indulge as they might in “giving 
betting news and football pool results”, which he regarded as 
even less desirable than commercial broadcasts. He noted that 
Radio Luxembourg forbade jokes about the Royal Family and 
Members of Parliament, and failed to comment on the BBC’s 
claim that such stations were pirates.
Moreover, said Beveridge, “most of us are opposed” to the BBC’s 
new bid to force 4­channel radio relay stations to carry all three 
BBC services. Although he had shown his own colours on this 
issue to the Ullswater Committee, he generously summarised the 
majority view: “It is not certain that a listener who on grounds 
of reception or to suit his own personal convenience prefers the 
relay system should be tied down even as much as he is now 
to the BBC programmes, and we see no reason for making this 
limitation closer".
Beveridge did nearly all his own drafting, indulging himself with 
obscure criticisms of the BBC’s failure to consult the right experts 
in its coverage of the Wordsworth Centenary – he meant, of 
course, himself! He speculated on whether the BBC’s powerful 
commitment to Christianity was in breach of the requirement 
for impartiality on controversial matters. He even whimsically 
wondered whether the BBC was “it” or “they” – “we have to 
determine". 
He chided the BBC for claiming that all the pre­war committees 
of inquiry had supported the BBC monopoly – pointing out 
that Sykes had opposed in principle and Ullswater had never 
addressed the issue, though conceding the argument in practice. 
But he also acknowledged that the largest of the fundamental 
issues his Committee faced was indeed “the Issue of Monopoly”, 
capital I, capital M.
At the very heart of the Beveridge Report is the 8­page section 
on monopoly. The issue is also at the heart of the BBC’s evidence. 
The debate covered three key areas. Whether the BBC was too 
32 large and dominating, inhibiting creative freedom and regional 
voices. Whether the BBC was too slow to develop television, 
which should be freed from the dead hand of radio. And whether 
monopoly was wrong in principle in a democratic society.
Surprisingly, the witnesses who opposed monopoly were few 
in number. They were also remarkably thin in their arguments. 
Advertisers were divided as to the merits of commercial broad­
casting, as were even the advertising agencies. Indeed, most 
agencies would have been happy to leave broadcasting to the 
BBC, provided it accepted advertisements. The two most elab­
orate submissions came from the Liberal Research Group, partly 
supported by the Fabians, and from a pair of political com­
mentators, Geoffrey Crowther and Robert Watson­Watt.
The Liberals described the BBC as probably “the biggest single 
bureaucracy in the world concerned with the propagation of 
ideas". Like the Fabians, the Liberals opposed monopoly in 
principle, but held back from proposing full­scale competitive 
commercial broadcasting. Their preferred solution was to leave 
radio untouched but to finance television in part by allowing 
carefully­controlled sponsorship.
Crowther and Watson­Watt developed a proposal that Crow­
ther had first advanced in The Economist during the war: “the 
only ultimate safeguard of liberty lies in diversity". Because they 
opposed commercial funding of broadcasting, they proposed 
dividing the BBC into three corporations, adding the curious 
notion that the licence fee be divided into four, with each mini­
corporation taking a quarter, and the most successful receiving 
the balance.
The BBC found this easy meat: “there is no need to ask whether 
(the bonus) would be voted to the corporation providing the most 
worthwhile broadcasting or to that giving the best forecasts 
for football pools". And the BBC went on to oppose sponsored 
programming, the separation of television – indeed, any breach in 
the edifice of monopoly.
33Not surprisingly, the BBC cited Gresham’s Law: “The good, in 
the long run, will inescapably be driven out by the bad". Indeed, 
any element of competition, commercial or otherwise, must be 
resisted: in the inevitable “fight for the greatest possible number 
of listeners, it would be the lower forms of mass appetite which 
would be more and more catered for in programmes…This is not 
merely a matter of BBC versus commercial broadcasting. Even if 
there were a number of public service corporations they would all 
be similarly and involuntarily driven down".
It was not just competition the BBC abhorred, but any element 
of commercialism. “All experience,” said the BBC, “is against the 
belief that sponsoring has any interest in covering the whole 
programme field". Moreover, if any broadcaster is funded by 
sponsorship, it “would tend inevitably to have an adverse effect 
on the programme standards of the public service". Even “the 
incursion of the film industry into television production would 
be contrary to the long­term interest of the public". Competition 
between unfettered commercial interests and a public service 
corporation with obligations would “not be fair competition".
The BBC – presaging an issue that would still be open forty 
years later – warned that “big fights would be staged before a 
comparatively small audience paying ‘ring­side’ prices and tele­
vised to a group of cinemas paying an exclusive price for the tele­
vision rights". Such damaging pursuit of exclusivity was actually 
attempted, noted the BBC, “in the case of the newsreels for the 
Olympic Games” in 1948. 
“If the public service of broadcasting is to be effective,” concluded 
the BBC, “it must remain a monopoly…It is vital to the public inter­
est that the monopoly of both sound and television broadcasting 
be preserved”, so as to protect impartiality, standards, regard for 
values, education, the arts, the raising of public taste, true citizen­
ship and the leading of a full life. Only good health seems to have 
been left off the list.
34 In the end, it was one of the Beveridge Committee’s own 
members, Selwyn Lloyd, who most cogently put the argument 
against monopoly control of such a powerful means of com­
munication: “I cannot agree that it is in the public interest that all 
this actual and potential influence should be invested in a private 
or public monopoly…the only effective safeguard is competition 
from independent sources. Without that competition the basic 
evils and dangers of monopoly will remain".
Selwyn Lloyd concentrated on the BBC’s sheer size – it had grown 
from 2,500 employees at the time of Ullswater in 1935 to nearly 
12,000 in 1950. For all workers in broadcasting to have just one 
employer, and for that employer to have such excessive power, 
struck him as “the negation of freedom and democracy". He was 
also critical of the BBC’s slow development of both VHF radio and 
television. With committee colleagues, he had visited America, 
and observed that New Yorkers had access to 45 radio channels 
and 7 television ones.
Selwyn Lloyd was content to retain a public service network: but 
he set it within a radical new structure. He wanted a broadcasting 
commission to set overall standards and rules. The licence­
funded BBC could continue in radio, but he wanted additional 
national radio stations that could accept advertisements, as 
well as local stations. Television would come under a separate 
corporation, the BTC, with permission to accept advertisements. 
When frequencies became available, competitive channels could 
be created, allowing the BTC to revert to licence­fee funding if so 
desired.
He concluded that
the present time, when television is young and VHF broad­
casting has not begun, is the most suitable for a change. 
If the opportunity is not taken now, and if it should recur, 
the task of breaking the monopoly will be many times more 
difficult.
35To our present eyes, the Selwyn Lloyd model looks both familiar 
and uncontroversial. For seven of his colleagues, however, it 
was a recipe for disaster. They were much influenced by a BBC 
witness’s fears about the “frightening rate” at which talent was 
being swallowed by television. They concluded that “multiplying 
programmes will simply spread our already strained supply of 
talent the more thinly” – again, a familiar lament from the current 
debate over the rapid expansion of channels.
The seven hard­liners believed the case against what they called 
“sponsoring” was “overwhelming” – a “fantastic” price to pay for 
an “unworthy product…Judgement in favour of the BBC is so clear 
as to be obvious to all who examine the facts". 
But it was not so obvious to Beveridge himself who, together 
with Lady Megan Lloyd George and Mrs Mary Stocks, submitted 
a separate minority note. They were willing to support spot 
advertisements on the BBC – as opposed to sponsored pro­
grammes – in order to fund the development of television. They 
saw a big difference between sponsorship – where the advertiser 
could directly influence programme content – and advertising 
spots, especially if these were broadcast in a block (which later 
became the practice in Germany). They cited the BBC’s million 
pound annual revenue from the Radio Times as evidence of the 
Corporation’s ability to live with commercial customers.
With this modest nod to heresy, Beveridge then assembled 
the full Committee – other than Selwyn Lloyd – behind his final 
conclusions on competition and monopoly. To appease his 
hard­liners, he offered a rhetorical Reithian flourish, urging 
that any competition should be in quality of service, not in 
pursuit of listeners. “To make broadcast programmes directly 
and automatically dependent on the preferences expressed 
by listeners would be contrary to the pursuit of the highest 
social purpose of broadcasting, which in the last resort is one of 
education".
36 He then found a way of ducking the principled issue by reference 
to the physical limitations on broadcast spectrum. He confidently 
asserted that technical advances would not “open the prospect, 
in any near future if ever, of free and open competition of broad­
casting stations". And he offered a similarly pragmatic response 
to the main critics of monopoly who urged a division of the 
existing Corporation. He simply pointed out that the increased 
cost of such separation delivered too few advantages to be jus­
tified. Moreover, if there were dangers in the monopolistic control 
of scarce spectrum, safeguards could more readily and consis­
tently be installed in a single corporation than in several.
The narrow ground on which he constructed his fudge put a 
strain on the Report’s language. Despite his personal views on 
advertising, he faithfully reflected the majority view in arguing 
that sponsorship should never be allowed to take over the main 
financing of broadcasting – “if the people of any country want 
broadcasting for its own sake they must be prepared to pay for 
it". 
At the same time, although ten of the Committee’s eleven 
members rejected “as a guiding principle in broadcasting 
competition for numbers of listeners”, Beveridge called in 
evidence the example of universities to conclude: “We do not 
accept that the only alternative to monopoly is degrading 
competition for listeners and that in broadcasting a monopoly 
alone can have high standards and social purpose". Having 
persuaded his hard­liners to accept such a formulation, 
Beveridge can at least be credited with creating the intellectual 
groundwork for the regulated form of commercial broadcasting 
that eventually emerged.
But such a concept was not on the agenda in 1950, except for 
Selwyn Lloyd. Instead, Beveridge concentrated on the short­
term justification of the BBC’s de facto monopoly and funding 
arrangements. Within that context, the prime issue was how to 
constrain the power of the BBC hierarchy. 
37For Beveridge, the main safeguard against the dangers of 
monopoly lay in an elaborate scheme for devolving power within 
the BBC to the regions. In addition, he wanted a means for the 
BBC Governors to by­pass the board of management and find 
out directly what the public thought of the BBC. He also urged a 
regular five­yearly review of the BBC’s operations. These were 
the means for the Committee to answer its own question: “Can 
we without direct Parliamentary control prevent a chartered 
monopoly for broadcasting from becoming an uncontrolled 
bureaucracy?”
All these proposals ran into opposition from the BBC – not sur­
prisingly, given that they challenged the tight centrist control and 
independence from the Governors that BBC management had 
built up over nearly thirty years. Even the most token of criticisms 
from Beveridge – that the BBC might at long last appoint a sep­
arate Director of Television to the board of management – was 
only grudgingly conceded. Yet these issues of devolved power 
came to have crucial tactical significance.
Indeed, the BBC’s chairman, Lord Simon, laid the blame for the 
failure by the Labour government to implement Beveridge’s main 
finding that the BBC’s Charter be renewed on the dispute over 
Beveridge’s recommendation for broadcasting commissions in 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. 
The truth is that by 1951, Labour – already weakened in the pre­
vious year’s election – was on its last legs, and broadcasting was 
a low priority. Stafford Cripps had resigned in October 1950, there 
were major parliamentary defeats over iron and steel, and Nye 
Bevan led a revolt against the new Chancellor’s imposition of 
prescription charges. Prime Minister Attlee was laid low for five 
weeks by a duodenal ulcer, and ill­health finally forced Ernie Bevin 
to relinquish the Foreign Office to his old rival Herbert Morrison 
in March 1951. For a month, Bevin himself was dealing with broad­
casting matters, as Lord Privy Seal, before he died in April 1951. 
His replacement as spokesman, the much more junior Patrick 
38 Gordon­Walker, was pre­occupied as Commonwealth Secretary 
by the Seretse Khama affair.
Belatedly, in July, the government issued a White Paper in 
response to Beveridge, floating a notion – deeply unwelcome 
to the BBC – of local councillors sitting on the proposed broad­
casting commissions. If the BBC had swallowed the Beveridge 
Report whole immediately on publication, perhaps its Charter 
could have been renewed promptly and with little opposition. 
Now it was all too hard, and the government had lost both inter­
est and will. As late as August 1951, the BBC’s director­general 
appealed to Gordon­Walker in vain for renewal. In September, the 
election was announced. In October, Labour were out.
Meanwhile, the BBC had made a crucial tactical error. During 
the Beveridge hearings, the BBC had been somewhat unfairly 
criticised for dragging its feet in developing television. In fact, 
government restrictions on capital expenditure had limited 
what the BBC could do. The BBC argued to Beveridge that it was 
devoting 20% of its resources to television, even though just 3% of 
its revenue came from television licences. Beveridge disapproved 
of this subsidy, on grounds of social equity: “those destined to 
remain for a long period or indefinitely outside the range of tele­
vision ought not in our view be required to pay for it” – an inter­
esting comment in the light of the BBC’s later investment in BBC2 
and current investment in new digital channels.
Beveridge even proposed that “advances” from radio to television 
be repaid in due course. But the biggest single point of pressure 
was that television lacked a director, and was only represented 
on the board of management through the home broadcasting 
directorate. In October 1950, whilst the Beveridge Report was 
still being drafted, the BBC belatedly appointed a Director of 
Television, but chose to pass over the obvious candidate, Norman 
Collins, the Controller of Television, because he was not seen as 
board­of­management material. Instead, the job went to George 
Barnes, who luxuriated in the titles of Controller of the Third 
39Programme and Director of the Spoken Word. Such was the BBC 
in 1950.
Collins promptly resigned, and became the most important 
single figure in the ensuing three­year campaign to end the BBC’s 
monopoly. The BBC’s chairman, Lord Simon, was to concede that 
“if we hadn’t fired Collins there would be no commercial television 
now” – curiously forgetting that Collins had not actually been 
fired. He later became deputy chairman of one of the first ITV 
franchises, ATV.
Collins linked up with two groups – commercial interests in the 
shape of the advertising and TV set manufacturing industries, 
and a dedicated group of backbench Conservative MPs who had 
taken over the principled argument set out by Selwyn Lloyd. 
This group had been greatly strengthened by the two elections 
that had brought over a hundred new Conservatives into the 
Commons. The most prominent of these were John Rodgers, with 
strong advertising connections, Ian Orr­Ewing, whose business 
interests embraced TV set manufacture, and John Profumo, who 
became chairman of the influential Broadcasting Study Group 
of Conservative MPs, created in 1951. The group’s secretary 
was Mark Chapman­Walker, who, remarkably, doubled as chief 
propagandist at Conservative Central Office under the chairman­
ship of Lord Woolton, who served as Churchill’s cabinet fixer. 
Chapman­Walker was another future deputy chairman of an ITV 
franchise. 
The Conservatives had won the election without any mention 
of broadcasting in their manifesto. Only three cabinet members 
favoured a commercial system. The new Postmaster General 
announced a short­term extension of the BBC Charter. Then 
party battle commenced.
Support for the BBC and public service broadcasting was strong, 
so the insurgents – who were always a minority in their party – 
concentrated on a sponsored television service as an addition 
to the BBC’s provision, initially using the BBC’s own transmitters 
40 during their down time. Their tactic worked. Woolton calculated 
that the supporters of the BBC he had to placate would be con­
tent with a compromise that protected the BBC’s monopoly in 
radio – which, after all, was the dominant medium – but allowed 
competition in television. That was the position announced in his 
White Paper of May 1952.
He was greeted, at least in the House of Lords, with howls of 
rage. Lord Radcliffe – who by now had rejoined the BBC’s General 
Advisory Council as chairman – described commercial tele­
vision as “too dangerous a hazard” to risk. Lord Hailsham saw 
the White Paper as a betrayal of the BBC and of the purpose of 
broadcasting. Lord Reith famously fulminated that someone had 
introduced Christianity into England, “and somebody introduced 
smallpox, bubonic plague and the Black Death. Somebody is now 
minded to introduce sponsored broadcasting".
The General Advisory Council had met the day before the debate 
for what Lord Brabazon, a consistent critic of monopoly, called a 
“pep talk” from the BBC’s director­general and the chairman. Sev­
enteen peers spoke in opposition to the government. More than 
half were closely connected with the BBC.
The government retreated, with its spokesmen in both houses 
suggesting that any form of competition was some years away. 
But perhaps the most significant development of that month 
was Patrick Gordon­Walker’s response to the further renewal of 
the BBC’s Charter and Licence. He committed the Labour Party 
to restoring monopoly if the Conservatives pressed ahead with 
introducing competition – a pledge repeated by his party leader 
the following year. This made it virtually impossible for any pro­
BBC majority in the Commons to emerge, as it might have done 
on a free vote. The decisive debate would now be within the Con­
servative Party, whose whips would impose the outcome.
The final battle was fought through 1953. Christopher Mayhew, a 
Labour MP and experienced broadcaster, strongly committed to 
the BBC’s cause, created the National Television Council, aided by 
41such luminaries as Lord Simon and Lady Violet Bonham Carter. 
The Council’s inauguration was announced in The Times – now 
edited by former BBC director­general Sir William Haley – in June 
1952, immediately after the coronation, which for the first time 
had seen the television audience outnumbering that for radio.
Just as significantly, the BBC’s triumphant coverage had been 
re­transmitted in the United States, often with advertising inter­
spersed, despite agreements with the BBC to the contrary. One 
broadcaster, NBC, even used a chimpanzee called J Fred Muggs 
on air, much to Mayhew’s glee. Within a month came the latest 
announcement of government plans, containing the feeble 
commitment that “competitive television might be permitted to 
operate". The Daily Express promptly proclaimed that “commercial 
television died yesterday".
The Express, like most newspapers with the exception of the 
Daily Mirror, was vocal in its hostility to commercial television. 
Other open critics included cinema and theatre interests, such 
as Granada, ABC (Associated British Corporation) and the major 
unions, NATKE (National Association of Theatrical Television and 
Kine) and what later became the ACTT (Association of Cinemat­
ograph Television and Allied Technicians). All of these opponents 
were, of course, soon to be greatly enriched by the breaking of 
the BBC monopoly.
The commercial lobby fought back, with the advertisers and 
Conservative Central Office setting up a Popular Television 
Association, which managed to attract such supporters as the 
historian AJP Taylor, the journalist Malcolm Muggeridge and the 
cricketer Alec Bedser. 
Finally, the deal was done. Party managers headed off potential 
revolts in the Lords by imposing a regulator on the new 
commercial system with enough public funding to build a sep­
arate transmission network, and by restricting advertising to 
spots, not sponsors – just as Beveridge’s own minority report had 
proposed.
42 The Conservative backbench group was horrified. The last thing 
they had wanted was a kind of junior BBC, as they termed the 
future regulatory body. But the tactic worked, with only 87 peers 
voting against the plan, despite Lord Hailsham’s impassioned 
attack on what he described as “a shabby and squalid con­
stitutional error” in betraying the BBC without putting the issue 
to the electorate in the form of a manifesto pledge.
In July 1954, the Independent Television Act was passed, and in 
September 1955, ITV was launched to just 370,000 homes whose 
television sets were capable of receiving the new service. By con­
trast, eight million people listened that night to BBC radio’s most 
popular serial to hear its lead character, Grace Archer, die in a 
fire. This burnt sacrifice – designed months in advance as a stunt 
to divert attention from ITV’s first night – seemed to fulfil the 
BBC’s own gloomy prognostications about the negative effects of 
competition.
Did the Beveridge Report also perish in the blaze? In just over 
three years, the changes in the political climate had been so 
sharp that they left the Report’s main conclusions in their wake. 
As austerity gave way to modest affluence, Conservative instincts 
more accurately reflected the public mood.
By contrast, Beveridge was a creature of its time, trapped in 
the constricted assumptions of the 1940s, just as Britain was 
emerging from its pre­war shell. With our fifty years of hindsight, 
we might even identify as Beveridge’s biggest omission the failure 
to switch – as urged by the likes of Lord Brabazon – from a 405­
line system to a 625­line system at an opportunely early moment. 
A generation of consumers paid the price for that lack of vision. 
Even so, Beveridge was a seminal moment in the development 
of the political structure of British broadcasting. The Report 
focused the argument over monopoly for the first time. It was 
published just as television emerged from the shadows of radio – 
and even that wily fox Lord Woolton failed to register television’s 
true significance. It exposed issues of the BBC’s governance that 
43remain unresolved today, as the debate over the Scottish Six 
O’clock News demonstrates.
More importantly, it set the tone and the framework for all the 
reports that succeeded it, for ill or for good. Even if the answers 
it provided were rejected, it offered confirmation that an orderly 
and regulated structure for broadcasting could be created by the 
political process. And within five years of ITV’s launch, another 
committee of inquiry would be set up which effectively concluded 
that Beveridge had been right all along. Pilkington’s scathing 
indictment of ITV is the subject of the next lecture.
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At the beginning of 1951, when the Beveridge Report on the 
future of broadcasting was published, 85% of UK households 
held BBC licences. The number of sound­only licences was 11.68 
million, whilst combined radio and television licences amounted 
to less than 600,000. A decade later, 95% of UK households pos­
sessed BBC licences, but the proportions had been dramatically 
reversed. In 1961, the level of combined licences was 11.66 million, 
whilst sound­only licences numbered just 3.66 million.
The broadcasting world had been transformed by a twin rev­
olution. In the words of the 1962 Pilkington Report, television 
that had taken over the “compulsive element” from radio. 
But just as the balance of power and spending within the BBC 
thereby shifted, so the introduction of commercial television in 
1955 changed broadcasting irrevocably. The last opportunity to 
forestall ITV had passed when the Labour Party lost the 1955 
election. By the time of the 1959 election, Labour’s leader, Hugh 
Gaitskell, had reluctantly conceded: “commercial television has 
come to stay".
46 ITV had survived a problematic birth. On its first night, fewer 
than 5% of homes with televisions could see the infant service. 
BBC Television scheduled The Donald Duck Story against ITV’s 
opening night coverage of its own white­tie launch banquet 
at the Guildhall. The BBC’s burnt sacrifice of Grace Archer – to 
the horror of a radio audience that dwarfed any for a television 
programme that night – smacked a little of overkill.
Yet within weeks, those homes equipped with both television 
services showed overwhelming preference for the newcomer. As 
the BBC’s Head of Audience Research painstakingly explained to 
the Governors the elementary principles of competitive sched­
uling – such as regular weekly series – ITV swiftly introduced 
Double Your Money, I Love Lucy, Sunday Night At The London 
Palladium, Dragnet, Take Your Pick and Robin Hood. In dual­channel 
homes, ITV rapidly captured more than 60% of viewing, and all 
ten top places in the weekly list of most­watched programmes.
A BBC relay of a performance of La Boheme managed to secure 
just 2% of dual­channel viewers against ITV’s Val Parnell’s Star 
Night. Along with hundreds of trained personnel, the BBC also 
started losing programmes to ITV – of which the first was Muffin 
the Mule. But even these successes for ITV, coupled with the rapid 
spread of its transmitters and coverage, could not disguise the 
early financial losses suffered by the pioneering commercial con­
tractors appointed by the Independent Television Authority, the 
ITA.
Within six months, the biggest company, Associated­Rediffusion, 
was facing a cumulative deficit of nearly £5 million. One of its 
shareholders, Associated Newspapers, sold most of its stake to 
its partner, Rediffusion, at a heavy discount. Rediffusion took one 
of their own programme titles literally, doubling their stake in ITV 
by secretly underwriting the losses of Granada Television for its 
first four years. 
ITV’s regulator, the ITA, had planned to create competitive 
franchises in each transmission area. Shortage of frequencies 
47prevented this, so the ITA carved up the days of the week 
between contractors in different areas, so as to generate 
competition and diversity. The ITV companies responded with 
a carve­up of their own. To reduce the financial pressure on 
them, they persuaded the ITA to tolerate a system of cost­
sharing whereby all the programmes the largest four companies 
produced were transmitted across the whole network at pre­
agreed prices. 
Also, seizing the moment of greatest perceived financial danger, 
ITV evicted from peak­time much of the serious programming to 
which it was committed. In February 1956, 90 minutes of Hamlet 
had managed to push a BBC programme – What’s My Line – into 
the Top Ten for the first time in five months. It was not a mistake 
ITV intended to repeat.
The turning point came in mid­1956, as it became clear that 
advertisers judged ITV a success and started voting with their 
wallets. By the time the contractor for Central Scotland launched, 
its proprietor, Canadian newspaperman Roy Thomson, could 
describe his ITV station as “a licence to print your own money".
By 1958, when the BBC was spending just £14 million on tele­
vision, ITV’s revenue was nearly £50 million. The profit margin 
was 60% of revenue. At ATV, where Norman Collins, former BBC 
Controller of Television was now ensconced, the shares had multi­
plied in value 220 times in just three years. Collins – in Asa Briggs’ 
memorable phrase, now one of the BBC’s “most intelligent, 
talented, determined and deeply detested adversaries” – had 
extracted a rich revenge. But the power of television, the level of 
profits, and the publication of a book – Professor Wilson’s Pres-
sure Group – demonstrating how a well­organised minority in the 
Conservative Party had squeezed ITV into existence, all combined 
to invite the inevitable backlash. 
The first set of ITV contracts was due to expire in 1964. The 
BBC’s Charter was extended by two years to match this expiry 
date – a decision that seemed to beg the creation of a successor 
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Macmillan was reluctant to take that step ahead of the 1959 
election, and it took some pressure from his Postmaster General 
Reginald Bevins before an announcement was finally made to the 
Commons in July 1960.
Bizarrely, one of the three names considered by Macmillan for 
chairmanship of the committee was Lord Radcliffe, who had 
been forced to stand down in favour of Lord Beveridge in 1949. 
In the end, the choice fell on the glass manufacturer, Sir Harry 
Pilkington, who had just completed a three­year stint chairing a 
Royal Commission on the pay of doctors and dentists. 
In September, the committee’s membership was announced. 
There were no politicians – the practice of appointing MPs of all 
parties to such committees had died out in the 1950s. Instead, the 
emphasis was on trade unionists, women, and representatives 
of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. There were gestures 
to popular taste, with the inclusion of the former England soccer 
captain, Billy Wright, and the comedienne Joyce Grenfell. Two of 
the more imaginative appointees – industrialist Sir Jock Campbell 
and theatre director Peter Hall – resigned fairly swiftly. But the 
name that came to be associated most closely with the Pilkington 
Report – more so even than its chairman – was Richard Hoggart: 
educationist, socialist, and author of the immensely influential 
study of the roots of working class culture, The Uses Of Literacy.
Hoggart became best known to the wider public as a defence wit­
ness in the trial of Penguin Books over the publication in paper­
back of Lady Chatterley’s Lover. His combination of earthiness, 
eloquence and high moral tone undoubtedly strongly influenced 
the Pilkington Report’s language and conclusions. Hoggart’s 
starting position could be gauged by an article he had published 
early in 1960, in which he described ITV’s programmes as looking 
“nicely acceptable – but whose texture is as little that of a good 
life as processed bread is like home­made bread". That Hoggart 
found a soulmate in the Committee’s secretary, Dennis Lawrence, 
49ensured that the Report would be imbued throughout with an 
earnestness that many of its readers found instantly repellent.
The Pilkington Report took 23 months from announcement to 
publication. It received 852 submissions in all, and met 78 times. 
Its cost, at £45,000, was three times that of Beveridge – as much 
a measure of inflation as of multiplication of work. Its number 
of recommendations, at 120, showed a more modest advance on 
Beveridge’s 100.
Pilkington’s terms of reference were to consider the future – and 
financing – of broadcasting and of the bodies providing it within 
the UK, namely the ITA and the BBC. This effectively ensured the 
future of these organisations, which was perhaps just as well, 
given the ominous tone of the Report’s third paragraph, which 
noted with seeming regret that our “terms of reference preclude 
us from recommending that broadcasting should again be a 
monopoly".
If Pilkington stopped short of such a draconian step, he 
nonetheless put forward – in his 43rd recommendation – a 
succinct proposal for the radical overhaul of ITV. If implemented, 
in the view of Bevins, it would have “destroyed commercial 
television". That this core proposal failed to find political favour 
did not, however, mean that the Report could be dismissed, 
in the way Beveridge was by some, as an irrelevance. Many 
of Pilkington’s recommendations were implemented, with 
important consequences – the creation of BBC2, the switch to 
colour, the change from 405­line transmission to 625­line, the 
allocation of local radio to the BBC, the rejection of subscription 
television, the continuation of the licence fee and the delay in 
using the fourth channel. 
Just as importantly, the spirit of recommendation 43 proved 
remarkably resilient. Its influence on the final shaping of Channel 
4 may not be obvious to most commentators, especially as two 
decades were to pass between Pilkington’s publication and 
Channel 4’s launch; but it was real. And Pilkington’s language, 
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tinctive note which is instantly recognisable, even 37 years after 
first reading.
Pilkington very self­consciously placed himself in the tradition of 
committees of inquiry. “Since 1923, new and impending devel­
opments have from time to time required a fresh examination 
of the principles of broadcasting by a succession of independent 
committees. As a Committee, we take our place in the succes­
sion". Indeed, when recommending extending the BBC’s Charter 
and the life of the ITA for a further twelve years, Pilkington was 
calculating the timing of his successor’s appointment.
But in one crucial respect, Pilkington inflicted serious damage on 
the credibility of the committee­of­inquiry system. He took the 
submissions from witnesses as objective evidence. Worse still, he 
disingenuously attributed his findings to the evidence submitted. 
The Report claimed to have started with “no general doctrine, no 
pre­conceived principles”: “our approach has…been empirical". 
Yet Dennis Lawrence, the Committee’s secretary, had issued to 
its members before they met position papers which made key 
assumptions about the social significance of broadcasting. These 
underpinned the crucial third chapter of the Report, on “The 
Purposes of Broadcasting” – itself, curiously enough, drafted 
after the Committee’s main recommendations had been reached, 
contrary to the clear impression left by the Report.
That most of the evidence Pilkington received came from self­
selected groups and was inevitably subjective seemed not to 
have occurred to the Committee. Professor Richard Rose under­
standably criticised the Report because “it asserted that tele­
vision is ‘of profound social significance’ without any empirical 
evidence to support so controversial a hypothesis". Pilkington did 
receive submissions from the social scientists Hilde Himmelweit 
and Hans Eysenck, but commissioned no research of its own. 
When it was pointed out to the Committee that people could 
always switch off their sets, and that it may not be “of great 
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noted: “we found this last a deflating thought".
Pilkington’s many conclusions flowed logically from its core 
presumption. “Our own judgement, after weighing such evidence 
as is available, leads us to a clear conclusion. It is that…unless 
and until there is unmistakable proof to the contrary, the 
presumption must be that television is and will be a main factor 
in influencing the values and moral standards of our society".
Three other a priori judgements underpinned Pilkington’s 
thinking. First, the nature of broadcasting spectrum was such 
that “since the frequency space available to broadcasting is 
limited, it is essential that what is available should be used to best 
advantage". The Report noted that “a control which derives from 
the need to ensure the orderly use of scarce frequencies – and is 
thus technical in its purpose – is applied here for reasons which 
are essentially social". 
Secondly, in the belief that broadcasting “should not be left to 
the ordinary processes of commercial enterprise” nor “under­
taken by the state”, Pilkington warmly endorsed the public 
corporation model. To complete the central structure of the 
argument, Pilkington simply asserted that “the duty of the 
public corporations has been, and remains, to bring to public 
awareness the whole range of worthwhile, significant activity and 
experience".
Upon this base of non­sequential arguments, Pilkington mounted 
a formidable array of definitions of good broadcasting and how 
it was to be achieved. “Broadcasting”, he believed, “must be in 
a constant and sensitive relationship with the moral condition 
of society". But there was no automatic path to virtue. “Broad­
casting”, said the Report, “is more nearly an art than a science…
no written formula for good broadcasting is possible. Good 
broadcasting is a practice, not a prescription".
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and the ITA – by what they did rather than by what they said. 
“Broadcasting should be judged not by the stated aims of the 
broadcasters, but by their achievements; and it is in the light 
of these achievements that the structure of their organisations 
should be examined. We have considered first the product and 
then the producer".
In a more ominous note for the ITA, Pilkington continued: “we 
thought it right to set our standards high. It is not enough that 
the broadcasters should nearly achieve the purposes of broad­
casting, or that one should achieve them and not another".
If one phrase has come to be associated with the Pilkington 
Report over the decades, it is “patronising and arrogant". 
Curiously, the phrase itself is the Report’s own, at the heart of a 
remarkable disquisition on one of the oldest chestnuts mulled 
over by writers on broadcasting – should the broadcasters give 
the public what they want or what is good for them? This is, of 
course, a false dichotomy, presuming that the audience is an 
undifferentiated mass. For Pilkington, it proved a trap all the 
more dangerous for the Committee’s false belief that they had 
escaped its snares.
Pilkington found the phrase “to give the public what it wants” 
offensive and misleading: “It has the appearance of an appeal to 
democratic principle but the appearance is deceptive. It is in fact 
patronising and arrogant. We reject it utterly…what the public 
wants and what it has the right to get is the freedom to choose 
from the widest range of programme matter. Anything less than 
that is deprivation".
The Report cited with approval one of its witnesses: “those who 
say they give the public what it wants begin by underestimating 
public taste, and end by debauching it".
Pilkington equally rejected as “patronising and arrogant” the 
notion of giving the public what you think is good for it. “The 
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caster must explore it and choose from it first. This might be 
called ‘giving a lead’: but it is not the lead of the autocratic and 
arrogant. It is the proper exercise of responsibility by public 
authorities duly constituted as trustees for the public interest".
But Pilkington did not content himself with these even­handed 
banalities. He described the effect of seeking “the largest pos­
sible audience” and appealing to a “low level of public taste” as 
“to produce a passively acquiescent or even indifferent audience 
rather than an actively interested one". In a phrase reminiscent of 
Hoggart’s pre­judgement about home­made bread, he remarked 
that “too often viewers were offered neither meat nor poison but 
pap".
The most sustained passage in this vein displays a mind­set 
reaching back to John Stuart Mill’s comparison of the fool satis­
fied and the wise man dissatisfied. “It is by no means obvious 
that a vast audience watching television all the evening will 
derive a greater sum of enjoyment from it than will several small 
audiences each of which watches for part of the evening only. For 
the first may barely tolerate what it sees, while the second might 
enjoy it intensely".
The idea that the preferences of the majority might have to defer 
to those of minorities found its most extreme form in a quite sep­
arate section of the Report, on radio relay services. We can recall 
that the Beveridge Committee rejected a request from the BBC 
that, where listeners received their services from relay systems 
rather than their own radios, such systems should be required 
to give full precedence to the BBC’s three radio channels – as a 
planned broadcasting unit – ahead of foreign radio channels such 
as Luxembourg. Beveridge could not see why the relay audience 
of more than a million homes should be more restricted in choice 
than people with the freedom to tune their own sets as they 
wished. Not so Pilkington.
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to receive all the BBC sound services and foreign sound 
programmes. But, if they cannot, then the requirement that 
a public service of broadcasting must seek to satisfy the 
needs and aspirations of minorities as well as of majorities 
must prevail. To put it at its simplest: a minority must not 
be deprived of the Third Programme/Network Three [as 
Radio Three used to be called], in order to provide two light 
programmes (one BBC, one foreign) – even though many 
listeners would, more often than not, choose one or other 
of them. Accordingly, we recommend that the relay licence 
should require licensees to relay all the national sound 
services of the BBC before relaying foreign services.
So, forty years after the BBC’s foundation, we still find the con­
cept of producer­driven broadcasting fully in control: consumer 
choice must give way to a planned service of broadcasting. 
A group of homes dependent on a relay must pay to listen 
to the radio, but may not express preferences. The careless 
assumption that serious programming is superior to non­serious 
programming, and that minority tastes are superior to majority 
ones, fails even to acknowledge that there might be a difference 
between two “light” programmes, one from the BBC and one 
from abroad: indeed, listeners may not even choose between 
these two. Small wonder The Economist accused Pilkington of 
“compulsive nannying".
Interestingly, the BBC itself accepted that its old notion of a 
tightly­integrated radio service was having to become more 
segregated, under pressure not just from Luxembourg but from 
television, and from the spread of portable and car radios. Soon, 
the advent of pirate radio would drive the BBC even further 
down the road of segregated services – a trend that Pilkington 
deplored. But for the moment, the Committee concluded that 
“the BBC’s sound services, in our judgement, succeed in realising 
the purposes of broadcasting". Indeed, the Report endorsed the 
BBC’s claim to start local broadcasting, as part of a continuing 
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planned”, as recommendation 89 put it.
But radio was really a sideshow in the Pilkington Report. Tele­
vision was at its heart. And again the BBC emerged with flying 
colours. This was no accident. The BBC had been preparing for 
Pilkington for some time, and the appointment of Hugh Greene 
as Director­General in January 1960 gave further impetus to this 
process. But Hugh Greene was not content with the elaborate 
paperwork merging from the secretariat.
He arranged a special screening of Richard Cawston’s award­
winning documentary, This Is The BBC, for the Committee. And he 
addressed the issue of audience share.
In his memoirs he wrote:
However good our case may be, there would be no political 
or public support for any recommendations the Pilkington 
Committee might make along the lines we urged if people 
were still tuning to ITV in an overwhelming majority. Why 
should they pay a licence fee if they were not using the 
BBC? I therefore told the television service that without any 
abandonment of BBC standards they must aim at increasing 
our share of the television audience from its lowest ratio 
of 27:73 to 50:50 by the time the Pilkington Committee 
reported. That was exactly achieved at the beginning of 1963.
In fact, Pilkington had reported six months earlier, but Greene’s 
objective had by then been largely achieved, with such pro­
grammes as Juke Box Jury, The Black And White Minstrel Show, 
Six-Five Special and The Benny Hill Show. Perhaps Greene’s major 
contribution to the BBC’s success in the Pilkington inquiry was 
to endorse the Committee’s own prejudices. He considered tele­
vision “one of the main factors influencing the values and moral 
attitudes of our society” and agreed it was the BBC’s duty “to give 
a give a lead to public taste”, even at “the risk of paternalism". 
By contrast, the ITA’s chairman offered the view that television 
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different in the absence of television. Pilkington found such an 
approach deeply irresponsible.
Amongst the BBC’s minor victories with the Committee was to 
persuade it to maintain the restriction on broadcast hours on 
each channel – so constraining ITV’s revenue and the BBC’s costs 
at the same time. Pilkington also adopted the BBC’s opposition to 
both a Broadcast Consumers’ Council and subscription television. 
In 1962, subscription was effectively pay­per­view television, not 
the monthly system developed in the last decade, so Pilkington’s 
arguments as to the excessive cost of delivering programmes 
and collecting revenue have much less force today. But the main 
objection to subscription – borrowed from the BBC – was that it 
might divert key programming, like sports events, away from free 
television. Pilkington thought it would be wrong to use a scarce 
terrestrial channel for such a purpose, and that wire distribution 
would never have more than limited reach. 
Pilkington, of course, could not resist a grander objection. Any 
television service, even delivered by wire, was still television, 
and so must be run by a public corporation and conform to “the 
purposes of broadcasting". As subscription television would, he 
argued, be driven to appeal to the majority, it could not meet 
those purposes, even if it was not using public frequencies. 
Accordingly, he recommended “that no service of subscription 
television be authorised”, and by the same woeful logic, that no 
experiment be allowed as it was simply wrong in principle. In the 
end, an experiment was authorised – but subscription technology 
was too primitive at this stage for it to have any significance.
In only one area was the BBC disappointed by Pilkington: its 
desire for all the proceeds of the licence fee to pass automatically 
to it. Pilkington, instead, supported ministerial discretion, on 
the grounds that it was “largely through the control of finance 
that authority is exercised” – a formulation seemingly lacking in 
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of broadcasting. 
As it turned out, ministers soon abandoned this limit on the 
BBC’s operations, relying instead on the right to limit the licence 
fee itself. By contrast, Pilkington expressed his approval of “the 
principle on which the BBC allocates money between its services” 
– in other words, reserving for radio’s use the proceeds from the 
£1 sound­only licence and from one­third of the £3 combined 
licence. Within a decade, of course, the radio licence had been 
abolished – as too inefficient to collect – and the BBC was left to 
decide for itself what proportion of the television licence to divert 
to radio.
Perhaps Greene’s neatest trick in managing Pilkington was to 
admit that the BBC was not perfect. On the one hand, the BBC 
declined to withdraw a single word of its apocalyptic evidence 
to Beveridge about the evils of competition; on the other, it 
acknowledged that its light entertainment might even have 
improved as a result of competition. But in general, even if 
Pilkington “found in the BBC an all­round professionalism”, 
it picked up from the BBC regretful hints that competition 
had forced it to depart from “its own ideal of public service 
broadcasting".
Mr Carleton Greene told us that the BBC did not aim at 
acquiring a particular proportion of the total television 
audience [which we know from Greene’s own words to be 
untrue]. But the Corporation had, he added, to realise that 
if the proportion fell too low, their claim to be the national 
instrument of broadcasting would be impaired.
Greene’s solution was simple. The BBC should be allocated a 
second television channel. Pilkington quickly picked up his line 
of argument, which rested on the attractive notion of com­
plementary scheduling. “The needs of the many groups of which 
a mass audience is composed cannot be met except by two pro­
grammes planned in contrast with each other". 
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1954, even before ITV was launched, but the then Postmaster 
General, Dr Charles Hill, had turned the idea down in 1956 on 
economic grounds. In 1960, within weeks of becoming Director­
General, Greene went public with his bid. Certainly, international 
frequency planning had opened up the possibility of more 
channels, but the first priority seemed to be the switch from 405­
line transmission (a standard unique to the UK) to the European 
norm of 625­lines. So Pilkington, having been advised by the 
technical specialists that new allocations of bandwidth made 
room for at least four channels on 625­lines, recommended that 
two be used for simulcasting the existing services, and the other 
two for new services.
Logically, this suggested an ITV2 as well as a BBC2. Unexpectedly, 
the ITA recommended that the two additional services be allo­
cated to a third, separate general service, funded by advertising, 
and to a specialist educational channel. This seemingly selfless 
proposal had a thinly­concealed sub­text. The ITA disingenuously 
argued that, given their pre­existing responsibility for one 
advertising­funded channel, they could happily supervise 
another. Meanwhile, the BBC’s ambitions would be thwarted.
Pilkington rejected every aspect of the ITA’s argument, preferring 
in its entirety the BBC’s approach. A separate educational channel 
was inadvisable, as it might diminish the willingness of generalist 
broadcasters to include educational material. Moreover, the 
Committee was much drawn to the BBC’s idea of complementary 
scheduling of two channels. The aim would be “not that either 
channel would be given a minority character”, but “so to con­
struct the sequence on each that viewers who did not switch 
would find themselves exposed at some time of the evening to 
informational material". 
This crudely manipulative model of television was reminis­
cent of Sir William Haley’s vision of the way the three BBC radio 
services could mould the audience. That this was already being 
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want another separate service: “competition in audience ratings 
we regard as regrettable". The recommendation for a BBC2 also 
coincided with the views of most witnesses that if there were an 
additional service, the BBC should provide it. But what of ITV2?
It did not help ITV that the ITA’s founder­chairman, Sir Kenneth 
Clark, was amongst those who disapproved of any extension 
of television: he “considered that there was not the material 
needed to support any extension of television services". Indeed, 
he feared “a Gadarene descent”, given the existing evidence that 
television could not in his view pitch too low in its appeal to public 
taste.
With friends like this, ITV scarcely needed enemies: but there 
was no lack of them amongst those giving evidence to Pilkington. 
Bernard Levin had long since condemned 60% of ITV’s offerings 
as “not fit to feed to the cat". But now the pigeons came home to 
roost. Pilkington noted that nearly all the disquiet and dissatis­
faction in the submissions it received related to television, and 
nearly all of that to ITV. 
The adjectives used included “vapid”, “puerile”, “derivative”, 
“repetitious” and “trivial". Triviality – in content, approach and 
presentation – was the worst sin, “a natural vice of television”, 
“more dangerous to the soul than wickedness". That such 
accusations were coming from a narrow group of organisations 
like the TUC, the Society for Education in Film and Television, 
the National Union of Teachers, the Association of Education 
Committees and the self­appointed Council for Children’s Welfare 
did not seem to strike Pilkington as worth noting.
Pilkington also accepted uncritically statistics presented by the 
Council for Children’s Welfare, to the effect that ITV was showing 
more than twice as many westerns and crime series between 
6pm and 9pm as the BBC. Only after publication could the ITA 
point out that its figures were almost identical to the BBC’s, 
if innocuous material such as Biggles, Flicka and Boyd QC was 
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of violence, in its amount, treatment and timing is unsatisfactory 
on independent television".
Another major source of criticism were quiz shows – “large 
rewards were to be won for little effort” in the course of a naked 
“appeal to fear and greed". Party game shows “humiliated 
members of the public". “We conclude that the dissatisfaction 
with television can largely be ascribed to the independent tele­
vision service…[hence] the widespread opinion that much in 
television is trivial". 
And it was not just ITV’s programmes that were objectionable. 
“On the content of advertisements there has been much disquiet, 
and we believe it to be generally justified…we conclude, then, that 
advertisements which appeal to human weakness could well in 
the long run have a deplorable individual and social effect".
But Pilkington reserved his major attack for ITV’s structure. If his 
terms of reference prevented him recommending abolition of the 
ITA, he was certainly free to point out that the ITV companies had 
no right to exist beyond 1964. As for the Authority, it had miscon­
ceived the relationship between itself and its contractors. They 
were not friends and partners. The idea that the ITA could rely on 
“persuasion and influence” to “realise the purposes of broad­
casting” was, in a word, “mistaken".
In Pilkington’s view, the ITA should only have chosen programme 
contractors who would “unfailingly” make the sale of advertising 
time incidental to the best possible service of broadcasting. Not 
having done so, the ITA lacked the means to correct the situ­
ation. “The ITA’s power to control the companies…is illusory and 
negligible…the sanctions available to the Authority…are either 
derisory, or too extreme, or inappropriate…once appointed, a 
contractor cannot be effectively disciplined".
The Committee fully recognised that ITV’s commercial success 
was “phenomenal". But the structural fault­line in ITV was 
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advertising time “as desirable as possible to those who want it [is] 
an aim largely incompatible with the purposes of broadcasting…
that the companies are widely regarded as principals and the 
Authority as their spokesman is unsatisfactory…it must, there­
fore, be master and be seen to be master".
Pilkington could not disinvent commercial television. But in their 
43rd recommendation, the Committee came up with an ingenious 
structure. The contractors would be given modest output 
guarantees if they chose to convert to being purely programme 
providers. Everything else would be done by the ITA – planning 
the schedule, buying the programmes, selling the airtime and 
passing surplus revenues to the Treasury. This would “remove the 
incentive always to aim at maximum audiences".
The similarity between this proposal and the eventual structure 
of Channel 4 will no doubt strike many people. Indeed, there are 
those who have noted that such an insulation of the programme­
makers and schedulers from direct commercial pressures might 
allow the BBC to operate as an advertising­funded public broad­
caster. But at the time, recommendation 43 found few takers, 
apart from a group of Labour MPs, led by Christopher Mayhew, 
by now his party’s broadcasting spokesman.
Pilkington had two objectives: to reform ITV and to block ITV2 
until reform took place. “We recommend that, as long as indepen­
dent television is constituted and organised as at present, it 
should not provide any additional services of television". Even 
if re­organisation took place, there should not be an ITV2 for at 
least five years thereafter.
Even before the Pilkington Report was published, Bevins was 
alerting the cabinet to its deficiencies: “this verdict is unbalanced 
and unfair. I think the Committee have been swayed unduly by 
the evidence of prejudiced but articulate organisations". The 
ITA’s chairman protested direct to the Home Secretary, Rab 
Butler: “the Report is loaded with prejudice and abounds with 
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burned an effigy of Sir Harry and his report on a huge bonfire. 
Some MPs used the phrase “moral authoritarianism".
The sharpest criticism was of recommendation 43. The Sunday 
Times – long before its present proprietor owned it – described 
the attempt “to make the ITA into another BBC” as “the hopeless 
last resort of men who fundamentally fear the operation of a free 
society". Less hysterical, but no less damning, was the verdict of 
the eminent television critic, Peter Black. “The Pilkington Report 
thought that reform could be achieved by creating a service that 
was supported by advertising but not dependent on popular 
appeal. It is an attractive notion to those who dislike advertising 
and popular appeal".
Of course, others were less critical. Beveridge called Pilkington 
to say he entirely agreed with the contents of the Report. By this 
time, Beveridge was suffering from selective memory. He told the 
House of Lords that he had changed his mind about preserving 
the BBC’s monopoly, but was opposed to advertisements – for­
getting that he had actually supported advertising on the BBC in 
1951, but expressed reservations about monopoly. The next rung 
down, former director­general Sir William Haley congratulated 
Greene on a splendid vindication for the BBC. As Bevins himself 
joked, Pilkington had found the BBC “whiter than white” – quoting 
an advertising slogan of the day.
But Bevins was no longer in control of the outcome. As a minister 
outside cabinet, he lacked clout. It was Butler, the Home Sec­
retary, who led the cabinet committee that decided how to 
implement the Report. BBC2 was swiftly endorsed, and came 
on air 21 months later. A new Television Act was submitted to a 
Parliament which had little appetite for a re­run of the passionate 
post­Beveridge debates. As one Labour spokesman put it, “we 
have left behind the old battle". Even Patrick Gordon­Walker, 
who had vowed to abolish ITV, now conceded that “competition 
has done some good". Christopher Mayhew chose to resign as 
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persuade his colleagues to support recommendation 43 – though 
his party conference later that year unanimously endorsed it.
Yet the Television Act of 1964 shifted the balance of power 
significantly in ITV. The ITA now had much greater control over 
the schedule, even if the companies remained in place. There 
was an explicit requirement for high standards, proper balance, a 
“wide showing for programmes of merit” and “a sufficient amount 
of time” for news. It may only have been of symbolic importance, 
but the 1954 formulation of “entertainment, instruction and infor­
mation” became in 1964 language “information, education and 
entertainment”, echoing the BBC Charter. 
Of equal significance was the pre­emptive strike by the Con­
servative government the year before Pilkington reported, when 
Chancellor Selwyn Lloyd introduced a Television Advertising Duty, 
designed to reduce the excessive profits of the ITV companies. 
Recalling his role in the creation of ITV, Selwyn Lloyd expressed 
the hope that the companies would “not mind being bitten by the 
hand that had fed them". In the 1964 Act, this Duty was replaced 
by the first version of the ITV levy – and again, the ITA fought a 
losing battle, with a turnover levy being enacted rather than the 
profits levy it preferred. This was expected to siphon off more 
than half of ITV’s profitability.
For ITV, the outcome of the Pilkington process was deeply painful. 
The official history of ITV ascribed the defeat to the programming 
cuts made in early 1956 and an unwillingness to make dutiful 
noises: “through a combination of parsimony and stubborn 
devotion to the concept of people’s television, ITV missed an 
opportunity to acquire easy merit in the eyes of the Committee". 
Hugh Greene was more dismissive of the companies: “they were 
lazy in the public presentation of their case and fatally casual, 
even, I believe, contemptuous, in the presentation of their 
evidence. They got what was coming to them".
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that no contractor would renew its licence in 1964. But his day 
had passed. All the companies duly re­applied, and the largest – 
Associated­Rediffusion, the most buccaneering of the pioneers 
– was reduced to a junior partner in the London franchise when 
the re­invigorated ITA eventually came to make its judgements. 
The new chairman, Dr Hill – now ennobled after being fired from 
Macmillan’s cabinet – was determined to make his mark.
The Pilkington Committee may have sailed upon a tide of anti­
ITV feeling, but its Report decisively focused that feeling and 
triggered the reforms of the 1964 Act. The deficiencies of a 
system of excessive ITA discretion were not resolved for a fur­
ther thirty years – but that can hardly be held against Pilkington, 
whose own, more radical, proposals would not bear fruit until 
Channel 4 was born.
That process took its first tentative steps in the final parlia­
mentary debate of 1963, when Bevins expressed the hope “to 
issue a licence for ITA2 during 1965”, in time to “come on air in 
1966". Within a year, Bevins and the Tory government were his­
tory. How ITV2 came to join them there is the subject of the next 
lecture. 
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Annan
2 March 1999
In May 1970, the Minister for Posts and Telecommunications – as 
the Postmaster General had been grandly re­titled by Harold 
Wilson – summoned a distinguished liberal academic to his office 
for a glass of brandy. The academic, Lord Annan, Provost of Uni­
versity College, London and previously Provost of King’s College, 
Cambridge, was invited to chair a new inquiry into the future of 
broadcasting. Of course, said the minister, in that future, tele­
vision as we knew it might well disappear, to be replaced by new 
technological marvels.
Actually, it was the minister who disappeared. John Stonehouse 
soon thereafter faked his own death by drowning, re­surfaced 
in Australia, and six years later faced 18 charges of fraud, false 
pretences and forgery at the Old Bailey.
The Annan Inquiry followed a course a little – but only a little 
– less eventful. To give Stonehouse due credit, his decision to 
appoint Annan had required his overcoming resistance from his 
own Prime Minister as well as from the BBC and the ITV, none 
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than eight years after Pilkington had reported.
The ministry was looking ahead to 1976, when the BBC Charter 
and the life of ITV’s regulator were due to expire. The civil 
service’s cautious calculation was that an inquiry might take three 
years (compared with Pilkington’s two), and consequential legis­
lation another two. Moreover, on general constitutional grounds, 
enquiry by independent committee is necessary in order that the 
two broadcasting authorities should be accountable, and be seen 
to be accountable, to the public.
Belatedly, this view prevailed – but too late. The day after Annan’s 
inquiry was announced, parliament was dissolved, Harold Wilson 
– to most people’s surprise – lost the election to Edward Heath, 
and within a month Annan’s appointment was rescinded by the 
new minister, the former international athlete and ITN news­
caster, Christopher Chataway. He made clear that the rebuff to 
Annan was political, not personal. The Conservative government 
was reluctant to pull up broadcasting by its roots in order to 
examine their health, and remained so for the four years of its 
term. 
All that Chataway agreed to was the de­restriction of broad­
casting hours, which helped ITV’s revenue. This was fiercely 
resisted by the BBC, for whom extra hours meant extra costs, 
not income; but Chataway mollified the BBC by continuing to 
withhold the fourth channel from ITV. He then compensated ITV 
by easing the burden of the levy on advertising. His successor as 
minister, Sir John Eden, also resisted persistent lobbying by ITV 
and its regulator for the creation of ITV2.
Thanks to Heath’s handling of the miners’ strike, Wilson was 
returned to power in February 1974. He abolished the ministry 
of posts and telecommunications he had invented, and handed 
broadcasting to the Home Office, where Roy Jenkins and his close 
associate Lord Harris presided. Within weeks, Annan had been 
67re­instated. The four­year gap meant that both the BBC Charter 
and the life of the ITV system had to be extended to 1979.
The choice of Committee members proved highly contentious. 
A constant re­balancing of interests saw the numbers swell 
to sixteen. Even so, the absence of any obvious friend of ITV 
triggered protests to the government. Annan himself later con­
ceded that “the composition of the Committee was modelled by 
politics...and for good reason: broadcasting itself has become a 
political subject".
Perhaps it was therefore fitting that the Annan Report itself 
eventually became a political victim. It was published in March 
1977, a good two years before the next general election was 
expected, yet a Labour government contrived once again to fail 
to implement the key proposals of a broadcasting report it had 
commissioned – indeed, commissioned twice in this case.
The main prize in Annan’s gift was the award of the vacant 
fourth terrestrial television channel. Through its own ineptitude, 
Labour allowed a Conservative Home Secretary to make the final 
decision. As a final irony, history repeated itself. In 1954, the Con­
servative government had disappointed its own hard­working 
lobbyists by imposing a formidable regulatory structure on the 
ITV their efforts had brought into existence. In 1980, William 
Whitelaw abandoned his own party manifesto pledge to allocate 
the fourth channel to ITV2 and, instead, set Channel 4 on its 
unique course.
If the creation and implementation of Annan were driven by 
electoral outcomes, a broader politics shaped the genesis and 
contents of the Report. However controversial Pilkington’s tone 
and recommendations may have been, the only substantial issue 
that Committee faced was the merits or demerits of ITV. But 
broadcasting changed dramatically in the years after Pilkington.
Most obviously, the introduction of BBC2 in 1964 and then colour 
television in 1967 transformed the BBC, financially, creatively and 
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licence fee, despite the fact that even five years later a quarter 
of the country could still not receive a signal. This appeared to 
breach the principle enunciated by Beveridge and Pilkington that 
the BBC’s different UK services should be funded by those who 
used them.
But in 1968, once BBC2 started colour transmissions, a colour 
supplement of £5 was added to the underlying £5 fee for a 
combined radio and television licence. This temporarily restored 
the theoretical attribution of specific incomes for distinct 
services. More importantly, it created an engine for the BBC’s 
revenue growth – further fuelled by the conversion of ITV and 
BBC1 to colour in 1969. In just eight years a majority of television 
households switched to colour: 9.3 million by 1976, leaving just 
8.3 million in black and white. At the same time, staff numbers 
at the BBC swelled from 17,000 to 26,000, and expenditure from 
£30m annually at the time of Pilkington to over £200m by the time 
Annan reported. 
Meanwhile, sound­only licences declined in number, to the point 
where the £1.25 fee became uneconomical to collect in the face 
of rapidly rising inflation. Annan later pointed out that the 25% 
of licence fee revenue allocated to radio amounted to much 
more than would have been provided by the sound­only licence 
together with the sound element in the combined licence. It 
would therefore be counter­productive as well as impractical for 
the sound­only licence to be re­introduced. 
The principle of separate funding for separate services was not 
entirely abandoned. Annan recommended that the BBC give up 
local radio, on the grounds that the licence fee should not be 
used for services unobtainable by most licence fee payers. But 
this proposal was rejected, and what had once been a central 
tenet of BBC funding faded into history, with no public debate.
Far more a matter of public concern was the BBC’s response 
to the advent of pirate radio in 1964. The Labour government 
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from the BBC in return a commitment to fill the pop music gap 
so created. This in turn drove the BBC to abandon its careful mix 
of programmes across its three services and replace it with four 
generic services, including a pop station.
So William Haley’s vision of a pyramid of taste slowly aspiring 
upwards was finally laid to rest with the publication of Broad-
casting In The Seventies in 1969. The shock for older BBC listeners 
was profound. After all, this was an institution which had declined 
to broadcast pre­race betting odds until 1961, and had banned 
any reference to royalty, politics, sex or religion in its comedies 
until 1963. Now, the BBC’s expansion, the inflow of young and 
adventurous producers to BBC2, and the more liberal atmos­
phere engendered by Director­General Hugh Greene triggered a 
backlash.
On one side, organisations like the National Viewers and Lis­
teners Association and the Festival of Light protested against the 
retreat from traditional standards. Conversely, re­structuring of 
the BBC as a business in the early 1970s, after five years of man­
agement consultancy by McKinsey and Company, persuaded the 
political radicals of the 1960s that the BBC was part of a broadcast 
system closely held by narrow political, institutional and financial 
interests. 
The cynical transfer in 1967 of ex­Tory minister Lord Hill from 
the ITA chairmanship to that of the BBC was widely interpreted 
as a snub inflicted by Harold Wilson on Hugh Greene for the sin 
of being too independently minded. That Hill was replaced by a 
former Labour chief whip, Bert Bowden, elevated to the peerage 
as Lord Aylestone, only confirmed the conspiracy theorists in 
their worst suspicions. Ironically, Hill’s BBC then enraged the out­
going Labour leadership by showing a documentary a year after 
they lost office entitled Yesterday’s Men. This further politicised 
the debate about broadcasting, the authorities that ran it, and its 
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Committee took shape, and took evidence.
Annan was explicit in acknowledging the nature and intensity 
of the debate. “Dedicated to the outworn concepts of balance 
and impartiality, how can the broadcasters reflect the multitude 
of opinions in our pluralist society?” he asked. The 750 submis­
sions and tens of thousands of letters the committee received – 
weighing in total some seventeen stone (approx 108 Kilos) – were 
filled, said Annan with demands that we should re­examine the 
whole structure of broadcasting and the political assumptions on 
which the British system rests. Fifteen years ago people would 
have found this astonishing.
Equally astonishing – just fifteen years after the BBC’s triumph in 
the Pilkington stakes – was the reversal of fortunes in the official 
verdicts on the national broadcasters. In part, this could be 
blamed on the presentations made by the BBC and by the IBA – 
as the ITA had been re­named after it was allocated responsibility 
for commercial local radio, so now embracing broadcasting 
rather than just television. The BBC’s future Director­General, 
Ian Trethowan, conceded that the BBC’s many submissions were, 
truth to tell, dull to look at, and dull to read. The ITV companies, 
by contrast, produced just one report, well­written and most 
attractively and stylishly presented. 
Annan reserved his strongest criticism of the BBC for its current 
affairs programming. The outcry over Yesterday’s Men seemed 
to have blunted the appetite for investigative journalism. “At 
all levels in the BBC, the row over this unfortunate episode 
was blamed for the caution, lack of direction, touchiness and 
unsteadiness in the current affairs output". 
There were wider concerns. As the BBC left behind the public 
service ideals of Reith, Haley and Pilkington, it took on instead 
an ethos of broadcast professionalism. “The post­1969 reforms,” 
said Annan “moved broadcasting a little further from a ‘cultural’ 
activity and a little nearer to a ‘business’ activity. It was no longer 
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and providing cultural guidance. The new spirit is now much more 
managerial. It is concerned with economic management, with 
the strategy of planning and development, and with maintaining 
overt control over programmes". How distinctly familiar these 
observations seem to us today.
If the BBC had sloughed off the occasional arrogance and com­
placency remarked upon by Beveridge, what replaced them was 
in Annan’s eyes no more attractive. “The BBC today sees itself 
as beleaguered, pressurised, lobbied and compelled to lobby. 
The BBC seems to us to have shown some loss of nerve which is 
partly the cause and partly the result of the barrage of criticism. 
Its sense of direction has weakened".
Annan was unimpressed by the BBC’s contention that its “pro­
grammes do not need to be more popular than is necessary to 
gain and hold 50% of the audience". In his view, “an uninstructed 
public might be forgiven for believing that the major concern 
of the BBC’s schedulers is to do a piece of no good to ITV". The 
correct objective, he thought, was not a 50% share, but to “inter­
est and entertain” the audience.
Some of the evidence – and some of the Committee – went well 
beyond this. The Association of Directors and Producers – a fore­
runner of the present Directors’ Guild – was in sacrificial mood. 
“We believe, sadly, that the time has now come for this great 
monolithic sacred cow to be dismembered". Taking their cue, no 
less than six of the Committee’s sixteen members recommended 
that the BBC be divided into two corporations, television and 
radio. 
They argued that a single corporation, trying to straddle two 
media, created too large a power bloc and offended against the 
need for pluralism. They regarded all the friction and complaints 
as “consequences of the Corporation’s unitary control”; con­
versely, dealing with a myriad of complainants engendered a 
“permanent defensive posture".
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to be an impossible one, paralysed by the over­riding need for 
consistency, chief executive responsible for assets worth £90m 
and an income of £200m, editor­in­chief and resident theologian, 
pope and emperor in one, interpreting and executing one indivis­
ible Corporation". 
Even the ten­strong majority conceded that it was a finely 
balanced argument. Indeed, their reasons for resisting a split 
were relatively thin – a risk to the BBC’s reputation abroad, some 
loss of influence and independence within the UK, a fear of the 
government becoming involved in the division of the licence fee 
revenue, and the prospect of more rather than less bureaucracy. 
That the dissenting minority was allowed the best tunes was 
symptomatic of Annan’s handling of his large and unwieldy 
Committee. Throughout the Report are scattered clashing 
opinions, individual reservations and mutually contradictory 
positions that are left unresolved.
All this was part of the politicisation of the enquiry process to 
which Annan himself had alluded. For instance, the driving force 
behind the minority recommendation to split the BBC was Phillip 
Whitehead, a noted television producer and Labour MP who, 
inside and outside Parliament, had lobbied hard for the Annan 
Committee to be established. After Annan had been stood down 
in 1970, he offered vocal evidence in the 1972 investigation of 
ITV by the Commons Select Committee on the Nationalised 
Industries. This cross­party body proved remarkably united 
in its critique of ITV, quoted approvingly the most extreme of 
Pilkington’s lofty preferences for the pleasures of the few as more 
intense than those of the many, and concluded by calling for 
Annan’s re­instatement. Whitehead was quickly on his feet the 
night the Committee’s report was published, calling for “exhaus­
tive analysis” of the “inextricably political and social” issues in 
broadcasting, which only a committee of inquiry could provide.
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Committee. He wanted no MPs, in line with Pilkington’s member­
ship. In fact, the choice of Whitehead seems to have been as a 
substitute for the preferred representative of the radical groups 
seeking thorough reform of broadcasting that had sprung up 
at the end of the 1960s, ranging from the Free Communications 
Group to the Standing Conference On Broadcasting, or SCOB. 
The leading light was Anthony Smith, later President of Magdalen 
College, Oxford, but then a writer and researcher who, as a tele­
vision producer, had been a contemporary of Whitehead’s both at 
Oxford and in BBC TV current affairs.
It was Smith who dreamed up the big idea that emerged from 
the hothouse of debate on the left. He proposed that a National 
Television Foundation be created, to act as a pure publisher, 
and use the vacant fourth channel to broadcast a wide range of 
programmes from independent producers and educational and 
cultural sources. Rumour had it that Smith was personally vetoed 
by Harold Wilson himself as a member of the Annan Committee.
Whitehead was close to Home Office ministers. His appointment 
forced Annan to seek balance, in the shape of a Conservative 
MP (who promptly gave up his seat before the second of 1974’s 
elections), and of another – right of centre – television profes­
sional: Antony Jay, the Yes, Minister scriptwriter. And if anyone 
thought the exclusion of Smith had scuppered the National Tele­
vision Foundation, they had reckoned without Whitehead, who 
warmly supported it. Indeed, like another member of the Annan 
Committee, Professor Hilde Himmelweit, he was a member of 
SCOB, which – despite its modest public support – was accorded 
two days to give evidence to the Committee. This gave a further 
boost to the Foundation idea: so much so, that the IBA and ITV 
hastily spatchcocked a version of it into their revised proposal for 
an ITV2.
The official history of ITV goes so far as to claim that Whitehead’s 
selection breached normal conventions, which required that 
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persons who have not committed themselves so deeply on any 
side of the questions involved…as to render the probability of an 
impartial enquiry and a unanimous report practically impossible". 
This is surely over­dramatic, as is the claim that Whitehead played 
as significant a role in Annan as Richard Hoggart had played in 
Pilkington. Annan largely drafted his own Report: what most 
influenced him was the desire for agreement and the mood of the 
time.
In at least one respect, ITV’s fears proved unfounded. Annan 
admitted that “we received very little evidence about ITV pro­
grammes”, and concluded that “ITV has come a long way since the 
Pilkington Committee reported”, and had “improved immensely". 
In particular, its news and current affairs compared favourably 
with the BBC’s. Even Sir Kenneth Clark, first chairman of the ITA, 
who had famously rubbished television and the ill effects of 
competition to Pilkington, was now willing to admit that, thanks 
to the “spur of competition”, television, including ITV, had done a 
“remarkable” amount of good.
By this time, of course, Clark had delivered a landmark doc­
umentary series to the BBC which had earned him the soubriquet 
of Lord Clark of Civilization. Without a hint of irony, Annan quoted 
Clark approvingly – “far from having debased public taste, he 
thought it had always been a little ahead of it. It had enormously 
widened people’s horizons". He then went out of his way to reject 
what he called “the most controversial proposal of the Pilkington 
Committee”, recommendation 43, which sought to transfer the 
functions of scheduling and airtime sales from the ITV companies 
to their regulator. 
The reasons given for such rejection do not bear close scrutiny: 
it would appear that Annan was simply balancing his ticket, for, 
despite the severity of his criticisms of the BBC, his final verdict 
was that the BBC still gave “a better all­round service to the public 
than ITV”, which, for all its progress, “could do better yet".
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most important decision – to deny a second channel to ITV. What 
drove this decision – a unanimous one – was the zeitgeist: the 
widely­held belief that to leave control of television within the 
hands of the BBC/IBA duopoly would be a profound error. Annan 
consciously adopted the adjective coined by Anthony Smith: the 
strait­jacket.
Smith told Annan that the creation of ITV2 would “complete the 
symmetrical strait­jacket of broadcasting in Britain and continue 
it for ever. Awarding a new channel or even a substantial part 
of it to the IBA and the companies would damage broadcasting 
irreparably. Better no to award it at all than to place it in these 
particular wrong hands".
Annan reproduced this verbatim. In defining his key three tasks, 
he identified preserving accountability through Parliament and 
the editorial independence of the broadcasters. But above all 
he wanted diversity, which “cannot be achieved in the future if 
all developments are forced into the strait­jacket of the existing 
duopoly of the BBC and IBA".
If, for Reith, the whole point of broadcasting had been unitary 
control, for Annan the key word was diversity. And in adopting 
such a stance, he also rejected the Reithian view of the power 
of broadcasting. Although a majority of the Committee paid lip 
service to Pilkington’s formula that, until there was proof to the 
contrary, the effect of television must be assumed to be direct, 
like water dripping on a stone, Annan’s own view – which he 
confusingly ascribed to the “great majority” of his Committee – 
was this: “television may influence us directly or indirectly in the 
goods we buy, but, except for those people who are emotionally 
disturbed…it is unlikely to cause us to commit violent crimes or 
change our deeply held moral or political beliefs".
The logic of such a position forced Annan to reject as ”deceptively 
simple” the old argument for broadcasting to provide moral 
uplift. “Too often those who advocate such a policy seem to 
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agreed, and then imposed on the broadcasters. No doubt they 
can in totalitarian countries. They cannot here. We do not accept 
that it is part of the broadcasters’ function to act as arbiters of 
morals or manners, or set themselves up as social engineers".
Instead, Annan retreated to broadcasting as being nothing 
more than the sum of the programmes being broadcast. Having 
rejected moral uplift, he saw virtue in the argument for breaking 
up the old power structure and creating more diversity. He was, 
of course, still a social engineer; but in the tinkering, rather than 
the towering, business. What he sought was “adjustments in the 
relationship between the broadcasters, the Government and the 
public".
Instinctively, he shied away from proposals from the left for 
an over­arching Communications Council – as advocated by 
the Labour Party – or a Broadcasting Commission, such as that 
supported by SCOB. He saw in these a “return to the monolithic 
control of broadcasting, which we have not had for 21 years". 
As a consequence, there would be “rigidity, limitation of choice, 
a threat to freedom of expression and of political interference, 
and spreading bureaucratisation". The Committee was therefore 
“unanimous in believing that an executive Broadcasting Commis­
sion would be insufferable. However pure and valiant [it] might 
be in its early days, it would in the end become…a self­serving 
and self­perpetuating power group". 
To all this, Annan preferred diversity, even at the expense of less 
efficient use of resources. Likening the contest between the BBC 
and the IBA to that between the Montagues and the Capulets, he 
came to a sweeping conclusion: “we believe the duopoly should 
come to an end during the period we are reviewing". By this he 
meant the next twelve to fifteen years, and what he proposed 
was a general re­structuring of the broadcasting institutions, re­
shaping the IBA and the BBC, and inventing two new authorities. 
Annan later revealed that the entire scheme, including the 
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Phillip Whitehead in ten short minutes at a Committee away­day. 
Annan adopted it almost wholesale, shorn only of the BBC split. 
He wanted local radio taken away from the IBA and the BBC, to be 
run by a Local Radio Authority. Concluding that “local radio is in 
a mess”, he observed that “as long as local radio is an appendage 
of the BBC or the IBA it cannot hope to be the first priority". As 
a consequence, the ITA would be re­named the Regional Tele­
vision Authority, to reflect the federal structure of the system 
it regulated. To complete the picture, an Open Broadcasting 
Authority would be created to run the fourth channel – “a pub­
lisher of programme material supplied by others".
That this was merely another name for the National Television 
Foundation the Committee made no effort to disguise. “By far the 
most comprehensive scheme came from Mr Anthony Smith, who 
proposed that such was the flourishing state of broadcasting in 
this country that the time had come when a National Television 
Foundation should be set up". In Smith’s words, it would have “a 
kind of impresario role, merely allocating resources to some but 
fitting producers, writers, technicians to others who arrive only 
with an idea, a grievance or a cause".
This vision suited Annan’s purposes well. “We are convinced that 
this is the right approach to the fourth channel. A great oppor­
tunity would be missed if the fourth channel were seen solely 
in terms of extending the present range of programmes,” which 
would be a recipe for “a self­destructive battle for ratings". What 
the Committee saw in the OBA was not only “an addition to the 
plurality of outlets, but a force for plurality in a deeper sense…
It should be a test­bed for experiment and symbolize all the 
vitality, new initiatives, practices and liberties which could inspire 
broadcasters".
In rejecting ITV2, Annan could not resist a sideswipe at the BBC. 
In an amusing re­run of the arguments to Pilkington concerning 
the third channel, when the ITA had disingenuously proposed an 
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Annan dismissed the BBC’s proposal for a specialist audiences 
network. “The IBA,” he said “regarded the BBC’s comments as 
gratuitous: their sole intention was to do ITV a bit of no good” – a 
distinctly Annanite expression we have heard before – “and pre­
vent the fourth channel going their way". 
The OBA squared the broadcasting circle for Annan. He was 
nervous of the call for greater accountability to the public by 
the broadcasters. He also rejected the idea of a general right of 
access to the media. In broad terms, he was content with the 
“chain of accountability” as he called it, which was from broadcast 
authorities to Parliament, and from broadcasters to broadcast 
authorities. Parliament should decide the number and nature 
of broadcast services, but thereafter not intervene. Broadcast 
authorities should “take broadcasters by the elbow rather than 
twist their arm” – “censure not censor". Now the OBA would offer 
an even looser rein, as a publisher more than a regulator.
Unfortunately, this neat solution ran into a practical problem. 
Annan had already adopted another liberal pseudo­principle, 
often advanced by broadcast theorists as one of the strengths 
of the British system in the way it seemed to deflect direct 
competition for audiences. “As far as possible, each Broadcasting 
Authority should have its own source or sources of revenue and 
should not have to compete with other Broadcasting Authorities 
for the same source of revenue".
In truth, such a principle could only be stated ex post facto 
rather than a priori: and the OBA simply did not fit the useful 
but accidental pattern of the past. Anthony Smith had imagined 
a control mechanism with “virtually no employees”, and with 
programmes financed by an annual fixed sum from advertising, 
from sponsorship and from payments by education authorities. 
It was by no means clear how sufficient money could be raised 
from such sources. Indeed, at one point the Report proposed, in 
the absence of other revenue, “a Government grant to sustain 
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possibly through the Arts Council". Annan himself subsequently 
conceded that “how the channel was to be financed was a matter 
on which we disagreed".
This insouciance struck the IBA as simply perverse. Its Director­
General condemned Annan’s proposals as illogical, naïve, ill­
thought­out and unrealistic. The verdict in the official history of 
ITV is scathing: “to all except the small lobby which had promoted 
it with such fervour, [the OBA] appeared patently impractical and 
a dead duck politically before the ink was dry on the report".
Disappointment amongst those furthest left was even more out­
spoken. “In line with Annan’s general thinking,” wrote Professor 
Nicholas Garnham, “the OBA is going to encourage diversity, 
pluralism and creative freedom by being structure­less. This 
improbable feat is achieved precisely, as its critics have rightly 
and with some well­directed ribaldry pointed out, by giving the 
new Authority no conceivably realistic source of funds".
Garnham’s attack went far beyond the inadequacies of the 
OBA: “what the Annan Committee has done is, paradoxically, to 
discredit structural change by partially endorsing it. Many, both 
inside and outside broadcasting, put much faith in the radical 
possibilities of a Committee of Inquiry and actively campaigned, 
against Government opposition and inertia, for such a committee 
to be set up. As the post­Annan debate…has shown more clearly 
than the report itself, the mood has decisively changed to one of 
a weary and fatalistic acceptance of the status quo. Indeed it is 
possible to sustain the cynical argument that Annan, like all such 
Committees of Inquiry, was expressly designed to lance the boil 
of radical discontent".
Of course, that is a verdict after the event, and it was surely 
beyond even such a brilliant mind as Annan’s to appease the left 
with a radical version of the fourth channel, but cunningly leave it 
without resources. The fault was in the original design. Although 
Anthony Smith dismissed criticisms of the Foundation from the 
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which he dubbed “Garnham­vision” – the weakness of the OBA lay 
in its financing.
Surprisingly, the OBA – at least in name – survived the next 
stage of governmental action, in the shape of a White Paper that 
emerged a year after Annan published his Report. This out­
come, however, was already heavily compromised. The Home 
Office, supported by the Treasury, had tried to drop the OBA in 
favour of ITV2. But a leak of the proposal to Phillip Whitehead 
allowed a rearguard action time to deflect this. The OBA survived 
– just – but within a framework of broadcasting measures that 
included the creation of three BBC management boards, half 
of whose members would be appointed by the Government. 
So unappealing was this latest document that few mourned its 
demise, along with the Callaghan administration, in the 1979 
general election.
To general astonishment, the new Home Office team of William 
Whitelaw and Leon Brittan seemed disinclined to enact their own 
manifesto commitment to ITV2. Instead, they embarked on a 
careful tour of the options. The reformists revived their campaign 
in the shape of the Channel Four Group, whose organiser 
was a recent media studies graduate called Michael Jackson. 
Under pressure from Whitelaw, the IBA repeatedly modified its 
proposals, until the ITV element had been reduced to proportions 
that the insurgents – and Whitelaw – found acceptable. 
In a moment of hubris, Annan claimed the credit. “The OBA,” 
he told the House of Lords, “was born from an idea of Mr Tony 
Smith…our Committee took that piece of dough and began to 
bake it. I do not think we got very far in the baking before we had 
to finish our report. The new fourth channel is really the same 
loaf, only now done to a turn". Few would dispute the implication 
that Annan’s OBA was half­baked: remarkably, however, his 
Report did indeed contain a plan for the precise structure of the 
future Channel 4, tucked away in Chapter 15, paragraph 7. 
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proposal. They suggested that the fourth channel should 
be allocated to the programme makers. The IBA should 
schedule the channel as a complementary offering to ITV1. 
Certainly the ITV companies would contribute but so would 
independent production companies, whose work should 
be fostered, and where necessary, financed by the channel. 
The channel would not need production facilities or studios 
apart from those necessary for presentation and continuity: 
all it required was a small staff with a chief executive and 
executive board and a secretariat under the overall aegis 
of the IBA. They would purchase and process productions. 
The IBA would finance the channel by imposing a levy on the 
ITV companies, who would have the exclusive right to sell 
advertising time on the new channel in their own areas. The 
channel itself would be a non­profit­making organisation.
The unofficial historian of Channel 4 has warned against seeing 
a direct route between this proposal and the eventual outcome, 
regretting its “address to expediency” as compared with the ide­
alism of the National Television Foundation. As it happens, the 
ADP document, far from being novel, was a re­draft of a proposal 
formulated by John Birt and myself in 1973, and endorsed by 
Jeremy Isaacs, who subsequently became Channel 4’s first Chief 
Executive. Its first priority was a funding mechanism that worked, 
around which could be built a structure which encouraged 
pluralism and diversity. The authors consciously looked back to 
Pilkington’s famous recommendation 43, separating the process 
of commissioning and scheduling programmes from that of 
selling advertising.
Whitelaw’s eventual endorsement of the mechanism and 
structure was all the more creditable for the politically sensitive 
aspect that Annan had correctly identified – the inevitable call on 
public money. Such a Channel 4 might not be a direct charge on 
the public purse, but insofar as its funding would be a first call on 
the levy payments by the ITV companies, there would inevitably 
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the total audience for ITV and Channel 4 earned sufficient extra 
revenue to offset the additional cost of Channel 4’s programmes.
The Welsh Fourth Channel – a last­minute fudge by Whitelaw 
under pressure from a Welsh nationalist MP threatening to fast 
until death – proved an even bigger drain on the Treasury: but a 
boon for the aerial industry, which sold special equipment to tens 
of thousands of non­Welsh speaking homes in Wales keen to see 
the English version of Channel 4.
As it has turned out, under Jeremy Isaacs’ leadership, Channel 
4 delivered much of what Anthony Smith’s Foundation had 
envisaged. Seen by many as the intellectual father of the channel, 
Smith was duly offered a seat on the channel’s board, graciously 
acknowledging that the ADP funding structure ignored for so long 
had proved to be the best way forward.
Annan was less gracious, continuing to claim many years later 
that Channel 4 was set up on the lines he had suggested, despite 
the utterly different structure of the OBA concept. No wonder 
Annan disparaged the ADP proposal as “novel” and thereafter 
ignored it. He understood it neither then, nor a decade later.
Channel 4 marked the high point of social engineering in British 
broadcasting. It carefully placed the new channel in the context 
of the existing channels, and minimised its competitive impact 
on the system. In Annan’s slightly crude formulation, “there are 
enough programmes for the majority – what is needed now is 
programmes for the different minorities which add up to make 
the majority". Whitelaw’s Channel 4 improbably delivered much 
of what Annan had imagined but which his Report had signally 
failed to make real.
In many other respects, the Report proved to be equally 
unproductive. The IBA was left untouched – only much later was 
commercial radio detached from it, and even then the BBC was 
left with its own local radio network. The proposed exclusion of 
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the proposed ban on dubbed laughter. 
Having themselves rejected a permanent Broadcasting Commis­
sion, and even Anthony Smith’s proposed National Broadcasting 
Centre as “at best a perpetual fidget and at worst an incubus 
hovering over all aspects of broadcasting”, the Annan Committee 
had come up with a Public Enquiry Board for Broadcasting, 
which would hold major hearings every seven years – a kind of 
intermittent Annan, which would, for instance, advise on the 
allocation of the fifth channel. This, too, failed to find favour. 
The only modest structural change Annan accomplished was the 
creation of a Broadcasting Complaints Commission to deal with 
allegations of unfair treatment of individuals and invasions of 
privacy. 
How well spent was the Annan Committee’s £315,000 cost? It is 
much admired as a statement of liberal principles at a politically 
turbulent time. It managed to straddle many conflicting views. 
Perhaps as a result, it has proved a poor guide to the future. It 
imagined that by 1991 the most likely technical advance in broad­
casting would be the public use of teletext. Like the BBC and the 
IBA, it doubted whether video­recorders would have mass sales, 
being seen as primarily of educational use and otherwise only 
of appeal to “the minority that is acutely choosy". Annan even 
feared that the attraction of VCRs to wealthy minorities might 
lead to certain types of programming disappearing from broad­
cast television onto VCR distribution. 
With a touch more realism, Annan predicted that “the biggest 
threat to the present concept of the mass audience watching 
a programme financed exclusively by one broadcasting 
organisation is undoubtedly cable". But at that point the 
Committee’s vision failed them. “We do not see cable in the next 
fifteen years developing as a national service. We consider it 
will develop as a local community service. We do not see cable 
services being developed as Pay Television". 
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channel service delivered by prohibitively­expensive high­
powered transmission. Annan instinctively allocated this to the 
BBC, which – to the Corporation’s delight – he designated as “the 
instrument of national broadcasting". Even the fourth channel 
was seen by Annan as a remote prospect “in the present eco­
nomic climate”, as he put it. And despite reminding the pessimists 
of their false prediction that there would be “insufficient profes­
sional talent” to service BBC2, he declared that “the prospect that 
a fifth channel could provide much the same fare at the same 
level of excellence [as existing channels] seems dubious". On that 
point, at least, the jury is still out.
At the end of 174 recommendations, few of which were to have 
any impact, Annan offered his final hostage to fortune. “We do 
not foresee in the fifteen years ahead the possibility of financing 
any major technological development such as will change the 
face of broadcasting". He had particular doubts about cable. 
Yet within five years, the new government, marching to a very 
different drum, had launched an urgent inquiry into the pros­
pects for cable television. The shift from the classical liberalism 
of Annan to the market philosophies of the 1980s is the subject of 
the next two lectures. 
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In 1924, in Hythe, near Southampton, Mr A W Morton connected 
his radio set by wire to a loudspeaker in another room in his 
house, so that his wife could listen there. A year later, he had 
extended the wire to 25 of his neighbours, charging them 7p a 
week – one shilling and sixpence in pre­decimal money. So was 
born the cable distribution system in this country. 
By the 1980s, it had enlarged on a commercial basis to serve 14 
percent of all UK homes; but it was an essentially passive system, 
apart from occasional experiments in community programming, 
pay­per­view and film subscription. Attempts to expand beyond 
merely relaying the existing terrestrial channels had always 
been thwarted. In 1982, official policy underwent a sea change. 
Politicians saw cable as a new Klondyke. And the instrument of 
change was a report written by a three­man committee of inquiry 
chaired by Lord Hunt.
Of all the reports I will be considering in this series of lectures, 
that by Lord Hunt is probably the least well known. Indeed, some 
people might well ask how so slim a volume – just 46 pages, 
86 produced at a cost of a mere £45,000 – can claim to be considered 
alongside the big beasts of Beveridge, Pilkington and Annan, let 
alone the subsequent Peacock. But the Hunt Report marks an 
extraordinary shift in the entire approach to broadcasting in the 
UK, all the more remarkable because it followed so swiftly from 
the apogee of the previous consensus – the creation of Channel 4 
as a deliberate extension of the public service principle which had 
prevailed for sixty years.
Even more curious is that this very Channel 4 – a prime example 
of social engineering – had been steered onto the statute book 
by the Home Secretary in the new Thatcher administration, 
rescuing it from the half­thought­through meanderings of 
the Annan Committee appointed – twice! – by Labour. Willie 
Whitelaw delivered a new channel that drained money from the 
Treasury, served minorities rather than commerce, and left the 
old ITV monopoly of advertising time untouched – about as un­
Thatcherite an outcome as could have been imagined. But within 
months of the passage of the 1980 Broadcasting Act, the Home 
Office found itself under increasing pressure from the Cabinet 
Office and Department of Industry to address the alluring pros­
pects of cable and satellite television.
As far as satellite was concerned, Whitelaw took his cue from 
Annan. A new international agreement in 1977 had created the 
opportunity for each European country to launch a high­powered 
satellite capable of delivering some five new services to small 
dishes attached to residences – a system described as direct 
broadcasting by satellite, or DBS. Annan had recommended 
allocating all these channels to the BBC. Whitelaw, more 
cautiously, invited the BBC to take up the first two, and held the 
other three in reserve.
No sooner had the Home Office published its plans for DBS in 
1981 than an Information Technology Advisory Panel was created 
within the Cabinet Office to pursue the possibility of encouraging 
a moribund cable industry to offer pay television services. It 
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homes connected to cable systems. Nearly half of these were 
blocks of flats served by a single roof­top antenna that spread 
the various channels by wire to all residents. The remainder were 
served by limited­capacity cable systems installed to overcome 
the inadequacies of VHF transmission before UHF broadcasting 
was introduced. A typical charge for such a commercial service 
was £15 per annum.
In practice, all that these services offered was simply a relay 
of the terrestrial channels. Hopes of turning them into proper 
subscription services had long met strong opposition. Pilkington 
had objected in principle to pay television, on the grounds that 
it might divert programming away from free television. Worse, it 
would fail to meet the purposes of broadcasting, as perceived by 
Pilkington, in that it would inevitably pursue majority audiences. 
“No service of subscription television [should] be authorised”, he 
concluded.
Annan was utterly dismissive of subscription funding. He saw 
the future of cable in local television, not pay television. “As the 
BBC and IBA extend the coverage of their UHF transmitters, 
there are going to be fewer and fewer people willing to pay a 
cable company to provide what they can get off­air…we were 
not persuaded that Pay TV of itself generated new programme 
material…it was therefore a ravenous parasite. Moreover, if Pay 
TV were commercially successful, there could well be less choice 
in the long run for most viewers. Pay TV organisations would 
probably be able to afford to buy exclusive rights in some events 
which are now broadcast generally by the BBC or the IBA". 
Annan was not persuaded that protecting named events would 
be enough. “Nevertheless there would be a real danger that the 
range of programming available to the public from the broad­
casting organisations would be reduced. Certainly it would 
reduce the possibilities of programming on the fourth channel. 
None of us, therefore, considers that a service of Pay TV based 
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can be regarded as a high priority and most of us recommend 
that the cable operators should not be authorised to provide Pay 
TV services".
Indeed, Annan was hostile to any significant expansion of tele­
vision: “better to have fewer services adequately financed than 
more of abysmal quality” – a forerunner of the “more means 
worse” school of thinking that would rapidly grow in the 1980s.
Despite this fierce onslaught, the Labour government, in its White 
Paper responding to Annan, chose to authorise a handful of pay 
television cable trials – thirteen in all, serving a few hundred 
thousand homes. But Labour shared Annan’s instinct that any 
large­scale development of cable should be centrally funded. 
Thatcher’s ministers sustained the trials, but had no interest in 
a publicly­funded cable system. Yet they were deeply attracted 
by the industrial and commercial prospects offered by cable: 
information technology was starting to take hold, and the job and 
export opportunities seemed limitless. 
Kenneth Baker, who had been given the title of Minister for 
Industry and Information Technology, was quite explicit in a 
Commons debate: “the reason we want to move quickly is [that] 
with cabling more jobs will be created". Although entertainment 
would be the driver, “the range of non­broadcasting services is 
the raison d’être of the expansion". Cultural issues were being 
displaced by industrial priorities. 
As a result, throughout the decade, a recurring theme would be 
the competition between the Home Office and industry ministers 
for control of the broadcasting agenda. Mrs Thatcher had already 
decided on the privatisation and de­regulation of British Telecom, 
and had encouraged the emergence of a competitor in the shape 
of Mercury. She noted the French government’s encouragement 
of cable and subscription television, and was persuaded that 
a new industrial revolution could be built on the back of the 
wiring of Britain. What that wiring needed was the engine of 
89entertainment to drive it along, whatever that meant in terms of 
the concept and practice of public service broadcasting.
Towards the end of the 1980s, the Department of Trade and 
Industry, supported by the Treasury, attempted taking primary 
control of broadcasting. Special advisers – typically, Thatcher’s 
favourite industrialists – would organise breakfasts to decide 
the future of television without a Home Office minister in sight. 
Broadcasting legislation was decided by a cabinet committee 
which excluded the broadcasting minister. 
On one spectacular occasion, the Trade and Industry Secretary, 
Lord Young, announced that BBC2 and Channel 4 would be 
shifted to direct broadcast by satellite, releasing their terrestrial 
frequencies to the commercial market: a proposal The Guardian 
characterised as “simultaneously lunatic and sinister". It was 
swiftly withdrawn, to barely concealed glee from Home Office 
officials: but that such a proposal could be made without their 
knowledge simply illustrated how impatient Mrs Thatcher had 
become with those she considered to be blocking the path to 
industrial prosperity.
At the beginning of the decade, she looked to ad hoc groups 
such as the Information Technology Advisory Panel, made up 
essentially of electronics industry executives, “to ensure that 
government policies and actions are securely based on a close 
appreciation of market needs and opportunities". The ITAP report 
on cable was published in March 1982. It wanted restrictions on 
cable programming removed, authorisation of local networks of 
30 or more channels, and a rapid declaration by the government 
of its policy intentions. “Only through a set of speedy, positive 
and radical regulatory changes can the United Kingdom obtain 
the benefits offered by developments in cable technology…
for British industry, a late decision is the same as a negative 
decision".
Curiously, one of the reasons for ITAP’s pressure was a fear that 
satellite development might have moved too far ahead if cable 
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path capability and potential for interactivity and transactions, 
which was seen as the main source of subsequent industrial ben­
efit. An early expansion of cable would then make it the natural 
distribution medium for DBS entertainment services. The ITAP 
Report believed original expectations that satellite receiver and 
decoder boxes would cost only £150 were too optimistic – perhaps 
£400 would be nearer the mark, making a cable build­out even 
more imperative. The ITAP calculation was that to cable 50% of 
Britain would cost £2.5 billion, but that the eventual benefits for 
the country would be more than a billion pounds annually. 
Immediately, the Home Office tried to re­capture the initiative 
by appointing a three­man team that same month to take up 
the ITAP challenge and recommend on the future of cable. The 
Committee was chaired by Lord Hunt, who, as Sir John Hunt, had 
been Cabinet Secretary up till 1979. He was joined by Sir Maurice 
Hodgson, a former chairman of ICI, and the physicist Professor 
James Ring, who had been for many years a member of ITV’s 
regulatory body, the IBA. A notable omission was that of an econ­
omist, which left the Committee’s findings open to heavy criticism 
from free­marketeers once they were published.
Hunt’s frame of reference was narrowly defined: its remit was 
“the government’s wish to secure the benefits for the United 
Kingdom which cable technology can offer and its willingness 
to consider the expansion of cable systems which would permit 
cable to carry a wider range of entertainment and other services 
(including when available direct broadcasting by satellite), but in 
a way consistent with the wider public interest, in particular the 
safeguarding of public service broadcasting". He was given just 
six months to complete his report.
Critics from the left seized on this tight brief as evidence that 
the decision had already been taken. The Campaign for Press 
and Broadcasting Freedom bitterly complained that Hunt had 
been given no room for manoeuvre by such a clearly­stated set 
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189 submissions. Hunt demurred: he claimed six months to have 
been sufficient and that his Committee was at liberty to reject 
the expansion of cable if it could not be squared with the inter­
ests of public service broadcasting. His solution was to position 
cable as supplementary to the terrestrial broadcasters, widening 
consumer choice by providing local, niche, specialist and 
minority channels. Hunt did not believe that “channels of general 
entertainment in direct competition with those of the BBC and 
ITV” would be created by cable.
Hunt reminded his readers that the seemingly large base of 
cabled homes was a mirage. “There are no modern cable systems 
in this country,” he said. “We have some ageing narrowband 
systems, which do no more than relay public service broadcasts 
except in the case of a handful of pilot schemes of subscription 
television and a single channel consisting almost entirely of 
films".
He shared the view that the replacement of these systems 
with modern wideband cable would not be possible without 
entertainment­driven investment. He acknowledged that there 
were fears of an expansion of television leading to a decline in 
standards, and also of the best (or most popular) programming 
migrating from free­to­air television to subscription channels if 
they became widespread. Nonetheless, he felt a balance could be 
struck.
“We believe that recent developments both in multi­channel 
cable technology and indeed in public service broadcasting itself 
justify a reassessment of the arguments against subscription 
television which the Pilkington and Annan reports found con­
vincing. We are however satisfied that some limited safeguards 
against damage to public service broadcasting will be necessary 
in the interest of the large sections of the community who, 
through choice or necessity, will remain dependent on it". 
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the dark". He saw it as “all about widening the viewer’s choice” 
rather than becoming “another branch of public service broad­
casting". In his view, “the whole approach needs to be different” 
to reflect the multiplicity of narrowcast services that cable would 
be able to offer. As new channels would be of “special inter­
est” or “locally orientated”, he saw no need for broadcast­style 
regulation. Rather, he imagined an “oversight” function, with “a 
few general guidelines”, direct regulation only becoming nec­
essary if self­regulation failed.
He shied away from the bold vision of electronic publishing that 
Peter Jay had set out in his influential Mactaggart Lecture at the 
1981 Edinburgh International Television Festival. Hunt did not see 
cable as ready for the role of publisher, subject only to the law 
of the land. His arguments against Jayvision, as it became called, 
were pragmatic rather than logical – cable was not fully spread, 
there was not enough capacity, and the power of the image was 
stronger than that of the written word. It was Peacock who would 
be more persuaded by Jay.
In structural terms, Hunt was willing to allow a large degree of 
vertical integration between those who laid the cable, those who 
managed it, those who supplied channels to it, and those who 
supplied programming to the channels. The Committee members 
noted warnings from the US as to the dangers of “ownership links 
between cable operators and programme providers”, but “we do 
not think there will be real risks from such vertical integration 
in the country in the foreseeable future: indeed, the problem is 
more likely to be one of a shortage of good material rather than 
good material not finding an outlet".
Hunt fully realised that the government had no intention of 
paying for the cabling of Britain, despite the ambitions in this 
direction within the Labour Party and interested parties like 
the Post Office Engineering Union. In such circumstances, there 
could be no question of regarding cable as a common carrier of 
93all signals seeking carriage, even if there were no capacity con­
straints. Instead, the old requirement for a Wireless Telegraphy 
licence would be dropped in favour of a simple local franchising 
process, whereby effective local monopolies would be granted in 
exchange for commitments to build the system. Local authorities 
hostile to cable or this franchising process would not be 
permitted to frustrate an operator by withholding permission to 
take up paving stones.
Hunt saw no need for particular ownership restrictions, except 
where political and religious groups were concerned, though 
he did seek to exclude foreigners – which at that point included 
Europeans – from majority control of any franchise. Nor was 
multiple franchise ownership an issue – “we see little danger of a 
monopoly arising from excessive ownership of cable franchises". 
Programmes transmitted right across the cable network would 
be welcome: “Cable operators in our view should have freedom 
to provide programmes which are likely to appeal to their cus­
tomers, even though some of these may be provided by national 
programme providers to a large number of cable operators".
Curiously, though, Hunt was bearish about the prospects for sub­
scription. Apart from films and the BBC’s DBS offerings, he was 
“satisfied that the number of additional channels for which most 
people are prepared to pay extra is limited". The Committee con­
tented itself by recommending that “subscription for particular 
channels should be allowed". Hunt was unconvinced by cable’s 
experience in America, believing, a little quaintly, that its rise 
had been caused, not by the inherent attractiveness of pay tele­
vision, the weakness of terrestrial signals or the meagre nature of 
public television, but by the “intrusiveness of broadcast television 
advertising". 
In the UK, he said, “for most people the presence of advertising 
does not affect the decision whether or not to watch a particular 
programme. Thus the motivation to pay for subscription tele­
vision may be weaker here than in the United States, and as a 
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finance". By this convoluted logic, he then concluded that cable 
would need advertising revenue, and that there should be no 
limit on advertising breaks – flying in the face of his observations 
of the American scene.
An equally odd line of logic led Hunt to ban pay­per­view as a 
method of funding. “The BBC represented very strongly that one 
of their main concerns about cable competition lay in the pos­
sible siphoning of sporting events from free television. We have 
concluded that it would be safer for the time being to preclude 
pay­per­view programmes being offered on cable systems". He 
frankly admitted that this did not prevent “siphoning to sub­
scription services – but it does at least avoid the problem in its 
most acute form". After all, he argued, pay­per­view was not 
that important for cable, but a ban would provide “a measure of 
reassurance for public service broadcasting".
The most sensitive target of potential siphoning by cable was 
the list of national sporting events to which broadcasters were 
forbidden from acquiring exclusive rights. This item of policy 
had its origins in the limited geographical coverage of the early 
ITV stations, which led the BBC to argue – with support from the 
House of Lords – that it would be wrong to deprive large numbers 
of viewers out of reach of ITV transmitters of major sports 
occasions. This had become enshrined in the Broadcasting Act of 
1981 as a reserve power of the Home Secretary to bar exclusive 
contracts with regard to seven listed events, but had never been 
utilised, thanks to informal non­compete agreements between 
ITV and the BBC.
Hunt conceded the main point to the terrestrial channels: “The 
present list of protected events…should apply to new cable 
services as it applies to broadcasters; apart from this [and 
pay­per­view generally] we do not think it appropriate to place 
restrictions on the sporting or other events which cable television 
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which are already televised".
In fact, the BBC had a shopping list of protected species that went 
far beyond the seven major events. It wanted to include rugby 
union, Open golf, boxing title fights, all the racing classics and the 
motoring Grand Prix; a further five categories of events shared 
with ITV, such as European athletics and soccer; ten other named 
sports and – most interesting of all – “foreign­produced material” 
as it was called, by which it meant such series as Kojak, Starsky 
and Hutch, and Dallas.
If cable were allowed to bid for these, said the BBC, we would see 
either “the majority of viewers deprived of star attractions” or, 
in fighting off cable’s bids, the diversion of BBC resources to the 
point of “impoverishing creative areas of minority programming".
The logic of the BBC’s position was clear. It should be allowed to 
continue buying existing material as cheaply as in the past. More­
over, the cable companies should be compelled to carry a sub­
stantial proportion of originated UK product on all their services, 
and should be prevented from running American product in 
substantial volume.
The BBC said to Hunt that
the introduction of foreign programmes, particularly 
American, comprising largely trivial entertainment material 
is in the long term bound to have an effect on viewing habits. 
Over a period, market forces of this kind could reduce 
finance available for UK television production. Expressed in 
extreme terms [and the BBC showed no reluctance so to do] 
there is a danger that the UK Television Industry could go the 
same way as the UK Film Industry. This clearly needs to be 
guarded against, particularly since UK Television is a major 
force in establishing and maintaining UK identity and its 
specific cultural value.
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in viewer choice without allowing a free­for­all in cable. “With 
the arrival of Channel Four, Breakfast Television and DBS, 
the industry is already being given an opportunity for proper 
expansion” – as opposed, presumably, to improper expansion – 
[so] “the BBC calls for regulation to protect the interests of the 
British viewer and the British Television Industry". 
Cable companies should simply provide “local access, ethnic and 
specialist programmes” – rather like the BBC’s view of Channel 
4 to Annan. “If they compete with the networks for popular 
programming, there could be just more of the same” – perish the 
thought. In its most apocalyptic mode, the BBC warned against 
“an operating philosophy made up of quick­kill methods of 
financial control, a cynical view of public taste and no concern for 
social side­effects".
But Hunt was opposed to specific programming requirements, 
and made “no recommendation on the range and balance of 
programmes". There were to be no quotas: film channels were 
likely to have predominantly American content, and foreign 
channels, such as RTE, would be welcome additions to the cable 
scene. For cable to spread rapidly, it needed attractive, low­
cost programming requiring a low basic monthly charge – Hunt 
looked to free­to­air services, the BBC’s DBS channels and foreign 
stations to help drive take­up. 
As a modest further reassurance to the terrestrial broadcasters, 
he ruled that broadband systems must carry “all free broad­
cast television services serving their particular locality whether 
present or future”, which included at least one of the prospective 
BBC DBS channels. As a concession to cable, he removed the 
“must carry” rule for old systems limited to four channels, though 
only for five years. Then, tacking back in the other direction, 
he sought to impose the old radio relay rules on cable systems 
offering radio services. “If channel capacity is no problem, it is 
only after distributing all the BBC’s national services and both 
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operator can choose to relay any other authorised broadcasting 
station, such as Radio Luxembourg". 
So we find the supposed apostle of de­regulation quoting directly 
from the Pilkington bible. It was no surprise when Welsh cable 
companies were later forced to carry the new Welsh Fourth 
Channel in preference to Channel 4 in English, however large a 
proportion of their customers opposed such an imposition. Yet 
elsewhere Hunt argued for the right of Welshmen and Scotsmen 
living in London to receive S4C or STV, even if the universal avail­
ability on cable of all ITV stations out of area might eventually 
undermine the economics of some of them, or even be in breach 
of transmission rights in acquired programmes. 
This haphazard approach to issues irritated the purists. Two free­
market economists, Veljanovski and Bishop, in a paper published 
by the Institute of Economic Affairs, complained of shallow­
ness and incoherence and “a weakness which infects the whole 
Report: its failure to evince an understanding of the market 
system in general and the cable industry in particular…as a result, 
it proceeds from recommendation to recommendation by the 
force of assertion rather than reasoned argument".
Even so, Hunt’s conclusion that cable should be allowed broad 
freedom to expand must have gladdened the hearts of the cable 
lobby. Indeed, the Campaign for Press and Broadcasting Freedom 
complained that the Cable Television Association’s evidence had 
been “taken on board virtually wholesale". Hunt offered minimum 
constraints, in his own phrase, other than that programming 
should follow the usual broadcast rules on taste and decency – 
the only exception being subscription channels with an elec­
tronic lock, which would be allowed to show at any time any films 
certified by the British Board of Film Classification below the 
adult R18 level.
Hunt also recommended that the only restriction on cable own­
ership should be a ban on control of any system resting in the 
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to be a new body, the Cable Television Authority. He feared that 
putting the IBA in charge might deter investors familiar with its 
role as a public service broadcasting regulator. This triggered a 
fierce attack on the Report by the IBA once it was published.
The IBA “totally dissents from the Hunt Inquiry’s central belief – 
that, if its recommendations were accepted, there would be no 
serious damage to public service broadcasting: the regulatory 
body proposed by the Inquiry…is to…be ineffective and toothless 
in the interests of encouraging investment". The IBA had no 
wish to take on such a feeble role, and predicted that rivalry 
between regulated and de­regulated broadcasting would be 
“inevitable and destructive” – which prompted Professor Ring, 
the Committee member who had served on the IBA, to comment 
that Hunt had been right not to hand cable to the IBA!
Interestingly, the IBA had been one of the few organisations 
to have argued in its evidence that subscription would be the 
primary funder of cable’s expansion – a prediction that proved 
more accurate than Hunt’s own.
Hunt’s critics were quick to assemble. The ACTT, the television 
technicians union, described his Report as “a get­rich­quick recipe 
for the cable buccaneers". The Post Office engineers sneered 
that “an inferior, outdated, half­baked cable system will appear 
in some towns and cities". The Labour Party’s Roy Hattersley 
called for “a national network of cable, laid and managed by the 
government". 
Some of the criticisms from the left were themselves contra­
dictory. On the one hand, it was predicted that no new cable 
would be built – the operators would take advantage of the 
five­year dispensation from the “must carry” rule for four­
channel systems, and substitute pay channels for the free­to­air 
channels in the areas they already controlled. Alternatively, if that 
temptation was resisted, the Campaign for Press and Broad­
casting Freedom argued that there was “a very real danger that 
99unlimited cable advertising could lead to a desperate scramble 
for revenue that would be disastrous for commercial television, 
radio and newspapers".
This theme was taken up by the then Director of Programmes 
at London Weekend Television. If the Hunt Report were imple­
mented, warned John Birt, “choice will diminish remarkably; and 
the public service system of broadcasting will quickly decline: 
this process will occur because of the impoverishing impact Lord 
Hunt’s prescription for cable expansion will have on the finances 
of ITV and the BBC". Birt believed that “few viewers will find much 
in this milk­and­water cable service to stimulate, to enthral or to 
satisfy them”; but even channels with few viewers, if there were 
enough of them, would collectively lead to ITV’s revenue declining 
in real terms within five years. Quite how this would negatively 
affect the BBC was not explained, but Birt’s solution was for one, 
and one only, of each type of niche service to be licensed at a 
time – youth, ethnic, cultural, sport, news. And the whole system 
needed tight regulation.
The BBC’s response was confused: and no doubt heavily 
influenced by its commitment to DBS – direct broadcasting by 
satellite. The day before Hunt reported, the BBC had held a press 
briefing at which, according to one trade paper, it had warned 
that “the end of broadcasting as we know it was nigh if entertain­
ment­based cable was introduced". The BBC spokesman talked 
of wall­to­wall Dallas: a remarkably derogatory concept coming 
from the broadcaster that had shamelessly hyped Dallas in its 
own schedule – even on the news – when competing with ITV. 
Apparently, carefully controlled doses of Dallas from the BBC 
were fine: it was when the patient gained access to unlimited 
amounts of the substance that “public taste was coarsened”, in 
the BBC’s own phrase. But then, this was the BBC that was about 
to launch its own breakfast television service as a pre­emptive 
strike to de­stabilise the new IBA contractor, TV­AM.
100 In any event, all this was “embarrassingly reversed the next day”, 
as the trade press put it. Having argued in its evidence to Hunt for 
cable to be regulated by the IBA, the BBC now chose to welcome 
the Cable Authority. Not surprisingly, it also approved the ban 
on pay­per­view which Hunt proposed – “for the time being”, 
the BBC noted – and the must­carry rule. For some unexplained 
reason, the BBC saw “great difficulties in implementing” the rec­
ommendation on non­exclusive major sporting events. Nor was it 
persuaded that commitments made during the licensing process 
could be enforced, declining to believe “that advance assurances 
made in seeking a franchise are a valid safeguard – experience 
has shown they are of little value".
It was the BBC’s Director­General, Alasdair Milne, who drew the 
crucial distinction which perhaps explained the BBC’s curious 
posture. Subscription television was not wrong in itself – after 
all, the BBC would be operating a subscription service on DBS. 
Satellite was “available potentially to everyone”, by individual 
choice: but access to cable was determined by where the 
operators chose to install. The BBC expected only 50–60% of the 
country to be cabled – and even that at a cost of £3–6 billion – 
and only 50–60% take­up within those areas: figures, by the way, 
which in practice the cable industry has come nowhere near to 
achieving.
“It is for this reason,” said the BBC, “that regulation is important – 
to prevent a service to the minority from limiting the choice avail­
able to the majority. Regulation is crucial because without it cable 
could damage and perhaps destroy whole areas of public service 
broadcasting and with it the variety, scope, quality and balance 
which such broadcasting currently represents".
The BBC was worried about the absence of quotas – “if foreign 
material is allowed in freely, the temptation to carry it in 
preference to home­produced material will be strong". Milne 
put it brutally: “to imagine that it is possible to buy additional 
American programmes to the ones we are already enjoying 
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tantamount to not being in the real world".
And even with UK material, there were still the dangers of 
siphoning or pushing up costs. Bill Cotton, the managing director 
designate of the DBS service, deployed yet again the familiar 
arguments against allowing cable to compete directly with 
ITV and the BBC. In stark contrast with Hugh Greene’s dismis­
sive attitude to ITV at the time of Pilkington, Cotton embraced 
ITV within the public service approach: “as a duopoly, we only 
compete for the attention of our audience, not for our income: 
we therefore can confidently commission and schedule minority 
programmes".
By contrast, “derestricted cable would introduce a service 
that would by its nature try to cream off the popular end of 
programming and have no requirement in terms of quality or 
indeed choice. Derestricted cable allowed to run riot in the 
area of popular programming will dilute the available material, 
therefore the audiences, and therefore the income to the point 
eventually when there will be nobody interested, or indeed able 
to invest, in quality programmes made for the domestic market". 
Moreover, “there is a limit that can be paid for sport [by the BBC] 
unless once again it is ripped away from the principle of being 
available to all and siphoned off to a cable sports ghetto for which 
people would have to pay extra".
These sentiments would re­emerge with much fuller force in the 
1990s, in connection with the satellite service, Sky: but because 
in 1982 the BBC had its own satellite ambitions, it could only 
attack cable subscription services, and then only because of their 
geographical exclusiveness. The BBC argued that its satellite 
subscription service would simply act as an extension of its 
free­to­air channels, offering feature films prior to their network 
release, international programmes, news, archive programmes 
and repeats. Yet in its own evidence to Hunt it had acknowledged 
that top sport might be featured: “The aspirations of sporting 
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through the channels soon to be available on DBS".
“DBS channels,” said the BBC, “need not disenfranchise viewers 
either on geographical or technical grounds. It was the appeal of 
their universality – the ability of everyone from Brighton to the 
Butt of Lewis to acquire additional services firstly by the acqui­
sition of a receiving dish and if he so chose, by the payment of a 
subscription – that attracted the BBC to DBS in the first instance. 
The ability to pay a little more offers all viewers the enrichment of 
their choice without the unwelcome social divisiveness that cable 
must produce". Rupert Murdoch could not have put it better 
himself.
The BBC had eloquently told Hunt that “if cable becomes 
symbolic of what Mayfair can have but Brixton cannot, what 
Metropolitan Man may enjoy but Rural Man is denied, then one 
more social tension will be generated in an uneasy age. Wideband 
cable is not likely to make economic sense outside the larger 
cities and towns, or even the affluent suburbs of some cities. So 
yet another shadow of social divisiveness may fall across our 
communities". 
Hunt was unimpressed by the BBC’s sophistic distinctions, and 
simply ignored them. He found allies such as the Conservative 
backbencher, Sir Philip Goodhart, who reminded the Cassandras 
in a Commons debate that “in civilisation’s long history, the 
greatest single decline in cultural, aesthetic and philosophical 
standards was produced by the printing press".
Hunt had critics from the right. They felt he had fudged the issues 
of principle, failing to understand the underlying precepts of 
economic theory and consumer choice, or to explain the limits 
he put on cable’s potential. “The Hunt Report can be searched in 
vain,” said Veljanovski and Bishop, “for a convincing reason why 
the industry should be regulated…nowhere is it stated why the 
local monopoly of cable operators should be controlled". In terms 
of major sports contracts, “Hunt gives no convincing reason why 
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these events". As for foreign ownership, that it is “unacceptable 
to whom, and why, in terms of the costs and benefits, is not 
explained…since the investment required will be both large and 
risky, and since US capital has far more experience of this form of 
investment, the harmful consequences may be substantial".
Despite all this, Veljanovski and Bishop had to acknowledge the 
significance of Hunt’s findings: they marked “a sharp break with 
60 years of government policy designed to restrict competition 
in broadcasting". That the government had broadly endorsed the 
Report on publication “effectively jettisoned the principles upon 
which the British broadcasting system had been based since its 
inception…the era of ‘rationed TV’ subject to public operation and 
extensive regulation will be over".
Other commentators agreed, though with regret rather than 
enthusiasm. Lord Annan, far from repenting his description of 
cable as a parasite, predicted “a flood of trash and porn”, if US 
experience was a guide. He congratulated Lord Hunt for steering 
between the Home Office and the Department of Industry in the 
manner of a master civil servant, but for him “the drift of the 
Report is clear: broadcasting authorities are passing into history".
The Daily Telegraph described cable’s de­regulated status as 
“unprecedented in British broadcasting practice". What The 
Guardian saw as unprecedented was the swiftness and fogginess 
of the political process of which Hunt was a part. Michael Tracey 
also noted the “incredible speed” at which “the proponents of 
public service broadcasting” had suffered “a sizeable defeat". 
“The priesthood,” he said, “will painfully come to realise that the 
congregation has taken over and life will never be quite the same 
again".
This was a theme to which Hunt himself turned in the Guildhall 
Lecture he gave soon after publication. Mischievously, he quoted 
from the Guildhall Lecture by Hugh Greene ten years earlier: “the 
future of broadcasting in this country is not going to be radically 
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riposte to Greene was: “remember the video recorder". The rapid 
rise in rentals and purchases of pre­recorded videos supported 
the findings of the National Consumer Council that 41% of viewers 
were dissatisfied with what was available on the three channels. 
“The voice of the consumer has not yet been heard,” he said. 
Greene was actually chairing Hunt’s lecture, and could not resist 
seeking the last word: “which would be the greater disaster for 
this country: if cable TV failed – which is quite possible – or if it 
succeeded…which is also quite possible?”
Six months after Hunt was published, a government White Paper 
adopted virtually all his recommendations, save only that licences 
would run for twelve years, advertising would face restrictions 
in extent, and pay­per­view would after all be permitted, though 
only for material not yet being broadcast. The new Cable 
Authority would have as its first director – the secretary of the 
Hunt Committee, Jon Davey. It had taken all of twenty years for 
Channel 4 to emerge from first blueprint in the Pilkington Report 
to the reality of launch in November 1982. Now, in less than 
twenty months, the way had been cleared for the much­heralded 
cable revolution. Paradoxically, it did not happen.
The government was primarily to blame. For instance, it 
attempted to impose its own preferred technology on the cable 
franchises, which proved counter­productive. The insistence 
on telephony being provided by BT or Mercury deprived cable 
operators of a competitive edge – Veljanovski and Bishop had no 
doubt that “so short­sighted a policy will reduce the long­term 
employment prospects cable expansion can offer Britain". Their 
predictions as to the ill­effects of excluding American capital 
proved equally well­founded. When the government changed 
its capital allowance tax policies, UK investment in cable ground 
to a halt. Only when foreign ownership was allowed, and cable 
was permitted to offer telephony in competition with BT – but BT 
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pace.
Even then, a crucial ingredient proved to be the availability of 
entertainment services delivered by satellite. But not by the BBC. 
In satellite, too, the government crucially miscalculated. The 
BBC’s DBS plans proved to be too costly to fund. An attempt to 
shoehorn the BBC into an alliance with ITV and other commercial 
interests through the so­called Club of 21 quickly collapsed. ITV’s 
launch of a Superchannel satellite service targeted at European 
viewers failed just as swiftly. Only when one of the two ITV 
companies that refused to join Superchannel – Thames – solved 
the satellite conundrum through an investment in a Luxembourg 
venture called SES Astra was a clear course successfully 
navigated. And then it was Rupert Murdoch who led the way, with 
cable only finally setting sail in the wake of his ambition.
Meanwhile, Hunt himself had been overtaken by the far more 
formidable Peacock Report. Here could be found full­blooded 
endorsement of the consumer­led, rather than producer­driven, 
approach to broadcasting. No­one could accuse Peacock of 
lack of logic or economic understanding. But if the full impact 
of the Hunt Report was inadvertently muffled by the govern­
ment that had commissioned it, with hindsight we can see that 
it changed the political perception of the structure of broad­
casting as decisively as technology was changing the consumer’s 
perception. How much further Peacock took this process is the 
subject of the next lecture: but it is from the Hunt Report four 
years earlier that we must date the decisive shift in the way 
broadcasting was to be regulated and managed.
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Peacock
9 March 1999
Whose words are these?
The BBC and the regulated ITV system have done far better, 
in mimicking the effects of a true consumer market, than any 
purely laissez­faire system, financed by advertising, could 
have done under conditions of spectrum shortage.
Does that come from the Annan Report? The Labour Party? The 
BBC or IBA? Let’s hear more.
We would go further: they have provided packages of pro­
grammes to audiences at remarkably low cost…the inter­
twining of information, education and entertainment has 
broadened the horizons of great numbers of viewers and 
listeners…the notion of cross­fertilisation of programme 
categories is inherent in BBC practice – and in ITV practice, 
too – and of great value…all that is in accord with the Reithian 
tradition.
Pilkington perhaps? A final clue.
108 It is, indeed, important that…we do not, prematurely, dis­
mantle or destroy the ‘packaged’ terrestrial broadcasting 
services that give good value today. The practice of providing 
a mixed diet at low cost is one that we wish to see continued. 
It is, in our view, compatible with the recommendations…for 
future funding of the BBC through subscription.
These are, of course, quotations from the Peacock Report, the 
last of the post­war committees of enquiry into broadcasting that 
are dealt with in this lecture series. If some people today find all 
but the last of those words quoted surprising – half­remembering 
the notoriety of Peacock as a free market manifesto – then 
imagine the dismay such sentiments must have caused in the 
hearts of those hard­line Tories who had seen the Peacock 
Committee as the chosen instrument of bringing the BBC to heel.
The election of 1979 that installed Mrs Thatcher in Downing Street 
was to have profound effects on British broadcasting. She had 
little patience with entrenched oligopolies, particularly if they 
failed to share her firmly held views. The warning signs were 
there from the beginning, with the first outburst of ministerial 
outrage over a BBC Panorama team filming an IRA unit operating 
a roadblock in the Ulster village of Carrickmore – a story that 
broke in October 1979 on a day the cabinet was due to discuss the 
licence fee. 
It was in attacks on the licence fee that hostility to the BBC 
found expression. The Times ran a series of anti­BBC leaders – 
open, of course, to the charge that its views conveniently fitted 
the commercial interests of its proprietor, Rupert Murdoch, 
who operated the BBC’s loss­making satellite competitor, Sky 
Television.
No similar accusation could be directed at the Adam Smith 
Institute, a right­wing think tank. Their 1984 publication, The 
Omega File, condemned the licence fee for its failure to relate 
the requirement to pay to consumer preference. The BBC was 
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tent of its broadcasting”.
It was the Falklands War, which triggered an explosion of anger 
amongst Conservative MPs in protest at the BBC’s even­handed 
treatment of British and Argentine information sources. The 
Corporation’s chairman, George Howard, and director­general, 
Alasdair Milne, were given a tremendous roasting at the House of 
Commons. 
The twin thrusts of the attack converged in 1985. The BBC’s vice­
chairman at the time, Lord Rees­Mogg, a Thatcher appointee, was 
aware that Conservatives saw the BBC as arrogant and no longer 
impartial – or perhaps too impartial! He believed it would be only 
a matter of time before “politicians would get fed up with the BBC 
behaving in this way and would start to cut it down to size – and 
indeed they did: the Peacock Committee was set up with just such 
a view”.
Leon Brittan, who had been Willie Whitelaw’s skilful Minister of 
State during the creation of Channel Four and was now Home 
Secretary himself, announced an inquiry, to be chaired by 
Professor Alan Peacock, to the House of Commons on March 
27th, 1985. The Labour Party was quick to pounce. “As right­wing 
as can be found,” was how one backbench MP described Peacock, 
who was a prominent liberal economist. Another MP insinuated 
that “this inquisition” was expected to come to the “foregone 
conclusion that there should be advertising at least on BBC1 and 
BBC2”. Brittan responded by pointing out that Peacock had for 
two years been an adviser to the previous Labour government 
and by denying that there was “a subtle plot to force advertising 
on the BBC”. But the Committee’s narrow terms of reference fed 
opposition suspicions.
For Peacock’s status was actually as chairman of “the Committee 
on Financing the BBC”, not one investigating broadcasting as 
a whole. The terms Brittan announced to the Commons over­
whelmingly addressed whether and how advertising and 
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brief reference being to “securing income from the consumer 
other than through the licence fee”.
Understandably, Labour’s shadow Home Secretary, Gerald 
Kaufman, denounced Peacock as the wrong inquiry – “an inquiry 
almost solely confined to the effects of the introduction of 
advertising and options for advertising is unacceptable”. Brittan 
pointed out that sponsorship was also mentioned – scarcely 
a point to deflect Kaufman – and that the phrase “other than 
through the licence fee” might include subscription: a nugget of 
information that all MPs ignored as Kaufman grandly committed 
his party to a brace of binding policy commitments. 
There are no circumstances in which a Labour Govern­
ment will permit advertising on either BBC television or 
radio. Professor Peacock must take that into account. A 
Labour Government will also phase out the licence so that 
no retirement pensioners will have to pay for a television 
licence. I make that commitment clearly and firmly on behalf 
of the Labour Party and the next Government of this country.
Twelve years are a long time in politics, so such pledges can be 
assumed no longer to apply. After all, under Attlee, the Labour 
Party once committed itself to abolishing ITV. Leon Brittan, well­
prepared, simply contented himself with pointing out to Kaufman 
that to absolve pensioners from the licence fee would cost the 
BBC £325 million a year.
Brittan also assured the Commons that Peacock would be free 
to draw his own conclusions. However, this conciliatory note was 
somewhat undermined a few weeks later when the Committee’s 
other six members were named. They included an industrialist 
and philosopher of confirmed right­of­centre views, and, to 
general astonishment, the Home Secretary’s own older brother, 
Sam Brittan, a noted liberal economist and Financial Times col­
umnist. The trade paper, Broadcast, described Sam Brittan as the 
Committee’s intellectual powerhouse. As a whole, the Committee 
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suggested. 
In fact, it was another action by Leon Brittan that caused the 
BBC most initial difficulty. He had timed his announcement of 
Peacock’s appointment just four days before the BBC’s three­year 
licence settlement was due to expire. The BBC had been pressing 
for its £46 colour licence fee to rise to £65 – a rate well ahead 
of inflation, but which the BBC sought to justify in a brochure 
hubristically entitled “the best bargain in Britain”. Critics were 
quick to point out that bargains were usually something you 
could choose to leave on the shelf. The Home Secretary was 
amongst those unconvinced, conceding only a £58 fee, to last for 
at least two years – depending on exactly when and what Peacock 
reported.
Peacock took a dim view of this old­fashioned haggle. To live 
within the £58 limit, the Home Secretary had invited the BBC 
to undertake economies and re­organisation: “none,” noted 
Peacock, “was described as potentially disastrous to the BBC…all 
these measures seemed to us to be extremely worthwhile, but we 
ask ourselves why they had not been adopted before”.
Peacock went further. “In granting finance to the BBC, the 
Government has to rely on the BBC for the information which 
will influence its decision. However, the BBC has never been 
asked to relate its requirements to target ‘outputs’ and to justify 
these. The process of budgeting for the BBC’s ‘needs’ and the 
monitoring of its use of its funds seems to be of the crudest kind".
The next point could have come straight from The Omega Report. 
“It has become increasingly clear that a vital element is left out 
of the discussion. The consumer has a direct interest in the 
amount of the fixed charge payable irrespective of the amount 
of his viewing or listening, but has no power to control what 
the charge should be…the sole direct source of information on 
the costs to be covered by the charge is the state broadcasting 
monopoly, which is an interested party. Therefore, there can be 
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with the provision of a given quantum of broadcasting services. 
The incentives normally provided by competition are lacking".
The Committee was unimpressed by the BBC’s regular pledges 
to greater efficiency as monitored by firms of accountants, 
noting, rather, a tendency “to take refuge in the findings of the 
Peat Marwick ‘Value for Money’ review of its activities”. Even 
this generally favourable report from Peat Marwick left Peacock 
complaining that the BBC had supplied no useful data to his 
Committee, and had “ignored a very important set of rec­
ommendations about the use of ‘performance indicators’” that 
the document had put forward.
The Committee’s view of the BBC had not been improved by 
Alasdair Milne’s performance at the all­day open session Peacock 
organised in London half way through his deliberations. The 
Report cited – clearly disapprovingly – Milne’s view that “broad­
casting is a process of scattering and thus sowing seed far 
and wide…some will fall on stony ground and some on fertile 
ground…broadcasting further means that the sower waits to 
see what grows” – an attitude whereby, in Peacock’s words, “the 
viewer’s main function is to react to a set of choices determined 
by the broadcasting institutions”.
Fortunately for the BBC, this was the limit of Peacock’s adverse 
comments. He rejected, as Annan had before him, the suggestion 
that BBC television and radio be divided – “although the range 
and quality of BBC radio programmes might well be enhanced 
by separation from television, it appears that the BBC is better 
retained as a single unit”. The reasons offered for this decision 
were skimpy, but perhaps what was most remarkable about the 
Peacock Report was the intellectual process by which it stood 
back from the institutional weaknesses of the BBC and concen­
trated on the broadcasting environment in which it operated. 
“It would have been tempting, “ said the Report, “to confine 
ourselves to a limited examination of the case for and against 
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devise guidelines for the finance of broadcasting, we have to 
specify its purposes".
Peacock’s view of those purposes was far removed from that 
of previous Committees. The question he asked himself would 
have stuck in Pilkington’s throat: “how can British broadcasting 
be financed in such a way as to bring the greatest enjoyment and 
pleasure to as many viewers and listeners as possible while at the 
same time fulfilling some public service obligation?” Peacock’s 
answer? “The fundamental aim of broadcasting policy should in 
our view be to enlarge both the freedom and the choice of the 
consumer and the opportunities available to programme makers 
to offer alternative wares to the public". Lord Annan was quick to 
note that this definition virtually abolished the previously central 
role of the broadcasting authorities around which he had created 
his own Report.
Peacock was by no means unaware that his Committee’s very 
existence challenged received wisdom. Wherever he went, he 
found “expressions of amazement – even from NBC and ABC in 
the United States – that the British should be thinking of changing 
their system, which is almost universally admired”. The first 
question the Committee addressed was: “Why is it right to look 
at a system of financing the BBC which has been in operation so 
long and which has been endorsed by every committee to review 
it?” Their justification was that “no political decision as complex 
and detailed as that which determines the structure of broad­
casting can be right for all time – it must be reviewed in the light 
of changing circumstances”.
What had changed for the BBC was that the licence fee had lost 
its buoyancy. For over sixty years, rises in the number of licence 
fee payers – first for radio, then for combined radio and tele­
vision, then for colour television – had allowed BBC revenue to 
grow faster than the nominal rate of the licence fee itself. But as 
colour licences reached saturation point, increases in the cost of 
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power in parity with ITV.
The BBC’s own evidence to Peacock noted that there had been six 
increases in the licence fee in the previous ten years, compared 
with seven in the previous fifty­three years. “In political circles 
generally,” conceded the BBC, this “has brought about some 
loss of confidence in the long­term durability of the licence fee 
system”. Having described the licence fee to Annan as the least 
unsatisfactory means of funding itself, the BBC depicted it to 
Peacock as “for the time being, still the most effective means of 
financing its various services in what is inevitably an imperfect 
world”. 
For Peacock, the problem was that this loss of buoyancy in BBC 
income was accompanied by rapid growth in the advertising 
revenue that fuelled ITV. If a primary objective was to keep a 
balance between the two systems, instability was inevitable. 
Moreover, the growth of cable and satellite would speed this 
de­stabilisation: “to consider the BBC as if it will continue with 
something like half of the small number of channels available is to 
fail to grasp the nature of changes which are already taking place 
and whose intensification seems irresistible”.
In any case, Peacock had a rooted objection to the parity model. 
Like Annan, but for different reasons, he disliked what he called 
“the comfortable duopoly”. “There is good reason,” he said, “to 
question whether a regulated duopoly does promote or could 
be designed to promote the welfare of viewers and listeners". 
Furthermore, “economic analysis of duopoly situations does 
not offer much support for the view that if the duopoly is stable 
the interests of the consumer rather than the producers will be 
paramount”.
He pointed to the elaborate system of cross­subsidies – from 
the centre to the regions, and from high­audience, low­cost 
programmes to high­cost, low­audience ones – as well as 
the absence of incentives to be cost­conscious. He observed, 
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effort to enhancing their reputation with fellow professionals”. 
Research commissioned by Peacock established that, measured 
by numbers of international awards, British television was “far 
and away the best in the world”. Yet according to a survey carried 
out for the National Consumer Council, 45% of the public were 
dissatisfied with British television, and only 46% satisfied. “All our 
experience of measuring consumers’ attitudes,” said the NCC, 
“show that you can normally expect about 75–80% to say they are 
satisfied with a service, whatever it is: 46% satisfaction is a very 
low figure". 
Whilst accepting that secure funding and mutual tolerance of 
parity in audience share allowed the broadcasters “peace to plan” 
and viewers “a wider variety of programmes than commercial 
considerations would dictate”, Peacock could not but help 
observe that “paradoxically, the status quo, given its requirement 
of retaining existing funding proportions, represents an unstable 
situation”. Told that “the biggest headache from the BBC’s point 
of view is maintaining its spending power in relation to ITV 
companies”, he concluded that the licence fee would be placed 
under intolerable strain in trying to match the steady growth in 
advertising – “consumer resistance would be bound to grow if 
the fixed proportion rule were paramount, and changes in the 
method of raising the licence fee would serve at best a cosmetic 
purpose”.
Keeping up with the ITV Joneses in any case carried the inherent 
objection that it transferred into the whole of broadcasting 
the specific inefficiencies within the ITV companies. Even the 
ingenious notion of funding the BBC’s additional annual needs 
out of ITV’s levy did not address this fundamental problem. 
Peacock noted that the Treasury’s proceeds from the ITV levy 
were flat, despite the rising curve of ITV revenue. Whether the 
levy was charged on turnover or profits, ITV’s monopoly of 
advertising “does not encourage these companies to minimise 
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to retain their professional labour (ie monopoly profits are shared 
between employees and shareholders) and this puts pressure 
on the BBC to follow wage increases granted by the independent 
television companies".
As a result, in general “the broadcasting industry was wasteful 
of resources through over­manning and self­indulgent working 
practices…whatever method of finance was appropriate for 
financing the BBC, the public had a right to expect that broad­
casting services should be provided at the lowest possible 
cost compatible with the provision of a service of high quality". 
Peacock observed that although the BBC appeared to be more 
cost­effective than ITV, independent producers seemed more 
efficient than either – an observation that was to have dramatic 
consequences.
Whilst admiring – as we have seen – some of the outcomes 
of public service broadcasting as provided by the duopoly 
arrangements, Peacock felt its weaknesses outweighed them. 
There was an “absence of true consumer sovereignty”, the 
system was “vulnerable to political pressure and vulnerable to 
trade union and other special interest groups”, the ITV franchise 
process was “near impossible” to be run fairly, and there was the 
“endemic weakness in the control of cost or pursuit of efficiency”. 
His verdict on the old system was damning: “even if it could by a 
superhuman effort of governmental regulation be preserved into 
the 21st century, it would be wrong in principle to seek to do so”.
So what could replace it? True to his remit, Peacock addressed 
the issue of advertising on the BBC exhaustively – and decisively 
rejected it. In all, the Committee received 843 submissions; 658 
were on the subject of advertising. The advertisers themselves 
acknowledged the deep improbability of there being enough 
revenue to replace the licence fee and sustain commercial radio 
and television. At best, the BBC’s requirements over and above a 
frozen licence fee might be met by absorbing £100 million a year 
117of the natural annual growth in advertising. Some advertisers 
felt this could be done without damaging ITV and ILR. But 
these commercial broadcasters submitted that they would be 
driven into the red if the BBC took as much as two minutes of 
advertising every hour.
The BBC, of course, had no desire to be what they called “a little 
bit pregnant”, suffering all the pressures of being dependent on 
advertising, whilst still facing regular negotiations with govern­
ments keen to reduce the licence fee rather than just freeze it. 
Peacock was conscious of the fate of New Zealand’s equivalent 
of the BBC, which had been induced to take advertising as a 10% 
supplement to its licence revenue, and had soon found itself 70% 
dependent on it. 
Peacock commissioned a series of specialist economic analyses 
which persuaded him that demand for advertising was simply 
not elastic enough to take up all the slots that a fully commercial 
system would offer, without the price dropping sharply. One 
pair of experts predicted that total advertising revenue might 
even fall. Peacock noted that “at present the IBA is helped in its 
regulatory function by the fact that a low audience share for ITV 
would (if our econometrics are correct) increase ITV revenues 
since advertisers would need to advertise more to reach a given 
level of audience size and the ensuing competition for advertising 
slots would push up the prices”.
The message for Peacock was clear. Competition for advertising 
revenue, whether limited or full­blooded, and however gradually 
introduced, would ultimately force the BBC to modify its 
schedule: “range and quality would become vulnerable to the 
need to maximise audiences; and much of the good drama and 
current affairs output would become starved of funding – a 
narrowing of the range of programmes on both BBC1 and ITV 
appears almost inevitable at an early stage”. Nor was Peacock 
persuaded that sponsorship could offer more than “a modest 
supplement to BBC funds”.
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public thought it “a good idea” to substitute advertising for 
the licence fee. But this finding was discounted, because, said 
Peacock, “those in favour of replacing the licence fee with 
advertising were chiefly of the view that this would not affect 
programme quality”: and 83% were opposed to advertising if it 
would reduce programme quality, which Peacock was confident 
would be the outcome.
There was a deeper problem. Peacock had become increasingly 
attracted, not just by the notion of consumer welfare, but of 
consumer sovereignty. This happy state could only be achieved 
when all households were connected to a common carrier of vir­
tually unlimited numbers of channels and programmes, allowing 
all providers free or low­cost access to the transmission system, 
and all consumers the freedom to choose from whatever was on 
offer on a pay­as­you­go basis.
A crucial distinction he drew was between an advertiser­funded 
broadcasting system and this consumer­driven version. “It 
follows from our concept of consumer sovereignty that we 
reject the commercial laissez­faire model, which is based on a 
small number of broadcasters competing to sell audiences to 
advertisers". So Peacock was able to reject replacing the licence 
fee with advertising, not just because of its effect on the BBC 
and on broadcasting standards generally, but because of its 
inferiority on economic and philosophical grounds, too.
The phrase most often used to describe Peacock’s vision of the 
future was electronic publishing. Its chief exponent was the eco­
nomics journalist, Peter Jay, who had first advanced the notion 
in an article in The Times in 1970, expanded it in an open mem­
orandum to the Annan Committee in 1977 (who politely praised 
it but then ignored it as too idealistic), and fully elaborated it in 
his 1981 MacTaggart Lecture at the Edinburgh International Tele­
vision Festival. Jay wrote to Peacock and spoke eloquently at the 
open day. His advocacy struck a ready chord, not least with Sam 
119Brittan, who was particularly attracted by the freedom of speech 
argument.
The first sustained passage in the Peacock Report gave a strong 
indication of its concerns. The evils of censorship – embodied in 
the Inquisition, the Star Chamber and the Stationers’ Company, 
with its 120­year long monopoly on printing – were contrasted 
with the champions of liberty: Milton, Macaulay, Wilkes and the 
First Amendment. 
The Committee argued that “electronic publishing is founded on 
the proposition that communication is an activity which does not 
normally require government intervention…what brought govern­
ment and the law­makers into the picture was the simple fact of 
broadcasting technology". We now suffered the twin defects of 
restricted entry and “massive control and regulation…[through] 
an elaborate series of formal and informal codes”.
By contrast, “rather before the end of the century, Mr Jay argues, 
it would be possible using fibre­optic technology to create a 
grid connecting every household in the country, whereby the 
nation’s viewers could simultaneously watch as many different 
programmes as the nation’s readers can simultaneously read 
different books, magazines and newspapers".
Peacock did not entirely endorse this somewhat utopian scenario, 
pointing out that “satellite technology…is in its infancy” and that 
“it could be well into the 21st century before there is a heavy pen­
etration of wideband transmission capability into the national 
communications network down to the subscriber’s premises”. 
The Committee noted the low take­up of cable, asserted that 
“at present cable is an uncertain investment” and looked to BT 
(British Telecom) – whose chairman, Sir George Jefferson, was an 
influential witness – to help build the national network in return 
for being allowed to offer the entertainment services from which 
it had been excluded in the hope of encouraging the growth of 
cable.
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otherwise, Peacock believed the fully interconnected society 
would eventually materialise: “we hope that as broadcasting 
moves towards the full maturity of the sophisticated market, the 
justification for general restrictions imposed in the first century 
of broadcasting to reflect both the scarcity of the spectrum 
and the novelty of the medium will wither away…the end of all 
censorship arrangements would be a sign that broadcasting had 
come to age, like publishing three centuries ago…pre­publication 
censorship has no place in a free society".
Peacock did not imagine consumer sovereignty as a passive 
expression of “static wants” – rather as a “discovery mech­
anism” in which “viewers and listeners are the best ultimate 
judges of their own interests”. But what he had no interest in was 
“compulsory uplift” – if people “still make for junk food, that is 
their privilege in a free society”. 
What Peacock was forced to concede, however, was that his 
ideal system lay far in the future. He had to find an intellec­
tual, economic and practical link between that future and the 
present. What he seized upon was the intermediate technology 
of subscription. For Peacock, “the whole subject of subscription 
technology brings with it the opportunity for viewers and lis­
teners to pay for what they want to receive and to have a much 
greater choice of programmes…subscription technology can 
on the one hand simply be used as a more convenient device 
for collecting the licence fee; on the other hand it can open the 
door to an almost infinite number of channels or programmes or 
indeed many other facilities – banking, direct mail ordering, etc".
When the Peacock Report was published, the notion of sub­
scription as a mechanism for funding the BBC was widely 
ridiculed. Few had openly advocated it to Peacock, apart from 
myself and the National Consumers Council. Yet it had a long 
pedigree amongst economists, with notable papers published in 
1211962, 1968 and 1982 – one written by a former deputy chairman of 
the IBA.
What commentators appeared to have missed was that the 
idea of subscription featured heavily in the evidence from both 
the BBC and the Labour Party. The BBC, in acknowledging the 
deficiencies of the licence fee, explicitly said: “perhaps the most 
beguiling prospect for future alternative or ancillary funding lies 
in the direction of subscription”.
The BBC’s preference, of course, was for all channels to be 
scrambled: “such a system would end all prospect of evasion at a 
stroke, introduce an automatic additional payment for additional 
sets and, most important, eliminate unfair competition between 
ITV, still perceived as free, and ‘subscriber’ BBC".
Whether or not as a result of a tip­off about the Committee’s 
thinking, the Labour Party told Peacock: “there appear to 
be strong reasons for suspecting that subscription might be 
advanced as a likely medium term solution to the problem of 
financing the BBC…there is evidence (notably from an IBA study in 
1984) to suggest that demand for BBC programmes would mean 
that subscription could be charged at a considerably higher level 
than the existing licence fee". Moreover, “a subscription system 
would ensure the independence of the BBC from Government 
control and censorship”.
Yet the Labour Party opposed subscription, because it breached 
what it saw as two important principles. The first was that all 
services should be provided universally at a fixed price, which 
seems less a principle than a description of the crudest possible 
form of subscription. The second was that it might eliminate 
cross­subsidies between services – presumably between BBC1 
and BBC2, or between BBC television and BBC radio, but the 
Labour Party did not specify, nor explain why the cross­sub­
sidies would disappear, let alone why they constituted a principle. 
Indeed, supporters of subscription argued that the subsidies 
implicit in the licence fee system were not entirely welcome: 
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honest licence payers subsidised the dishonest licence evaders, 
the poor paid the same fee as the rich, private households sub­
sidised hotels, and those within easy reach of transmitters sub­
sidised those in remote areas. 
Labour’s greatest worry was that subscription services might 
not be universally taken up, and so lead to some kind of social 
exclusion. But, as Peacock pointed out, such exclusion was vol­
untary. “Optional subscription clearly breaches” the principle of 
universality, but it adds “an extra opportunity (opting out)” – and 
“government regulation of price or even quality of service…is 
one possible answer to the claim that subscription television is 
inherently divisive”.
Nor did Peacock accept the argument that “types of programming 
for which consumer demand is weak” might be squeezed out 
in a subscription service. This was a point made twenty years 
earlier by an American economist, Jora Minasian: “a subscription 
system can be expected to yield a more diversified programme 
menu than an advertising system because the former enables 
individuals, by concentrating their dollar votes, to overcome the 
‘unpopularity’ of their tastes”. And as Peacock had already noted, 
the licence fee could not register intensity of viewer preference 
at all.
Peacock was encouraged by the BBC’s apparent open­minded­
ness: “the BBC evidence…makes clear that subscription is 
feasible…there is at least some support in the BBC evidence for 
a subscription system (although there is more than one view 
in the Corporation) and a good deal of confidence within the 
Corporation in its ability to sell its services directly under such a 
system”.
What also struck Peacock was how vulnerable the BBC was to 
licence evasion. It did not control collection, which lay in the 
expensive hands of the Post Office. Estimated licence defaulters 
numbered 1.6 million households, yet just 85,000 evaders had 
123been convicted in the previous year. Their average fine was 
only £7 above the level of the licence fee. Moreover, Peacock’s 
researchers pointed out that the official evasion figures missed 
the clear discrepancy between the number of monochrome tele­
vision sets estimated to be in use and the much larger number of 
monochrome licences held – suggesting more than half a million 
further defaulting households.
Peacock could see that encryption of BBC services would 
effectively halt licence evasion: but the attractions of subscription 
went beyond that. As two­set and even three­set homes grew in 
number, the possibility of restoring the missing buoyancy in BBC 
finances beckoned. It was true that an encrypted signal could 
be fed to more than one set, but such sets could only allow the 
same programme to be viewed at any one time. If different sets 
were to be used for viewing different services, each would need a 
decoder: “subscription television thus has the potential of raising 
extra revenue from multiple­set owners”. Peacock even took care 
to note that a BBC funded by subscription “would preserve the 
long­established principle of British broadcasting that each major 
provider of television can count on its own distinctive source of 
revenue”.
Peacock conducted some fairly crude research into public will­
ingness to pay for the BBC voluntarily, but had to admit that “the 
numbers are awkwardly inconsistent, and we cannot place much 
reliance on them”. He estimated that take­up of the BBC on sub­
scription would be in the 45–95% range – not very helpful – with 
the likely outcome being 75–80%, leaving the BBC dependent 
on multi­set buoyancy to avoid either a subscription rate higher 
than the licence fee or a cut in quality of service. Nonetheless, 
so persuaded was he of the virtues of subscription that he rec­
ommended the switch to it be subsidised: “there is a strong case 
for the Government or the BBC paying for or providing cheap 
finance for the decoders…this would be an investment in the 
broadcasting market analogous, for instance, to investment in 
roads".
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was to copy the French and Italians and make compulsory the 
installation in every new television set of a special peritelevision 
socket. This would increase the cost of new televisions but greatly 
reduce the manufacturing cost of decoders that would plug into 
the sockets. 
Meanwhile, Peacock fully acknowledged that, if his perfect 
market was a distant stage three of the process, even stage two 
– subscription – was some years distant: though in his view “likely 
to start well before the end of the century”. Meanwhile, in stage 
one, the BBC needed stability, and the damaging effects of ITV’s 
entrenched inefficiency had to be curbed. This led to a flurry of 
proposals at the end of the Report, which bore little relation to 
the fifteen questions in the consultation document issued by the 
Committee at the start of their deliberations.
The final chapter – number 12 – of the Peacock Report contained 
his conclusions and recommendations. One can only assume it 
was written well after the rest of the Report and, indeed, after 
an intense debate amongst the members. The truth is that many 
of the ideas introduced at this stage had only the sketchiest 
connection with the previous chapters – for example, the call for 
40% of all television output to be provided, within ten years, by 
independent producers rather than the broadcasters themselves.
This signalled a tremendous victory for the independent lobby, 
which had first emerged as a force only five years earlier during 
the shaping of Channel 4. They argued that they represented 
diversity and lower costs – both calculated to appeal to Peacock, 
who pronounced: “the requirements for in­house production 
are at the root of union restrictive practices”. ITV and the BBC 
using independents – and not just Channel 4 – would “increase 
competition and multiply sources of supply”, as well as relieving 
the plight of the independents themselves, who were “con­
strained by their limited market and their virtual dependence on 
a single monopoly buyer”.
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to paragraphs 71–74 of his Report. Unfortunately, these para­
graphs deal only with the structure of Channel 4, and make no 
reference to independent producers at all. Similarly, the opening 
paragraph of Chapter 12, claiming that “much of the unpopularity 
of the licence fee arises from the annual lump sum nature of the 
payment, and the burden it inflicts on the poor”, refers us back to 
paragraph 209 – which has nothing to say about the annual lump 
sum. It was, in fact, the BBC in its own evidence to Peacock that 
made this assertion. Paragraphs 439–448 are then cited to jus­
tify saying: “the evidence we have received from public opinion 
surveys shows a degree of public willingness to pay directly for 
BBC programmes and services” – which is only true if you do not 
examine the word “degree” too carefully.
That the conclusions were so evidently put together in a hurry 
led some commentators to claim, as details of the last­minute 
arguments started to leak, that this was a “Committee desperate 
for something radical to say”. A fairer comment would be that the 
recommendations, unlike the Report, followed no logical pattern. 
They attempted to create a pathway to what the Report called 
stage two, in preparation for a stage three in the distant future, 
but with most recommended measures concentrated in stage 
one.
So recommendation two simply absolved BBC television of 
any requirement to accept advertisements before the advent 
of subscription; but recommendation seven gave the BBC the 
option to privatise radios 1 and 2 and local radio. Indeed five 
of the seven members of the Committee would have imposed 
such privatisation, in the belief that it would strengthen the 
commercial radio sector and do little damage to the BBC – saving 
annual running costs and providing a handy lump sum. The five 
even favoured a worker­management buy­out, though offering 
not a glimmer of evidence to support such a proposal.
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the BBC would be given control of collection, pensioners drawing 
supplementary pension in households wholly dependent on a 
pension would be exempt from the licence fee, and a £10 radio 
licence would be charged for car radios – despite the fact that this 
very notion had been discarded in the body of the Report! Again, 
if we look back at the BBC’s own evidence to Peacock, we can see 
the origin of the idea. Noting that the radio licence fee had been 
abolished in 1971, because collection costs were 25% of revenue, 
but when there were already a million radios in cars, the BBC 
noted regretfully: “fifteen years on we must ask whether total 
abolition might have damaged the BBC”.
This combination of measures Peacock thought would leave 
the BBC roughly neutral in financial terms. His preference for 
RPI­linking rather than using a broadcast costs index was that 
“this would put some pressure on the BBC to exploit its revenue­
earning potential more forcefully and to think more carefully 
before embarking on peripheral activities far removed from its 
core obligations”. The BBC was already sensitive to such implicit 
criticism, and had promised – once the DBS venture had collapsed 
– to keep its hands off cable and satellite – “the BBC seeks no 
significant part in these developments…the BBC’s claim, both for 
position and for funds, concerns its role as a continuing provider 
of new programmes for the whole nation”.
To open up broadcasting a little, Peacock proposed selling off the 
night­time hours ITV and the BBC were not using – again, citing 
the BBC’s evidence (in support of its own commercial proposal 
to download material at night for recording on videos) that “the 
marginal running costs of the BBC1 network were less than £500 
an hour”. More importantly, and most controversially, a majority 
of the Peacock committee recommended auctioning the ITV 
licences to the highest of those bidders who passed a quality 
threshold – a proposal designed to replace the featherbedding 
of the levy and introduce efficient use of spectrum, in equal 
measure.
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ownership of cable franchises to be removed, all restrictions on 
pay television to be lifted, and Channel 4 to be allowed the option 
of selling its own advertising, so giving up its dependence on ITV 
funding. As a final flourish, in anticipation of broadcast content 
eventually being subject simply to the law of the land, Peacock 
suggested that such legislation as the Obscene Publications Act 
should no longer exempt broadcasting on the grounds of it being 
separately regulated.
Peacock was not sure when the transfer to subscription might 
take place, so he offered a safety net to protect minority 
programming in stage two. He proposed that a Public Service 
Broadcasting Council be set up – perhaps funded by the ITV 
auction proceeds. This would support programmes offering 
knowledge, culture, criticism and experiment, on radio and tele­
vision, and would not be confined to any one channel. “If a full 
broadcasting market is eventually achieved, in which viewers 
and listeners can express preferences directly, the main role of 
public service could turn out to be the collective provision…of 
programmes which viewers and listeners are willing to support 
in their capacity of taxpayers and voters, but not directly as 
consumers".
Knowing that the BBC insisted that its public service role covered 
the full range of programmes – how else could the universal 
compulsory licence fee be justified? – Peacock anticipated that 
this idea would not be popular with the broadcasters, who would 
depict it as an Arts Council ghetto. “The present system is unlikely 
to last far into the 1990s,” warned Peacock. “Past successes…
may in the future create a fool’s paradise. It is time to recognise 
the need for public finance for public service programmes…the 
defenders of the duopoly may unwittingly be the worst enemies 
of high quality programmes in the arts, current affairs and for 
specialised tastes". Peacock’s rhetoric could not disguise a failure 
in logic: if subscription funding could be expected to sustain a full 
128 range of programming, why was a Public Service Broadcasting 
Council needed?
No doubt conscious that his 18 recommendations – a mere 
handful compared with the hundred or more of Beveridge, 
Pilkington and Annan – could easily be implemented or ignored 
selectively, Peacock concluded by saying that they were “designed 
to form part of a coherent strategy…it is not possible to pick and 
choose at will among them, without destroying the whole thrust". 
No doubt all chairmen are tempted to similar pieties.
But his final paragraph offered an overview rare in conciseness. 
“We have neither sought to ‘get the BBC off the hook’ nor to 
persecute it. If we had to summarise our conclusion by one 
slogan (which most of us would not want to do), it would be direct 
consumer choice rather than continuation of the licence fee. The 
arrangements we suggest for the latter, though designed to take 
the heat out of the subject, are designed to bridge the period 
before subscription becomes practicable. Eventually we hope to 
reach a position where the mystique is taken out of broadcasting 
and it becomes no more special than publishing became once the 
world became used to living with the printing press".
The Peacock Report was published in July 1986. It was greeted 
with a storm of abuse, anger and derision from broadcasters, 
regulators, unions, MPs and ministers. Gerald Kaufman described 
the Report as “ideological dementia” which “should be put in the 
waste paper basket”. A minister was heard to describe Peacock 
as a “dead duck”. There was universal astonishment that Peacock 
had both declined to re­shape the BBC and then spectacularly 
exceeded his remit by recommending major surgery on ITV and 
Channel Four. The IBA predicted that the separate selling of its 
own advertising would “wreck” Channel 4. One ITV chief, David 
Plowright of Granada, denouncing the licence auction, quipped 
that “we have already got one show on the air called The Price Is 
Right”. Another, Christopher Bland of LWT, called the auction “a 
pretty loopy procedure…a Friday afternoon suggestion”.
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With a mixture of scorn and admiration, it noted that “seldom 
has a government set up a committee with clearer instructions 
on precisely what it was expected to report…seldom has a 
committee so disappointed and defied its political masters”. 
One of Broadcast’s columnists, Nick Higham – now the BBC’s 
own media correspondent – gave the Report even shorter shrift. 
“It has brought in from the lunatic fringe two proposals for the 
organisation of broadcasting which even two years ago would 
have received scant serious attention from broadcasters or 
policy­makers. These are the scrambling of broadcast television 
signals so that they are accessible only to subscribers who have 
paid for the appropriate decoder, and the auctioning of the 
broadcasting frequency spectrum". Higham had no doubt of 
Peacock’s fate: “savaged by opposition politicians, dismissed by 
a patronising Home Secretary as ‘stimulating, challenging’ and 
having exceeded its brief, the Committee’s Report was shoved 
unceremoniously into the deepest pigeon­hole the Home Office 
could find, leaving only a few stray feathers to remind us of its 
passing". 
This dismissive diatribe proved decidedly premature. The 
Peacock Report may not have been entirely to Mrs Thatcher’s 
taste – she called herself an economic liberal, but freedom of 
speech attracted her far less – yet she chose to chair the cabinet 
committee dealing with broadcasting. Soon, the sheer power 
of Peacock’s arguments and Thatcher’s will would cut a swathe 
through the world of television. For this, Peacock can claim much 
of the credit – or the blame. 
With its coloured charts and diagrams, its sophisticated economic 
analyses, and its emphasis on the centrality of the consumer 
rather than the broadcaster, the Peacock Report looked, felt and 
read utterly differently from its predecessors. It was easily the 
most brilliant of the five such inquiries since the war: but because 
its focus was primarily on the distant future, it missed much that 
130 lay immediately ahead – such as the prospects for a fifth terres­
trial channel and the significance of medium­powered satellites. 
Even Peacock would probably have been surprised to find, just 
ten years after publication, 30% of the population enjoying access 
to 50 channels of television.
Yet, at its best, the intensity of his logic and the clarity of his 
vision dwarf his failings. The reverberations of his Report 
would be felt for a decade or more, even though his key rec­
ommendation – subscription funding – would only achieve its 
impact through a route he barely anticipated. 
In the last lecture of this series – entitled “The Politics of Digital” 
– I will trace the battle over Peacock, Mrs Thatcher’s calculated 
assault on television, the emergence of satellite as a key force for 
change, and the attempt to construct a new political rationale for 
regulating broadcasting within the framework of the digital rev­
olution. And finally, I will try to place in the context of the last fifty 
years the latest Review Committee, led by Gavyn Davies, whose 
terms of reference bear a remarkable resemblance to those of 
Peacock itself.
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After Peacock: 
The Politics Of Digital
11 March 1999
The Peacock Report, published in July 1986, had been 
simultaneously bullish and cautious about the future of broad­
casting. The technological prospects were alluring, but “any 
attempt to look ahead should…be governed by caution, humility 
and by a realistic view of what government policy can achieve”. 
Peacock even tried his one modest attempt at wit. Faced with 
an inflow of satellite programming, he predicted that “govern­
ments would find that, like King Canute, they could not control 
the waves”.
Professor Peacock had reckoned without Margaret Thatcher. 
Despite a series of embarrassing governmental setbacks in failed 
attempts to impose industrial preferences on broadcasting, 
the Prime Minister was still on the warpath. Douglas Hurd’s 
Home Office had signalled, immediately after publication, that 
the Peacock Report would be consigned “to the long grass”. But 
once Mrs Thatcher herself had taken the chair of the cabinet 
committee dealing with broadcasting, and brought on board 
her hard­liners – Lord Young, Norman Tebbit and Nigel Lawson 
– Hurd found himself outnumbered and outgunned. His most 
132 senior broadcasting civil servant, Quentin Thomas, reports 
having to accommodate the “very close interest” being shown by 
the Treasury and the Department for Trade and Industry.
By October 1986, Hurd was publicly supporting subscription – it 
“fits well into the general approach of this government” – and 
even questioning public service broadcasting – “it cannot chunter 
on for ever”. Mrs Thatcher herself characterised public service 
broadcasting as a “somewhat nebulous and increasingly outdated 
theory”.
Driving this attack politically was the continuing Conservative 
disquiet over the way broadcasters dealt with what Mrs Thatcher 
saw as the enemy. Even while Peacock was deliberating, a furious 
row had broken out between the BBC and Norman Tebbit over 
Kate Adie’s reporting from Tripoli of the American bombing of 
Libya. On this front, the BBC defended itself stoutly, but a libel 
action brought by two right­wing MPs, Gerald Howarth and Neil 
Hamilton, over an edition of Panorama entitled Maggie’s Militant 
Tendency, was settled on painfully expensive terms, above the 
heads of management, thanks to a U­turn by the Governors after 
the sudden death of the Chairman.
Soon afterwards, the Home Secretary who had appointed 
Peacock, Leon Brittan, had written to the BBC’s Governors to urge 
they withdraw from the schedules a documentary entitled Real 
Lives that profiled a republican and a loyalist closely identified 
with the paramilitaries in Northern Ireland. The unprecedented 
decision by the Governors to view the programme before trans­
mission, and delay its showing, eventually led to the peremptory 
dismissal of the BBC’s Director­General, Alasdair Milne, by his 
new chairman, Marmaduke Hussey.
However, the Peacock Report gave the government no immediate 
purchase on the BBC. Indeed, all broadcasters had rallied round 
what was seen as a beleaguered Corporation, out of a mixture of 
narrow and broad self­interest. ITV and Channel 4 had even less 
desire to see the BBC funded by advertisements than the BBC 
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collective virtues of a relatively closed and self­sustaining system. 
It was therefore all the more galling for the commercial broad­
casters to find themselves fighting the post­Peacock battles on 
their own. 
The BBC offered little support. Indeed, BBC Television’s Director 
of Programmes, Michael Grade added fuel to the Peacock fire by 
suggesting that Channel 4’s airtime should – as the Report had 
suggested – be sold separately from ITV’s: a view he renounced 
when suddenly installed as Channel 4’s new chief executive at 
a point in time when Channel 4’s board was still hostile to the 
proposal. But within two years the board had concluded that this 
particular battle was not worth fighting. They gave higher priority 
to fending off the threat of direct political appointments to their 
own membership, and negotiating a safety net to smooth the 
now­accepted transition from dependence on ITV.
It was ITV that was most exposed by the Peacock process. In a 
remarkable development, the Monopolies and Mergers Commis­
sion was asked to investigate ITV’s allegedly bloated labour 
costs. That the eventual findings were surprisingly positive was 
little consolation: Peacock had thoroughly entrenched in the 
Prime Minister’s mind that ITV was – in her famous expression 
– “the last bastion” of restrictive practices. She used this phrase 
at a Downing Street seminar in 1987, at which the broadcast 
establishment had found themselves facing – amongst others – 
Thatcher, Lawson, Young, Peacock, the independent lobby and 
such Number 10 policy and industrial advisers as Brian Griffiths 
and Jeffrey Sterling. 
Also there was Michael Green of Carlton Communications, a 
cousin by marriage of Lord Young and a contributor to Con­
servative funds, who had been frustrated in an attempted 
take­over of Thames Television by an IBA veto. His ambition 
to win an ITV licence for Carlton remained, and he was more 
than willing to use his political contacts eventually to achieve it. 
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Director­General, John Whitney, who by his own admission put 
up a disastrous performance. ITV as a whole suffered a severe 
handbagging.
Mrs Thatcher had already decided to ride roughshod over the 
least palatable – to her taste – of Peacock’s recommendations: 
progressive freedom of speech for broadcasters. Her 1987 
election manifesto had included a promise to impose stricter con­
trol on portrayals of sex and violence. Within months of winning 
that election, the Conservatives established a Broadcasting 
Standards Council, appointing to its chairmanship Sir William 
Rees­Mogg, who had for long – from his vantage point as deputy 
chairman of its Governors – deplored the BBC’s lack of editorial 
discipline. The BSC was given statutory status in the 1990 Broad­
casting Act.
Meanwhile, in 1988, ITV broadcast an edition of This Week entitled 
Death On The Rock, analysing what had happened when three 
unarmed IRA terrorists had been shot dead on the streets of 
Gibraltar by an SAS squad. The Home Secretary, Douglas Hurd, 
who was responsible for broadcasting, declined a request from 
the Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, to intervene with 
the IBA to prevent its transmission. So Howe took on the task 
himself. The IBA, having seen the film – which had been commis­
sioned and vetted by me, as Director of Programmes at Thames 
– approved it for broadcast. Sir Geoffrey denounced both Thames 
and the IBA publicly. Most Fleet Street newspapers, taking their 
cue from Downing Street, were equally vituperative – expensively 
so for those which libelled one of the film’s interviewees, Carmen 
Proetta. Mrs Thatcher was bitter: “worse than treason”, she 
fulminated to a Japanese film crew. 
That put an end to whatever doubts ITV might have had up to 
that point about the government’s determination to impose 
the Peacock auction. The IBA, ever since Lord Thomson had 
replaced Lady Plowden at its head, had searched unsuccessfully 
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than simply a beauty contest every ten or twelve years, when 
a handful of incumbents could expect to be dislodged for no 
better reason than “pour encourager les autres”. After Death 
On The Rock, the IBA too came into the line of fire, along with its 
appointees, the ITV companies.
However, it would be wrong to see the auctioning of the ITV 
licences simply as a punitive measure. The idea of a spectrum 
market had a long and honourable pedigree, dating back till at 
least the 1950s. Harold Lever, one of Harold Wilson’s brightest 
and most inventive cabinet ministers, had floated in the 1970’s the 
idea of treating ITV franchises like North Sea oil fields – as scarce 
public assets whose return to the Treasury should be maximised. 
Even the Annan Report contained an appendix on “The Profits 
of Advertising­Financed Television”, by a Dr Hindley, which asked 
why those who sought a right to broadcast did not “bid a price…in 
competition with other potential users”.
In rejecting the idea, Annan had quoted approvingly Pilkington’s 
view that there was “no natural connection between the best all­
round qualification to provide a public service and the amount of 
money an applicant might offer or think it prudent to offer”.
Peacock had no such resistance to economic logic, citing the New 
Zealand authorities who had described giving away spectrum as 
inherently inefficient and wasteful – like giving away wool. Only 
a spectrum market would allow Parliament and the regulators to 
place a proper value on the trade­off between the full commercial 
value of a broadcast licence and the reduction in that value 
flowing from the requirement to carry elements of public service 
programming within an otherwise commercial service. Whilst 
Peacock was sitting, the then leader of what were then the Social 
Democrats, David Owen, called for ITV licences to be auctioned.
In Peacock’s view, a sensible balance could be achieved by setting 
a reserve price on each licence, laying down a threshold of quality 
any would­be bidder must cross, and then allowing the highest 
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Exchequer and squeezing waste out of the broadcast operation – 
equally desirable outcomes. 
However, that there was a punitive element in the government’s 
agenda was a conclusion hard to resist. What emerged in its 1988 
White Paper – six months after the broadcast of Death On The 
Rock – was a version of ITV hard to recognise. ITV would not even 
be allowed to retain its name, instead being required to call itself 
channel three. The IBA, which had authorised Death On The Rock’s 
broadcast, was itself to be re­cast: as the Independent Television 
Commission. Independent Television News, the ITV news provider 
wholly owned by the contractors, would be required to bring in 
outside shareholders: this the result of private lobbying of Mrs 
Thatcher by a disgruntled news presenter using political con­
nections to settle scores with owners insufficiently appreciative 
– so he thought – of ITN’s potential.
In practice, these petty measures made little difference. ITV 
declined to change its name. The IBA did become the ITC, but with 
identical personnel – even absorbing the previously indepen­
dent Cable Authority. The required change in ITN’s ownership 
was largely ignored by the companies, using the simple device 
of placing their surplus shareholdings in ITN in deadlocked shell 
companies rather than in their broadcast arms.
But ITV lost on all the big issues. It was decided that the auction 
of licences would go ahead, without even the protection of the 
reserve price envisaged by Peacock. How the Treasury came to 
this bizarre arrangement – which defied common sense – has 
never been explained: it was certainly not for want of explanation 
to the Chancellor, Nigel Lawson. As a result, several successful 
bidders for ITV licences secured them at far below their market 
value, costing the Exchequer hundreds of millions of pounds 
over the years. As if to add insult to injury, the 1990 Broadcasting 
Act actually provided for subsequent renewal of the ITV licences 
to be based on a reserve market price set by the ITC – a belated 
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the outset.
By the time the 1990 Act took final shape, Lawson had fallen 
out with Mrs Thatcher, and in the attendant cabinet re­shuffle, 
a former junior broadcasting minister, David Mellor, had been 
re­instated to make sense of the legislation. His first task had 
been to head off the possible resignation of the IBA chairman – 
who was also chairman­designate of the ITC – over the auction 
process. George Russell had made clear that he would not simply 
rubber­stamp the highest sealed bid. So Mellor tightened up the 
quality threshold and also conceded a right for the ITC to reject 
the highest bidder in exceptional circumstances.
Interestingly, Peacock himself went to see Mellor, to float the idea 
that there might be a trade­off between the level of bid and the 
quality of programming offered. However, as he told ITV’s official 
history, “in the end this proposal was rejected – the govern­
ment said ‘no, there’s a threshold: you get over Becher’s Brook; 
it doesn’t matter how high you jump, and then after that it ’s the 
bid’”.
The exceptional circumstances clause proved to be something 
of a mirage. For instance, Thames Television, of which I was 
Programme Director at the time, had a formidable track record. 
But this was irrelevant in the licence auction, as complete 
newcomers to television broadcasting could apply, and there­
fore the only fair comparison would be between future promises, 
not past performance. Moreover, under new networking 
arrangements required by the ITC, individual licensees could 
not be held to account if their promised programmes were not 
later commissioned. With its high historic cost base – developed 
over three decades when a condition of holding a licence was the 
proven ability to deliver high­quality programmes – Thames felt it 
more than likely that it would be outbid by a competitor with no 
such historic cost base.
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and hoped that its clear edge in quality might trigger the 
exceptionality provision. This strategy failed, and it was galling 
to learn afterwards that George Russell felt Thames might have 
been better advised to bid less and thereby be able to promise 
even higher quality – the very trade­off proposed by Peacock and 
rejected by Mellor.
Of course, Thames was not the only casualty of the system. Some 
incumbents were rejected for over­bidding, even though they 
demonstrably possessed sufficient funds to afford their bid, or 
indeed had forecast future ITV revenue more accurately than 
the ITC. Another of those outbid – TV­AM – actually received a 
note of condolence from Mrs Thatcher herself, protesting “we 
didn’t mean you”: begging the obvious question of whom they did 
mean. Those of us at Thames were in little doubt.
Lawson later described the ITV auction as having had “an 
unusually high farce content”. That so many of the franchises 
attracted only one or two bidders surely suggested a flaw in the 
design or the concept. Lawson, however, put the blame on the 
Home Office’s last­minute meddling, echoing his former Prime 
Minister’s sentiments, who felt that “unfortunately, in the Home 
Office, the broadcasters often found a ready advocate”. Indeed, 
Mrs Thatcher attacked the results as “a compromise which 
turned out to be less satisfactory than when the ITC bestowed 
the franchises…in the old­fashioned way”. By contrast, Mellor 
believed the Bill he had inherited to have been a “wretched” 
affair, reflecting the ideological preferences of ministers like 
Lawson who thought any “group of paint merchants could run a 
television company”. But at least Michael Green finally achieved 
Carlton’s desire to break into ITV.
ITV suffered another defeat, based on a calculated gamble. In an 
attempt to head off the separate selling of Channel 4’s airtime, 
it espoused the idea of Channel 5 as a way of delivering – in 
due course – the competitive airtime market the advertisers so 
139wanted. Interestingly, as late as 1984, Douglas Hurd, in his first 
stint as a Home Office minister, had told the House of Commons 
that it was “unlikely that a fifth channel could be added to those 
available from terrestrial transmitters”. Not surprisingly, Peacock 
virtually ignored the prospect of a fifth channel, other than in 
the context of noting how the IBA’s regulatory powers seemed 
to depend upon restricting entry of competitors into commercial 
television. The conflict between regulation and freedom of entry, 
said Peacock, “would become acute if there were a chance of a 
5th or 6th channel for ordinary terrestrial broadcasting”.
When the DTI and the BBC’s engineers worked out in 1987 how 
to create a fifth network covering 65% of the country, ITV hoped 
its instant support for that channel to be advertising­supported 
would allow the more immediate danger of competition from 
Channel 4 to be averted. They pointed to Peacock’s own state­
ment that “even the direct sale of its own advertising by Channel 
4 would breach the principle of no competition for the same 
source of revenue”. 
Peacock’s rationale for splitting off Channel 4 was scarcely a 
principled one: he simply observed that “Channel Four is now at 
a point where its costs are of a similar order to the revenue from 
advertising”. On that basis, he believed it should be offered the 
option of separation, despite his repeated assertion that once 
the protection of ITV from direct competition for revenue from 
rivals went, “the IBA will find it extremely difficult to enforce its 
standards”.
The government’s view of the issue ignored the potential impact 
on programme standards. The White Paper – whose subtitle, 
tellingly, was Competition, Choice and Quality, in that order – was 
brutally frank about whose interests should prevail. “Greater 
competition between those selling television air time – a pressing 
demand from those whose expenditure on advertising has paid 
for the independent television system – is essential. The govern­
ment’s wider proposals for a more competitive independent 
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such an integrated ITV system will no longer be available. Struc­
tural change is accordingly unavoidable". Alice in Wonderland’s 
Queen of Hearts had found a kindred spirit.
When the Channel 4 board eventually took up the option, the 
ITV companies found they had lost on all fronts. They would face 
the licence auction, the separation of Channel 4 and competition 
from Channel 5, all virtually at the same time (though in practice, 
Channel 5 was delayed for four years after the first invitation 
to apply for the licence produced just one candidate, whose 
business plan the ITC rejected).
So Channel 5 – uniquely in the history of UK analogue terrestrial 
television – was triggered without the benefit of any committee 
of inquiry. Indeed, Sam Brittan protested at the very decision to 
allow it to be advertiser­funded: he thought it the ideal oppor­
tunity to test out subscription television, along the French lines 
of allocating a terrestrial frequency to Canal Plus, so greatly 
reducing the cost barriers to entry for the consumer.
This was not the only setback to Peacock’s favoured project of 
subscription. Immediately after the Report was published, the 
Home Office commissioned a firm of consultants led by Charles 
Jonscher to advise on the feasibility of subscription. Jonscher’s 
appointment can scarcely have disappointed Peacock. He had 
written a monograph in 1985 that might have served as a blue­
print for the Peacock proposals. He had seen the future – the 
addressable set­top converter – and thought it not only worked, 
but provided “the essential basis for an efficient market to exist”. 
At the right price, “it would be possible to introduce such devices 
into all UK television sets, and then to scramble the transmissions 
of the BBC and any other non­advertiser­supported services in 
order to introduce the new transaction system”.
Jonscher had few doubts. “At some time in the future, perhaps 
five years from now, the price of these devices will have fallen 
to the point where the BBC could scramble its services without 
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sive cost barrier if they are to continue obtaining BBC services. 
The licence fee could then become conditional on the viewer’s 
wish to view BBC programmes".
Jonscher pointed to the fact that the high cost of VCRs and rented 
tapes “has not deterred a very large proportion of UK house­
holds from subscribing to this new medium”, as he called it. “This 
can make us confident that television channels…will be able to 
command substantial revenues if financed on a subscription 
basis. For this reason the BBC need not be afraid of switching 
to this new technology at such time when the price drops to a 
sufficiently low level – perhaps in the region of £50 per unit. This, 
and not commercial advertising, is clearly the correct long run 
solution to the funding problem".
Jonscher’s report, published in 1987, was the same length as 
Peacock’s and was similarly laden with graphs and tables. But his 
conclusions were utterly at variance with Peacock’s, and indeed 
with his own previously published views. Sophisticated analyses 
had led him to the clear conclusion that subscription was inferior 
to both the licence fee and advertising as a means of funding 
broadcast services, in terms of consumer welfare. Moreover, he 
calculated, neither BBC1 nor BBC2 could be expected to sustain 
themselves simply through subscription. 
In addition to these “negative economic impacts of transferring 
BBC financing substantially to subscription basis”, Jonscher was 
in no doubt that “in a subscription environment…the BBC would…
change its programme mix substantially…if subscription were to 
be the only source of BBC income…the Corporation would have 
to switch almost completely from the current mix to one which 
relies heavily on ‘premium’ programming” – by which he meant 
sport and movies.
This was a blow for the subscription lobby. Unhappily for them, 
the mass of detail in the Jonscher Report effectively concealed 
its profound methodological weakness. The reason Jonscher 
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only successful pay services available to him for examination 
depended on these genres. There was no precedent for a 
generalist service, let alone one with a pre­existing 50% share 
of viewing, transferring to subscription. Indeed, Jonscher could 
not even imagine more than three pay services flourishing in any 
market. His analysis therefore failed to address the BBC’s unique 
position.
More importantly, his entire edifice of consumer welfare 
calculations was built on the flimsy base of interviews with just 
84 participants in 13 discussion groups, who were, as Jonscher 
himself conceded, highly unrepresentative of the population 
as a whole in their viewing habits. Despite the report stating 
that “the purpose of this survey was not to generate statistically 
valid quantitative results”, all the Report’s findings on consumer 
behaviour and welfare were calculated from the responses of 
these 84, even though when asked such a basic matter as how 
many hours a week they might purchase from the four channels, 
“more than a third of the respondents found this question too 
difficult to answer”.
To compound this gross error, Jonscher then constructed all his 
calculations on the assumption of one television set per home. As 
Peacock had already made clear, however, a key attraction of sub­
scription was the opportunity it represented to restore buoyancy 
and fairness to the funding of the BBC by making a charge per set 
rather than a charge per home. Only after having arrived at his 
negative findings did Jonscher lamely add: “we note in conclusion 
one potential attraction of the use of access control technology 
for the collection of the licence fee, namely the ability to charge 
a separate licence fee for each set in the home”. Given that the 
average number of sets per home was already nearly two, the 
failure to accommodate this factor in his calculations effectively 
rendered the Jonscher Report worthless as a document to shape 
policy, despite the wealth of information it had assembled.
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wisdom, and a range of witnesses, including the BBC, the IBA, 
the Home Office and the Broadcasting Research Unit, cited them 
to the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, which held 
extensive hearings in 1988 into the future of broadcasting. Only 
two academic economists from the London Business School – 
who happened strongly to support the licence fee – challenged 
Jonscher’s findings on subscription, believing the likelihood to be 
very small indeed of people opting out of the BBC if the charge 
for it became voluntary.
Indeed, the LBS then embarked upon a two­year research project, 
jointly led by a former senior research specialist from the BBC. 
Their report on “Viewers’ Willingness to Pay” was published in 
1990. Its ingenious methodology demonstrated that “British tele­
vision viewers are willing to pay far higher prices than the current 
licence fee to keep their mainstream channels…the results 
suggest that BBC­TV could easily be financed by subscription 
instead of the licence fee: if the BBC were to charge as much as 
the market would bear, it could be highly profitable". The LBS still 
preferred licence­fee funding, on the grounds that subscription 
operating costs appeared at the time to be greater than the cost 
of licence fee evasion and collection. However, even the LBS failed 
to build into its study the multi­set factor, resting its case simply 
on the finding that “almost no­one would stop watching BBC1 or 
(mostly) BBC2 with voluntary subscriptions at about the licence 
fee overall level”.
The Home Affairs Committee had published its report in the 
summer of 1988. It broadly endorsed Peacock’s approach, with 
the addition of the early introduction of Channel Five and of a 
five­year timetable for a 25% independent production quota, 
ahead of Peacock’s ten­year target of 40%. Despite the fact that 
most of the independent producers were to the left politically, 
the Conservatives warmed to them as mini­capitalists who would 
be a force for greater efficiency in broadcasting. In my days as an 
independent, I had once led deputations to Alasdair Milne at the 
144 BBC and Lady Plowden at the IBA, asking for a 2% quota. Now the 
government bludgeoned a 25% voluntary quota into existence, 
with the threat of a higher statutory figure if the BBC and ITV 
failed to comply. 
So what had been almost an afterthought in the Peacock Report 
was swiftly implemented, and was to lead to profound change in 
the industry. The partial disaggregation of what had previously 
been a locked vertical structure of resources, production, broad­
casting, transmission and distribution set loose a remorseless 
logic, not least in the BBC. Its effects are still being felt.
The Home Affairs Committee also reminded the Government of 
Peacock’s desire for peritelevision sockets to become mandatory 
in new television sets from 1988. It now recommended shifting 
the date to 1990 to reflect the intervening delay. However, the 
Jonscher Report had largely undermined this notion, pointing out 
that there were many means of achieving the same outcome, and 
arguing that the issue of such sockets really lay outside its terms 
of reference. So it had made no recommendation. 
Curiously, the Home Office itself, in evidence to the Commons 
Committee, claimed Jonscher had recommended against the 
mandatory socket. In any event, the 1988 White Paper remained 
unconvinced, whilst still arguing that the BBC must prepare for 
the eventual introduction of subscription in place of the licence 
fee. “To provide a financial incentive” for such a transfer, “the 
Government intends after April 1991 to agree licence fee increases 
of less than the RPI increase”. 
The peritelevision socket – or the scart connection as it later 
became known – eventually became mandatory for larger tele­
vision sets through a European Commission directive. But by 
then, the whole issue of subscription had been hi­jacked by 
Rupert Murdoch, who proved in spectacular fashion what the 
research from the National Consumer Council and the London 
Business School had suggested – that the dissatisfaction with 
the existing four channels expressed by nearly half of all viewers, 
145and the willingness of viewers to pay for television far beyond 
the level of the licence fee, could be converted into a substantial 
revenue stream.
By an odd coincidence, the day the Broadcasting Act of 1990 
had received the Royal Assent was also the day that Murdoch’s 
Sky Television had merged with its IBA­sponsored rival, British 
Satellite Broadcasting, in the form of BSkyB. This deal had out­
raged a helpless IBA, as well as the liberal press, especially when 
they discovered that Murdoch had forewarned Mrs Thatcher of 
it at a private meeting. Indeed, nearly all the sins attributed to 
Murdoch in the satellite television business are also blamed on 
Thatcher, who is assumed to have helped her political admirer 
and fellow outsider in his broadcasting successes.
The facts do little to support this conspiracy hypothesis. Murdoch 
had rescued London Weekend Television soon after its 1968 
launch, when it fell into financial and managerial crisis. But the 
regulator at the time – the ITA – had baulked at letting such a 
commercially­minded Australian entrepreneur actually take over 
the running of LWT. He had bowed out, amid much bitterness, 
and concentrated on building up his newspaper empire – and 
here there is no question but that the Thatcher cabinet facilitated 
his take­over of Times Newspapers by not referring it for a 
monopolies inquiry.
In television, however, Murdoch was spinning his wheels. It was 
Robert Maxwell who was the potential beneficiary of the Govern­
ment’s mid­1980’s de­regulation of cable. (Not that Maxwell had 
the business skills to capitalise on this, even letting a half share 
in the hugely valuable MTV Europe slip through his fingers.) 
Murdoch, meanwhile, was distributing his Sky satellite channel 
to European cable systems, losing tens of millions over six years 
before accepting that there was virtually no pan­European 
advertising market. When the rules were changed in 1985 to allow 
domestic premises to install dishes, it was to facilitate the success 
of UK DBS, not Rupert Murdoch.
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Council of Europe (which embraced 21 countries rather than the 
EU’s then 12) led to agreements requiring all member states to 
accept satellite transmissions emanating from other member 
states. Some degree of harmonised regulation was established, 
with the UK supporting Swedish moves to make such regulation 
realistic. Murdoch played no part in this ground­clearing process, 
but was swift to respond when one EU member, Luxembourg, 
defied the working agreement amongst European telephone 
companies – nearly all state­owned monopolies – that medium­
powered satellites should only be used for telecommunications 
purposes.
A Luxembourg company, SES/Astra, wanted to use one of 
Luxembourg’s internationally agreed space slots for a satellite 
targeting 60 centimetre dishes that could be attached to 
domestic premises across virtually the whole of Western Europe. 
There was much regulatory disapproval – when Thames chose 
to invest in Astra, the IBA queried the satellite’s legal status, 
echoing the allegations of piracy aimed at Radio Luxembourg 
in the 1930’s. But when BT broke ranks with its fellow telephone 
companies and chose to support Astra, official hostility fell away. 
Murdoch promptly booked four transponders on the satellite to 
re­launch Sky Television as Sky One, along with news, film and 
sports channels.
His surprise move took off guard the BSB consortium that had 
won the right to use the official high­powered UK satellite slots, 
beating off other applicants that had included Michael Green 
and Rupert Murdoch. BSB dismissed the Sky threat, mistakenly 
believing the Astra dishes would retail at two or three times the 
price of their own smaller ones. Launching 14 months later, BSB 
could never erode Sky’s head­start. Both operators lost huge 
amounts of money, with Murdoch’s entire business – News 
Corporation – coming close to financial meltdown. In the end, it 
was BSB’s shareholders who finally lost their nerve, conceding 
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the equal split of ownership.
Thatcher’s role in all this was never more than marginal. She 
could no more have prevented Sky’s launch than the even­
tual merger. That BSB was burdened with unnecessary costs 
and regulations simply reflected a long history of governments 
believing they could indulge their prejudices irrespective of 
market forces. It is true that Sky was boosted heavily by the 
Murdoch press – but no more so than ONDigital being boosted 
by ITV. Indeed, if any Conservative­supporting media operator 
can be said to have benefited in business terms from government 
decisions, Michael Green’s is the name that springs to mind.
In any case, what made Sky work was not so much the merger – 
in December 1990, BSkyB was still losing £10 million a week – as 
determined management, a close understanding of consumer 
preferences and technological innovation. Here, too, Murdoch 
was to be accused of unfair practices, in building a vertically­
integrated company that owned subscriber management 
systems, encryption technology, a smart card company, a dish 
installation business, transponder leases, production and trans­
mission facilities, and access to the films and series produced by 
the News Corporation subsidiary, Fox.
Yet the truth is that, without all those aspects to its business, 
BSkyB would not have been a business – and nobody was going 
to do it for Murdoch. Indeed, most competitors forecast he would 
fail – because old­fashioned PAL signals could not be encrypted, 
or the smart cards would be swamped by pirate versions, or 
people would refuse to have unsightly dishes on their walls, or 
British broadcasting was simply too good for anything other than 
premium movies or sport to find a market. That premium movies 
and sport only take a quarter of satellite and cable viewing today, 
and that dozens of niche and general channels have managed 
to flourish off the back of Murdoch’s enormous gamble and 
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thinking over many years.
But the terrestrial broadcasters fought back, finding a strong 
ally in the cable industry that the BBC had denounced to the 
Hunt Inquiry as socially divisive. The cable programme offering 
was immeasurably strengthened by the availability of Sky 
programming, but cable’s marginal costs were largely in Sky’s 
control and marginal revenue largely flowed to Sky’s pockets. 
The plaintive cries from the cable companies led to regular OFT 
investigations of Sky’s alleged abuse of its dominant position. No 
complaint was ever upheld, but the clear public perception was 
created that Sky was an unscrupulous competitor.
ITV suffered a major psychological blow when it lost its biggest 
sporting contract – top level league football – to Sky in 1992. But 
its revenues were barely affected, and the importance of the 
Premier League to Sky has been much exaggerated: the biggest 
single boost to Sky’s business came, not from the launch of the 
Premier League in August 1992, but from the launch of the Multi­
Channels package in September 1993. The proportion of sport 
on Sky that has been diverted from terrestrial television – the 
biggest fear of successive committees of inquiry in relation to pay 
television – is less than 5%. The BBC has lost more major sport to 
ITV, Channel 4 and even Channel 5 than to Sky.
Even so, a substantial body of anti­Murdoch opinion, carefully 
guided by the BBC, managed in 1996 to overturn the government 
majority in the House of Lords, and secure a ban on the listed 
sporting events – eight in all, including the Cup Final and Wim­
bledon – being sold exclusively to limited circulation channels. 
The BBC had also judged it worthwhile to invest in expert 
evidence to support cable complaints against Sky. And it strongly 
supported moves within the European Parliament to impose tight 
controls on the development of the next generation of pay tele­
vision, using digital technology.
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the public interest as well as its own interest in all this – and 
for the BBC, the stakes were high: digital could make or break 
the Corporation. For all players, the attractions of digital were 
considerable. The new technology increased the number of 
channels that could be squeezed into any distribution pipeline, 
promised improved picture and sound quality, and permitted 
greater interactivity, particularly as television, telephones and 
computers could all now use the same language. Those who had 
complained – rightly or wrongly – of Sky’s alleged abuse of its 
dominant position in analogue pay television were determined 
that, if it achieved a similar position in digital, it would be unable 
to abuse it.
Even the Conservatives – even under Thatcher – introduced 
media cross­ownership rules, designed to prevent the biggest 
newspaper proprietors from owning more than a small stake 
in terrestrial television. Murdoch’s critics felt this missed the 
point: it was in satellite pay television that he had been allowed 
to build an immensely powerful position. Yet who could have 
prevented it? Satellite transponders were not a scarce resource 
– the IBA currently licenses over 200 satellite services. Moreover, 
if they were leased from a non­UK source, they were not in the 
government’s gift either to allocate or to regulate in great detail. 
Any attempt to impose tight ownership rules on non­domestic 
satellite channels would have been self­defeating: operations 
would simply have transferred, perfectly legally, elsewhere in the 
EU, costing thousands of jobs in the UK.
Instead, a new form of regulation emerged, based on fair trading 
rather than service content. The competition authorities required 
Sky to make all its programming available to its cable rivals, 
though conversely cable­exclusive programming could be with­
held from the satellite platform. Sky’s rate­card for its services 
was regulated. It was forbidden from requiring cable companies 
to take one of its channels as a condition of acquiring any other 
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digital it would have to start again.
In digital, the forces wary of Sky identified two areas where new 
controls might be imposed. The first battle was over the design 
of decoder boxes themselves, which took place at the industrial, 
regulatory and political levels in Europe. A determined attempt 
– with the BBC and British MEPs very much to the fore – was 
made to impose either a ban on proprietary conditional access 
systems in digital boxes, or a separate common interface that 
could be used by broadcasters free­riding on the back of the 
pioneer investors after a sufficient population of boxes had been 
established. In the end, industrial logic prevailed over political 
preference: neither measure was implemented, and the pros­
pect of digital dying for lack of investors faded. However, Sky and 
other users of proprietary systems were faced with an array of 
regulatory controls against abuse.
The other battlefield concerned the electronic programme 
guide – the navigation system that enabled viewers to steer 
through the plethora of choice available in digital. The possibility 
of manipulation was clear. The BBC even produced a £10,000 
cod video showing how a purported Sky EPG might banish BBC 
services to remote parts of the system. This backfired somewhat 
when Sky was able to demonstrate how the BBC’s own listings 
guides – on television and in print – discriminated against its 
competitors, especially non­terrestrial ones. However, the invest­
ment paid off, as ministers and regulators were persuaded to 
impose strict conditions on the way EPGs were designed.
In the event, as the experience of Sky Multi­Channels had already 
shown, far from wanting to exclude rivals from its platform, Sky 
was keen for all of them to come on board, with prominent slots 
on the EPG. It was Sky’s competitors who chose to withhold their 
services – notably, ITV and ITV2; and that was because their 
owners now had their own platform they wished to favour, as a 
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digital terrestrial television, or DTT.
In preparing for the digital age, the BBC’s most important victory 
was in persuading Whitehall and the other terrestrial broad­
casters of the virtues of DTT. That the existing analogue masts 
could be used for DTT was easy enough to see. That up to thirty 
channels could be squeezed into a terrestrial system which 
currently barely provided five was also evident. That most people 
would be able to receive these without a dish or cable box, but on 
their existing aerial, seemed likely.
For cable and satellite, the transfer to digital was a business 
decision, not a political one. What was harder to understand 
was either who would pay for DTT transmission, costing at 
least £70 million a year in addition to the costs of the analogue 
terrestrial system, or which consumers would be attracted to 
such a limited array of channels – fewer even than in analogue 
cable and satellite, and a fraction of what these platforms could 
offer in digital. Yet there were powerful political and regulatory 
attractions in DTT.
For Westminster politicians, in the absence of DTT, there was 
the unwelcome prospect of a digital television system effectively 
outside their control and potentially dominated by Murdoch. 
And paradoxically, a limited capacity system, allocated by UK 
regulators, held out the possibility of preserving a central place 
for the traditional broadcasters, even in the age of spectrum 
plenty. The dizzy visions of electronic publishing, beyond the 
effective reach of any regulators, could be blinkered off in a re­
invented version of spectrum scarcity.
A typical trade­off was arranged. In return for all the terres­
trial broadcasters agreeing to transmit their analogue services 
in parallel in digital for many years, they were all allocated 
additional capacity in the best half of the thirty­channel DTT 
system. This they could use to start launching new services within 
a controlled environment that they could continue to dominate. 
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the government sufficient to induce their co­operation – in 
effect, the public is paying for the DTT transmission system. The 
other half of the capacity was put out to tender to commercial 
operators.
The winning bid came from a consortium of Carlton and Granada 
– who now owned two­thirds of ITV – and BSkyB itself. However, 
under pressure from the European competition authorities, and 
the telecommunications regulator OFTEL, the ITC forced BSkyB to 
withdraw as a shareholder, but to leave its promised programme 
services in place. The government, through the ITC, also created a 
complex set of ownership and content rules for DTT. Undeterred 
by the experience of the 1980s, and without the benefit of any 
public inquiry on the post­war pattern, a politically­driven broad­
casting agenda had been re­instated, just at a time when the 
Peacock era of direct consumer choice appeared within reach.
It has been a surprising turn of events, not without risk. Both 
Conservative and Labour administrations have seen the virtue 
of a limited attempt at shaping the digital market. The public 
justification has been that the consumer benefits of digital 
broadcasting are potentially very large, and that a three­plat­
form system should hasten its rapid adoption. DTT also allowed 
consumers to switch to digital simply by purchasing a digital 
television set, without any need to subscribe to pay channels or 
purchase a separate decoder. Moreover, the faster the universal 
take­up of digital, the more quickly the government could re­pos­
sess the analogue terrestrial spectrum, so delivering a potential 
one­off windfall in the multi­billion pound sale of that spectrum 
for telecommunications use.
The reality of that windfall should not be taken for granted. The 
ITC has already warned that switching off the analogue broadcast 
system is likely to take even longer than the 21 years that passed 
between deciding to switch off the 405­line transmitters in favour 
of 625­line ones, and actually doing it in 1985. Today, television 
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sets, and nearly every home has a video recorder. Virtually every 
single piece of functioning hardware will need to be upgraded to 
digital before switching off analogue becomes politically pos­
sible. The idea that a switch­off date even five years ahead could 
be announced, say when 75% of homes have one digital set, is 
fraught with danger. 
The politics of digital are far more complex than the version 
of broadcasting Peacock imagined. Economic regulation has 
emerged as a key factor in government involvement. Ministers 
are now contemplating how to manage the mix of content and 
competition regulation, as broadcasting converges with other 
digital technologies. 
The broadcasting market has grown rapidly, but there is still a 
major degree of public sector provision – not just through the 
licence fee and the cost of Welsh and Gaelic services, but in the 
implicit public subsidy of Channels 3, 4 and 5, who pay reduced 
– or nil – amounts to gain access to their valuable frequencies, in 
exchange for accepting public service obligations. Even in the age 
of ostensible spectrum plenty, there is still a premium for scarce 
terrestrial frequencies, on which the great majority of homes are 
dependent.
The fair competition issues now go well beyond Sky’s activities. 
We have already seen the ITC issue a new set of cross­promotion 
guidelines after ITV was adjudged to have abused the right to 
promote digital television in promotional airtime by supporting 
the terrestrial platform in opposition to satellite. New questions 
come thick and fast.
Should ITV and its effective subsidiary, ONDigital, be allowed to 
bid jointly for major sports rights, such as the Champions League 
football, when no other broadcaster has similar access to both 
free­to­air and pay channels? Should free­to­air rights and pay 
rights for such championships be separated and sold as stand­
alone packages, as is required for live and highlights rights by 
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their costs are driven up several percentage points by Carlton 
and Granada selling £50 million of their own airtime to their own 
group companies? Should the BBC be allowed to buy all rights 
to a tennis tournament, knowing full well that it will schedule 
only the highlights of the final on its main services, relegating 
live coverage to BBC Choice, available to just a small minority of 
homes?
How substantial a player in the commercial market­place do we 
want the BBC to become? Are its commercial activities abroad as 
sensitive as those at home? Does it matter if its commercial arm – 
which makes its money out of the exploitation of licence­funded 
programmes – loses money on investments overseas? How does 
the BBC balance the short­term maximisation of revenue from 
licence­funded programming with the opportunity to build cap­
ital assets using that material as collateral? Is it right to require 
licence­fee payers to pay again to see programming they have 
funded, when opportunities arise for that material to be sold to 
free­to­air broadcasters?
To what extent should the BBC involve itself in the new pay tele­
vision and digital market? When Channel 4 launched its premium 
film service, Film 4, it put £30 million at risk. Given that Channel 
4 pays nothing for its highly valuable broadcast frequencies, that 
investment might be considered to be public money diverted 
from the programme budget. If the BBC used the licence fee 
for such a service – whether or not it proved profitable – there 
would be loud protests. The BBC promised Peacock that, after 
the failure of its DBS ambitions, it would not venture into the pay 
television business again. Instead, it puts non­cash assets into 
commercial partnerships with the likes of Flextech and Discovery, 
and uses licence fee cash to fund new free­to­air services.
Even these free­to­air services, however, create controversy. Sky 
has complained to the European Commission that its Sky News 
service was damaged when the BBC made available to cable 
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BBC’s free­to­air digital services constitute in effect a transfer of 
resources away from those services available to 99% of house­
holds and 100% of licence fee payers, to those homes who have 
invested in multi­channel technology.
This conundrum goes to the heart of the BBC funding review, 
chaired by Goldman Sachs chief international economist Gavyn 
Davies, appropriately just fifty years after Lord Beveridge was 
announced as chairman of the first of the post­war committees 
of inquiry. The Davies review is not a full inquiry – but its terms 
cover much the same ground as Peacock’s, though with an 
emphasis on fair trading and how to supplement the licence fee 
rather than on advertising and sponsorship specifically.
Peacock felt entitled to draw his inquiry much wider than just 
how to fund the BBC, because of the way other media were 
drawn into the argument. The likelihood is that Davies will quickly 
reject advertising and sponsorship as meaningful sources of 
BBC revenue, just as Peacock did. He will also find the BBC’s 
potential for generating commercial revenue limited in scope, 
as well as hedged with competition issues. All the signs are that, 
like Peacock, he will assume that there is no realistic political 
option for indexing the licence fee ahead of inflation, and that 
some other source of restoring the BBC’s revenue buoyancy and 
funding its legitimate digital ambitions will need to be found. 
A clear temptation is a digital supplement to the licence fee, just 
as happened when television and then colour were introduced. 
Those who used the new services paid for them. At a stroke, 
commercial and political objections to the BBC’s digital channels 
would fall by the wayside. Moreover, because every digital 
decoder would have an automatic switch to prevent access by 
non­payers of the digital supplement, and every digital tele­
vision sale could be recorded centrally, the digital licence would 
be easier to collect than the analogue one, and multi­set homes 
would, equitably, pay proportionately more. Peacock’s famous 
156 stage two – the subscription era – would be accomplished by the 
transfer to digital.
For the digital pioneers – broadcasters, manufacturers, retailers 
– it would be a heavy temporary blow, a potential brake on a 
politically desirable technology switch, made worse by being 
introduced only months after they had laid their digital bets. Yet 
it would restore the principle laid down by Beveridge, Pilkington, 
Annan and Peacock that the different BBC services should be 
funded by their users.
Is it necessary? Perhaps not in the short term. The funding gap 
between the BBC and ITV has proved as illusory as Kennedy’s 
missile gap. Peacock and Jonscher imagined it might reach £1 
billion a year by the end of the century – but it has not materi­
alised, even a dozen years later. The BBC has squeezed hundreds 
of millions from its costs, thanks to internal reforms accelerated 
by the introduction of independents. It has kept over £200 million 
from the sale of its transmitters – a rare concession from a 
post­Thatcher Conservative administration. It has secured spe­
cial increases in the licence fee to fund its initial steps in digital. 
Meanwhile, ITV and Channel 4, though prospering, have seen 
their revenue and programme budgets staying only just ahead 
of the BBC’s. Against the expectations of many, the BBC and 
its licence fee are secure until at least 2006. The BBC, putting 
its Peacock evidence behind it, has hardened its support for 
the licence fee. Subscription funding may still beckon, but only 
distantly.
The BBC’s central role in British broadcasting has remained a 
constant through the succession of post­war inquiries. So has the 
desire to regulate broadcasting through its incremental points 
of growth. From the start of the 1980s, the consumer came to 
displace the broadcaster as the key figure in shaping government 
policy: but the instinct for monopoly, the habit of managing the 
market and the belief that the man in Whitehall knows best die 
hard in political circles. Consumers must seemingly be protected 
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The digital age whose joyous freedoms Peter Jay delineated 30 
years ago may soon be with us: but it has paradoxically begun 
with a renewed impetus for regulation, not just in the UK, but in 
the EU generally. 
If there is a lesson from the last fifty years, it is that broadcasting 
continues to defy the normal rules of consumer provision. As 
Pilkington put it, controls that derived from technical reasons 
have assumed a cultural, social and political dimension. The pol­
itics of digital are in many ways the politics of analogue writ large. 
Perhaps the time will soon come for another full­scale inquiry, 
to unravel the many policy threads that digital broadcasting 
entwines. And perhaps the ensuing report will permit a postscript 
to this series of lectures.
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Davies and the Digital 
Licence Fee
25 November 1999
Between the publication of the Peacock Report and that of the 
Davies Report, thirteen years elapsed. Have Governments been 
remiss in leaving the structure of broadcasting unexamined 
through a period of profound change? Perhaps yes, if we look 
at the unprecedented transformation of the entire industry in 
that period. Or perhaps no, in that if we exclude the narrow­
remit Hunt Report, thirteen years turns out to be the average 
gap between major investigations into broadcasting in general 
and the BBC in particular – Beveridge in 1949, Pilkington in 1962, 
Annan in 1977, Peacock in 1986 and Davies in 1999.
Of course, that already begs the question as to whether the 
Davies Report is on a par with the other four. The Davies Panel, 
by its very nomenclature, seemed subtly down­graded from the 
Committee status of the other Reports. And it was allowed only 
six months to complete its work: no more than the three­man 
Hunt Committee, and only half the time allocated to Peacock. 
Moreover, as the Panel’s Report was at pains to point out, its brief 
and its timetable precluded any investigation of the broadcasting 
industry as a whole, or even the nature and purpose of public 
160 service broadcasting. Indeed, even the BBC’s status and rationale 
were beyond the Panel’s remit.
The same was true of the licence fee. When the terms of what was 
described as a “BBC Funding Review” were announced in October 
1998, it was made clear that those charged with the task must 
“start from the position that the licence fee is sustainable at least 
until the review of the Charter due in the run­up to 2006”.
That the licence fee would persist as the BBC’s main source of 
funding for twenty years after publication of his own Report 
would have surprised Peacock. That it did so was largely the 
result of Mrs Thatcher bringing her guns to bear on commercial 
television rather than the BBC, and then losing office in 1990. 
Her successor, John Major, displayed far less hostility to the BBC. 
He hived off broadcasting from the Home Office, and created a 
Department of National Heritage, whose first Secretary of State 
was none other than the salvage merchant of the 1990 Broad­
casting Act, David Mellor. 
By this time, the BBC had acquired a Director­General, John Birt, 
determined to make the Corporation more palatable to the Con­
servatives, editorially, structurally and financially. Despite (or 
perhaps because of) a rapid turnover of ministers at the DNH 
– four in six years – Birt and his corporate strategists were able 
to secure a ten­year renewal of the BBC Charter and a five­year 
licence fee settlement designed to carry the BBC into the digital 
era.
Tony Blair’s electoral victory in May 1997 saw the DNH turned 
into the DCMS – the Department for Culture, Media and Sport. 
A former shadow DNH spokesman, Chris Smith, was appointed 
Secretary of State. His survival through two cabinet re­shuffles 
means that he will be the only post­war minister to have both 
introduced a major broadcasting inquiry and decided whether to 
implement its findings.
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Review”, as he termed it – how to supplement the licence fee so 
as to enhance “the BBC’s position as the nation’s foremost public 
service broadcaster”, whilst keeping a balance between the BBC’s 
public service and commercial activities. A specific additional task 
was to examine the concessionary licence fee scheme.
By the end of November, he had found his chairman, the 
prominent economist and long­term Labour Party advisor, Gavyn 
Davies. By January, eight formidable panellists had been named, 
suitably balanced between the sexes and the parties; though one 
of the eight was promptly promoted to the BBC’s Board of Gov­
ernors. Nine weeks were allowed for evidence to be submitted, 
with the final Report appearing four months later.
If that seemed a tight timetable for such a major issue, suspicion 
that the Panel’s conclusions were anyway foregone was inevita­
bly aroused by the identity of the chairman. Gavyn Davies, after 
all, was famous for many reasons – his support of Southampton 
Football Club, his immense wealth as a partner in Goldman Sachs, 
and his closeness to the Labour Party hierarchy, underlined by his 
wife’s role in the private office of the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
– he actually met her whilst working in Downing Street for the 
previous Labour administration.
He is also indelibly connected with the digital licence fee: a notion 
he had discussed in an influential pamphlet funded by the BBC 
and published in 1997. Davies had co­authored “Broadcasting, 
Society and Policy in the Multimedia Age” with his old Oxford 
tutor and fellow Labour Party economic advisor, Andrew Graham. 
The chapters are not individually attributed, but it was no secret 
that Graham wrote most of the philosophical section and Davies 
the financial portion. 
The pamphlet urged that the BBC be funded at a level that kept 
pace with the commercial sector. This argument was popular 
within the BBC and would be cited in the Davies Report as 
forming part of the Director­General’s grand vision for the BBC 
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July 1999:
Unless and until the BBC’s income grows as the nation’s 
income grows, and as the broadcasting industry’s income 
grows, the BBC will gradually, slowly, imperceptibly, 
incrementally diminish in relation to the rest of broadcasting 
and will play a reducing part in this nation’s life.
This bid, not just to inflation­proof the BBC’s income, but to link 
it to GDP and/or broadcasting industry revenue, was indicative 
of the scale of the BBC’s financial ambitions. Irrespective of how 
good or cost­effective or necessary the BBC’s current level of 
service might be, it should automatically be granted yet more 
access to public funds generated by the most socially regres­
sive of tax mechanisms, simply to preserve an arithmetical 
relationship between its income and some more or less relevant 
measure. 
As far as broadcasting industry revenues are concerned, the evi­
dence adduced by Davies was that the BBC’s income has actually 
kept abreast of or ahead of revenues for its two main television 
rivals, ITV and Channel 4. It is true there has been a surge of 
subscription payments, but the broadcasters who receive these 
are only marginally competitive with the BBC. Their focus is very 
much on thematic and niche channels – many of which constitute 
a revenue source, rather than drain, for the BBC, in buying from 
its library. As for the subscription sports and movie channels, 
these are overwhelmingly purchase rights that are either not 
available to free­to­air stations, or are beyond their collective 
financial reach. To argue from BSkyB’s success to raising the 
licence fee pro rata is profoundly misleading.
Like so many economists who were subsequently persuaded by 
the BBC to write similar essays on broadcasting policy, despite 
lacking specific expertise in broadcasting, Graham and Davies 
took for granted that the BBC was a good thing, that it faced 
growing competition, and that therefore it needed extra funding. 
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accepted as the method of funding the BBC that was fairest or 
most effective or most conducive to quality broadcasting. The 
implicit logic of such a position was that in order to sustain an 
arbitrary proportion of audience share below which the BBC 
could not be allowed to drop for fear that the licence fee might 
become unsustainable, the level of the licence fee would keep 
having to be raised in the face of the rapid growth in choice avail­
able to the viewer. The less you watched the BBC, the more you 
would have to pay for it until the sheer weight of its spending 
power commanded your viewing attention. 
The merits or demerits of these arguments need not detain us 
here: suffice it to say that the Davies essay, in acknowledging the 
apparent need to increase the BBC’s income ahead of inflation, 
and the political difficulty of doing so simply by raising the licence 
fee, suggested either that multi­set households should pay extra 
or that owners of digital televisions should be charged a sup­
plementary fee.
The multi­set concept, of course, is close to the subscription 
model preferred by Peacock, with homes deriving most benefit 
from the BBC’s services paying proportionately more. This is 
already standard in cable and satellite homes, where the facility 
to allow subscription services to be chosen on more than one TV 
set in the household costs an additional fee. However, in non­
subscription homes, collecting multiple licence fees presented 
such severe practical problems that the Davies Panel eventually 
discarded the idea.
In his 1997 pamphlet, Davies seemed anyway more taken by the 
digital licence fee, comparing it with the introduction of an extra 
licence fee for television (over and above radio) and for colour 
(over and above black­and­white television) when the BBC had 
made previous step shifts in its provision of services. He rec­
ognised difficulties with the proposal: the pace of introduction of 
digital was hard to predict accurately, so creating uncertainty for 
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ment initiatives, such as the spread of the “information society”; 
and if analogue switch­off forced households into involuntary 
higher digital costs, the whole concept might become unaccepta­
bly unpopular.
At this stage, it is important to note that Davies made no link 
between the BBC’s provision of additional digital services and 
the digital licence fee: it was the price of gaining access to the 
benefits of digital, by whomsoever provided, and was designed 
simply to restore buoyancy to BBC revenues to be spent on 
protecting market share. If Davies was aware of the principle 
of separate funding for separate services enunciated by the 
Beveridge, Pilkington and Annan Committees, he betrayed no 
knowledge of it here.
Also at this stage, Davies imagined such increased buoyancy in 
BBC revenues to be a continuing process, with a levy of £45 per 
digital home bringing in nearly £150 million extra each year by 
2005 (a figure remarkably similar to his Report’s eventual rec­
ommendation) rising to £970 million per annum a decade later 
(more in line with the BBC’s now declared ambitions).
It would be wrong, as a matter of record, to attribute solely to 
Gavyn Davies the notion of a digital licence fee. Indeed, after pub­
lication of the Davies Report, at least one newspaper claimed that 
it was Gordon Brown’s idea, from before his becoming Chancellor, 
and that Gavyn Davies in his 1997 pamphlet was simply the 
mouthpiece being operated by the puppet master (in The Sun’s 
less than elegant phrase). 
Be that as it may, the idea certainly had earlier provenance. In 
December 1996, when John Birt and his chairman, Sir Christopher 
Bland, were giving evidence to the Commons National Heritage 
Committee, Labour MP and licence fee critic Joe Ashton asked 
whether the BBC intended to have a digital licence fee, following 
the precedent of the colour licence fee. Birt’s answer would be 
165quoted ad nauseum by opponents of the digital licence fee during 
and after the Davies Panel’s deliberations.
Neither the Government nor we are inclined in that direction, 
I suppose for two main reasons. The first is that a higher 
licence fee for receiving digital programmes would in effect 
be a tax on innovation and might hold up the development of 
digital delivery systems. The second point is that colour was 
quite unusual in being a technical innovation to be funded in 
that way. Other innovations like FM for instance have been 
funded simply by the increases in the basic licence fee.
The second “reason” offered by Birt actually confused two issues. 
There is a difference between paying for new services only 
receivable by adopting a new technology – such as colour TV – 
and funding new delivery systems for existing services – which 
are nearly always justifiable out of the basic licence fee, in that 
you are entitled to those services whatever the cost of delivering 
them to you. On the same principle, Scots pay no higher a licence 
fee than Londoners despite the far greater cost of transmitting 
the BBC’s services to them. 
It was the first reason proffered by Birt that was clearly the 
important one, and it was amplified by his Deputy Director­
General, Bob Phillis, at the same Commons Committee session. 
A digital licence fee would “inhibit and delay the growth of digital 
broadcasting in Britain and it would certainly push back that 
time where a government of the future might be able to consider 
closing down the analogue broadcasting systems in Britain”.
This was not an impromptu response to verbal questions. Six 
months later, in June 1997, the BBC published the outcome of a 
public consultation on its planned digital services. “We do not 
agree,” said the BBC, “that a differential licence fee for those 
who make use of the public digital services would be practical 
or desirable. A premium on the licence fee might discourage the 
take­up of digital public services. In any case, viewers opting 
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equipment".
Clearly, the BBC had not anticipated that competition in the 
market place might reduce or even eliminate equipment costs 
for new digital households. In any event, another part of the 
document revealed that the BBC was perfectly content to fund 
new digital services out of the basic licence fee. “The cost of the 
BBC’s new digital services”, it said, “will represent only a small 
proportion of the BBC’s total expenditure. We estimate that, 
after five years” – i.e., by June 2002 – “annual spending on digital 
services will be equivalent to 9% of funds from the licence fee".
In fact, the BBC has already exceeded that 9% level. And digital 
programme services, of course, are a separate category of costs 
from investment in digital transmission, which few would deny to 
be a legitimate charge to the licence fee. Unfortunately, a degree 
of ambiguity had been left by the 5­year licence settlement 
negotiated during the last months of the Conservative govern­
ment. This had been, in economic parlance, front­end­loaded, 
allowing the BBC licence fee increases ahead of inflation for the 
first two years, balanced by increases below inflation in the last 
two years, precisely in order to ease the BBC’s entry into digital 
broadcasting. Retention of the £244 million derived from the sale 
of its transmitter network provided an additional cushion.
Indeed, in May 1996, when one of the BBC’s most senior execu­
tives, Will Wyatt, was quizzed on Newsnight as to how the BBC’s 
new digital services would be funded, he replied: “from savings 
we are making now, from step changes in savings we believe 
we can make in the future and from extra commercial money…
we will be able to earn over the next ten years”. Even seven 
months later, in the midst of a licence fee negotiation in which 
the BBC sought “a modest real terms increase” in its level, the 
BBC promised to fund the “lion’s share” of its digital strategy 
“from increased efficiency and the contribution of its commercial 
arm”. At this stage, of course, such proposed channels as BBC 
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subscription partnership with Flextech, not as BBC­funded free­
to­air services. 
If a digital licence fee had been considered and rejected by the 
government at the time, it was not made evident when the 5­year 
settlement was announced. Yet when the BBC launched its first 
new digital service, a 24­hour news channel, it ran into wide­
spread criticism: from commercial competitors, outraged that 
this was being offered free of charge to cable operators; from 
viewers, dismayed by the service’s quality on air; from staff, 
worried by the diversion of scarce resources to a service only 
a minority of homes could possibly receive; and from licence 
fee payers, convinced that their basic services were suffering 
while the BBC spent twice as much – £50 million annually – on an 
adjunct to its news output than Sky spent on the entirety of its 
clearly superior news channel.
By the time the Davies Panel started receiving evidence, the 
issues it faced were far sharper than those Davies had considered 
in his 1997 pamphlet. Ironically, his co­author had re­issued much 
of that pamphlet – this time solely under his own name – at the 
beginning of 1999, even though Davies had by then apparently 
distanced himself from one of the options it canvassed – licence 
fee increases ahead of inflation. Both men attended a private 
seminar for the DCMS in February, where Davies made clear his 
preference for a digital licence fee – or so another participant in 
the seminar, Ray Snoddy, media editor of The Times, reported in 
his column a few days later.
The level of the fee being floated at this stage was £35, rather 
than the £45 posited in 1997. Yet it was not this inspired leak, but 
another report from Snoddy two months later, which triggered 
the fierce pre­publication debate that surrounded the Davies 
Panel. Snoddy had attended a BBC Governors’ seminar on paying 
for broadcasting, at which Sir John Birt had – somewhat coyly – 
put to the attendees the view that “one of the virtues of a digital 
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of his audience supported the idea: thereby allowing the BBC to 
perform an unsubtle U­turn, which promptly alienated virtually 
all the commercial broadcasters (my own Channel 5 being the 
sole exception).
Nine major broadcast companies – soon to be joined by manu­
facturers and retailers – protested to Chris Smith at the potential 
threat to their digital investment that a supplementary licence fee 
represented. They quoted back at Davies – inaccurately – his pre­
vious acknowledgement that such a fee would be “a substantial 
disincentive to digital take­up” (in fact, he never used the word 
“substantial”).
Interestingly, the most vociferous member of this group, BSkyB, 
had been immensely keen, only a little earlier, for the BBC to 
launch an array of subscription services which might help build 
the market for pay television, and also to place its existing and 
new free­to­air services on digital satellite as well as the digital 
terrestrial transmission system the BBC had championed for so 
long. 
Now, however, Sky and its main competitor, ONdigital, had com­
mitted themselves to hefty subsidies for set­top boxes, offering 
them at little or no charge to new subscribers. Having themselves 
raised their monthly subscriptions by £2 to recoup this invest­
ment, they were distinctly unhappy about a further charge of 
perhaps £3 a month being imposed for what they saw as no extra 
benefit for consumers. 
The orchestrated attack on the digital licence fee continued right 
up to – and beyond – publication of the Davies Report. An NOP 
poll was regularly quoted, suggesting that it would put 60% of 
consumers off digital. Even after another NOP poll showed a far 
lower level of resistance, this figure was still cited. 
A digital licence fee was claimed to be socially divisive, hitting 
the poorest hardest – even though the opposite was more likely 
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to adopt digital, and yet would find themselves (in the absence 
of a digital licence fee) paying through the basic licence fee for 
digital services provided free to homes which could afford pay 
television. 
A subtler argument was that digital viewers would have more 
choice of viewing available, and would therefore watch the BBC 
less whilst having to pay more: but the same logic would lead 
to cable and satellite analogue customers paying a lower basic 
licence fee now, because on average they, too, watch less BBC 
output. 
Another complaint was that it would be a retrospective tax for 
those who had already adopted digital – but the continuing 
surge in take­up of free decoders, after the Davies digital licence 
proposal had been published, suggested that advance knowledge 
of a possible digital surcharge would not have deterred many of 
those early subscribers.
The extra fee was dubbed a digital poll tax by its opponents, even 
though it was a voluntary charge, paid only by digital adopters, 
and therefore much fairer than having the overwhelming cost of 
the BBC’s digital services paid by non­adopters. But the phrase 
did its intended share of damage, as did the explicit threat made 
by the commercial lobby that its long­term support for the basic 
licence fee would be jeopardised by the introduction of a digital 
supplement.
What Davies chose to confront in his Report was the main pre­
publication thrust of the commercial lobby’s attack. The fear 
that a digital licence fee might inhibit switching off the analogue 
transmission system – a clearly stated Government policy – had 
been raised by Davies in his own pamphlet. He now finessed the 
issue by devising a version of the digital licence fee that would 
disappear well before switch­off, by starting at a level from which 
it would steadily diminish until it was absorbed by the normal rise 
in the basic licence fee. At this point, a majority of homes would 
170 have adopted digital television, so funding additional digital 
services out of the general licence fee would no longer be seen as 
unfair. 
But solving one big problem created two other small ones. For 
the length of time it took the basic licence fee to catch up with the 
digital supplement, digital homes would face no annual increase 
in their payments to the BBC, even though they were enjoying 
the improvement in quality of core BBC services that the rest of 
licence fee payers were funding on a rising basis year by year. 
Also, whatever inhibition to digital take­up there might be as a 
result of the digital licence fee would be maximised in the early 
years by the proposed structure. 
In the end, the Davies Panel seemed to have spent so much 
effort refining its digital licence fee proposal – which even then 
was opposed by one member, the commercial radio boss, Lord 
Gordon – that it was forced to confess that it had not had time to 
examine the wider argument for publicly funded broadcasting. 
In his foreword to the Report, Davies admitted that the Panel had 
been unable to define public service broadcasting or what the 
BBC’s role should be, only that “some sort of market failure must 
lie at the heart of any concept of public service broadcasting”. 
Yet no description of actual market failure was offered, though 
– perhaps in a nod to his old mentor, Andrew Graham – Davies 
did include as a final annex to the Report a brief, theoretical and 
unconvincing general account of market failure in broadcasting.
In practice, the Davies Report essentially attempted to deal with 
the BBC’s bid for more resources in its own terms. Yet the BBC’s 
evidence to the Panel was not published, nor any of the other 186 
submissions: a frustrating omission. Nor was any attempt made 
to compare the BBC’s submission with its previously published 
proposals and statements, even though it was clearly in sharp 
contrast to all that had been said to the Commons National Her­
itage Committee barely two years previously. 
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anticipated, it is also less impressive than it first appears. It con­
tains 209 numbered pages, but 28 of those are blank. Indeed, 
excluding routine annexes, the main body of the report contains 
just 133 pages of text, 30 of which are the chairman’s foreword, 
fluent and well­argued but inevitably repetitive of the main body 
of the report.
A further 20 pages deal somewhat inconclusively with the 
various licence concession schemes, and 16 pages are devoted 
to a skimpy section on achieving sustainability, which frankly 
acknowledges the weakness of the licence fee system, but does 
scant justice to the alternatives. Subscription is dismissed with 
the dubious tautology that it negates universal accessibility: 
but then even the one question on subscription included in the 
opinion survey commissioned for Davies is misleadingly sum­
marised in the report. 
There are other blemishes. Although Gavyn Davies himself is a 
public admirer of Sky’s services, he seems to have swallowed 
undigested gobbets of anti­Sky propaganda. He claims in his fore­
word that “the majority probably have much less choice in some 
crucial types of programming than they had a decade ago”, which 
is demonstrably untrue. He believes that there is “widespread 
resentment that the majority of the British population cannot get 
first­run movies on television”, seemingly unaware that there has 
been no change in the length of time it takes for films to reach 
free­to­air channels: pay services simply fill a gap that has always 
existed in nearly all markets, but not to the detriment of free­to­
air viewers.
There is also, bizarrely, on the very first page of the foreword, a 
seeming contradiction with the body of the Report. In his sum­
mary of his 40 recommendations, Davies says that “the prime 
source of new funding for extra (digital) services should be self­
help (i.e., savings) by the BBC”; and that “the secondary source of 
new funding, amounting to about £150–200 million a year, should 
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says that “as a broad principle, we believe the BBC should ensure 
that expenditure on programmes which are available only to 
digital viewers should be no higher than the funds generated by 
the digital licence fee”.
This principle is enunciated no less than three times, on pages 33, 
82 and 87 of the Report, along with a requirement that the BBC 
account annually for its success in achieving this objective. Yet on 
page 55 of the Report, the Panel seems to accept that, within the 
context of substantially upgrading all its core services, using £600 
million of savings and revenue growth, the BBC should also be 
granted a further £150–200 million: not the £650–700 million extra 
it would like to spend each year on digital services, but – and cru­
cially – over and above the £200 million it already spends.
It is very hard to reconcile that calculation on page 55 of the 
Report with the oft­repeated principle – which Davies himself 
adopted as his post­publication mantra – that it was manifestly 
unfair for analogue licence fee payers to subsidise digital service 
viewers. The Panel also adopted the principle that, in pursuit 
of a healthy public service broadcasting ecology, “the inherent 
disadvantages of the licence fee system imply that we should 
fund the minimum BBC services necessary to do this, not the 
maximum amount that could be usefully spent”. The problem, as 
the Report ruefully admitted, is that “turning these principles into 
hard figures is more of an art than a science”. 
If we take literally the Panel’s view that only temporarily and 
to a modest degree should new services be funded out of the 
basic licence fee, the implications for the BBC’s digital strategy 
are substantial: after all, £150–200 million annually is what the 
BBC already spends on digital, so if that is the limit of what it can 
spend on new digital services, it will, as the report says, “have to 
prioritise its activities in the digital world and not seek automati­
cally to expand into every new area of activity”.
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after the Report’s publication, did the BBC unequivocally accept 
the principle at the heart of Davies. In an article in the Sunday 
Express, BBC Broadcast chief executive Will Wyatt said: “it ’s 
a tried and trusted formula. A new licence for a new level of 
service. Those who pay a little bit extra get a great deal more. 
Hence the idea for a digital licence fee, paid only by those who 
use digital services rather than a hike in the general fee, which 
would unfairly hit those who had not yet made the switch". But 
this unique statement of principle was thereafter buried under a 
formula whereby, even though the BBC recognised that a digital 
supplement was preferable to a rise in the basic licence fee, it was 
for the Government to decide what to do. The BBC would not risk 
short­term cash for higher principle.
Few BBC executives, other than Wyatt, found it easy to conceal 
the Corporation’s dismay when the Davies Report was published. 
The Panel said that “some of the BBC’s digital offerings have been 
distinctly threadbare” and that its future plans were “exciting” 
and “compelling”, yet it “was not convinced by the case made 
by the BBC for £650 million extra funding by 2006”. The main 
problem was that less than half that amount had been earmarked 
for specific proposals, and the Panel was “not happy to pre­fund 
services which had not yet been fully identified and specified”.
The BBC complained that Davies had willed the ends but not the 
means by which the BBC could play a full part in the digital future. 
What made the pill even more bitter to swallow was that Davies 
also argued for a swathe of measures to ensure greater account­
ability for the BBC and demonstrable fairness in its trading 
practices. Proposals for selling off the BBC’s production resources 
and 49% of its commercial division, BBC Worldwide, were espe­
cially unwelcome to the Corporation.
But the BBC’s disappointment did nothing to assuage the 
commercial lobby. The Report’s rejection of advertising on the 
BBC, and recognition of their anxieties on BBC accountability 
174 and fair trading, were poor compensation for the survival of the 
hated digital licence fee – even though it started at £24 a year, a 
far lower level than they had expected; even though it diminished 
to £12, so averaging just £19 during its life before eventually dis­
appearing; and even though it could have only the most minimal 
impact on analogue switch­off.
The Sun headlined “Fury at Beeb’s £19 ‘Digi­tax’". The fury was 
largely their own – “scandalous” was the verdict – “a stitch­up”, 
“a scam”. The Mirror – though it was about to close its loss­
making television subsidiary – pronounced the digital licence fee 
“outrageous”. Even the Daily Mail – only a marginal investor in 
commercial television – described it as “an insult to the public’s 
intelligence”. Its columnist, Andrew Neil, harking back to the 
original Davies pamphlet, funded by the BBC, and the known 
political connections, described the report as “about as ‘indepen­
dent’ as Pravda was in the Soviet era”. The digital licence fee was a 
poll­tax, a luddite levy, ludicrous and unfair: and the Report itself 
should be consigned “to the waste basket”.
The Sun fulminated that “the digital poll tax is supported by no 
newspaper of any consequence”, thereby putting in their place 
The Independent On Sunday, The Financial Times, The Guardian and 
its own stable mate, The Times. The commercial broadcasters re­
doubled their efforts, with Sky’s top two executives, Carlton Tele­
vision’s chief executive, United Broadcasting’s chief executive and 
Granada’s chief executive all placing lengthy newspaper articles 
condemning the digital licence fee.
New arguments joined the old ones. The BBC needed no new 
money in order to run its digital channels – it could easily tighten 
its belt. Brussels would object to state funding that would dis­
tort the digital market. A digital licence fee would be a liability if 
it were introduced (as recommended) just before the May 2000 
local elections. Misreading a consultant’s report submitted by 
the BBC to Davies, the commercial lobbyists claimed that London 
175Economics had demonstrated how the colour TV licence had 
delayed the switch­off of 405­line transmissions by 2–4 years.
In fact, the London Economics document simply showed that 
even if the colour licence revenue had not been spent on 
programming, it would in theory have caused only a modest 
delay in 405­line switch­off. That the revenue was used to fund 
BBC2 and convert BBC1 into colour was clearly an immense driver 
of 625­line take­up: a fact conveniently ignored by the commercial 
lobbyists.
In response, Davies penned a series of letters and articles in 
which he sharpened his critique of their stance. In his Report, he 
had pointed out that “the private broadcasters who are opposed 
to a digital licence supplement are in the position of arguing 
simultaneously that the new technologies will open a new world, 
offering a compelling uplift in service provision, and that a 
(monthly) supplement of £1.57 on the licence fee will kill the new 
technology. We are more inclined to believe the former than the 
latter".
Now he went further, arguing that leaving the licence fee settle­
ment untouched, and funding BBC digital services from a digital 
supplement, would save the analogue licence fee payer £10 a year 
in digital costs and a further £25 over seven years in lower licence 
fee levels: all of which may have been implicit in his report, but 
was invisible in its summary. And he seized on a further piece of 
BBC consultant’s research, from a company called .econ, which 
took the London Economics argument a step further.
This document predicted that pay television services would carry 
digital penetration no further than 60–65% of homes. A mass of 
consumers would only convert to digital if there were additional 
free­to­air services on offer – and the kind of services the public 
apparently wanted were the kind the BBC tended to provide. So, 
argued Davies, in the interests of driving the analogue switch­off 
the commercial broadcasters claimed was in their interest and 
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in digital.
But his critics were not convinced that BBC free­to­air channels 
would help drive the digital market. Sky, in particular, produced 
evidence that BBC channels did not feature in the top ten reasons 
offered by consumers for going digital. On that basis, it was 
reasonable to propose that either the BBC should offer such 
services only in subscription form, so that viewers could decide 
for themselves whether or not to pay for them; or they should be 
funded out of direct taxation if they were perceived as some form 
of public welfare; or they should not be offered at all.
This last option, however, was never publicly adopted by the 
commercial lobby. If the BBC wanted to provide additional, digital 
free­to­air services, let it do so: it should simply be held to its 
promise to fund them from internal savings and commercial 
revenues, even if this was unfair to analogue licence fee payers.
Nor did they accept that the digital licence fee could be fairly 
compared with the colour licence. With colour, the supplemen­
tary fee was admittedly 100%, but the increase in the number of 
channels funded by it was 50%. The digital supplement might add 
only 20% to the cost of a licence fee, but it would increase by less 
than 5% the number of channels, and none would have the broad 
appeal of BBC2. 
Nor were the commercial operators prepared to accept the 
London Economics argument that the impact of a digital licence 
fee on digital take­up would possibly be positive rather than neg­
ative, in supporting BBC digital spending. They commissioned yet 
another consultant’s report, from NERA (an economic consulting 
firm), who unsurprisingly supported their clients’ preconceptions. 
NERA claimed that a digital licence fee would delay analogue 
switch­off by about three years because it would reduce the take­
up of digital television by between two million and 5.7 million 
homes in the period 2004–2008, costing broadcasters, manu­
facturers and retailers nearly £5 billion.
177Davies derided these figures. If a temporary £2 a month – reduc­
ing annually – surcharge for digital would do so much damage, 
why did Sky and ONdigital voluntarily increase their charges by £2 
a month on a permanent basis earlier this year? Were they trying 
to destroy their businesses? And if it would have such a damaging 
effect, would it not make economic sense for the industry to pay 
the charge itself?
Yet the political tide appeared to be turning. Ray Snoddy reported 
a possible arrangement whereby the Government would drop the 
digital licence fee in exchange for the commercial broadcasters 
supporting an increase in the basic licence fee. A member of the 
Davies Panel, the economist Lord Lipsey, protested at such a deal 
in a letter to The Times at the end of September.
It would transfer the whole cost of developing the BBC’s 
new digital services from digital subscribers who benefit 
from them to licence payers generally who do not. Since on 
average ordinary licence fee­payers are less well­off than 
those who have gone digital, this would be Robin Hood in 
reverse – the poorer robbed to subsidise the richer. I cannot 
believe that this Government would contemplate appeasing 
the digital lobby at the cost of such social regressiveness.
Within a week, the first inspired leaks began to appear. “Blair 
set to block £24 ‘poll tax’ on digital TVs”, announced The Mail 
On Sunday at the beginning of October. The same day, Sunday 
Business reported that Chris Smith was calling in the rival digital 
broadcasters to insist that they co­operate in order to help speed 
digital take­up: the price they might have to pay, perhaps, for the 
dropping of the digital licence fee. A fortnight later, The Sunday 
Times headline read “TV licence fee to rise as digital levy is axed”, 
quoting “senior Whitehall sources” as saying it was easier to raise 
an existing fee than introduce a new one. A Davies Panel member 
was reported as saying that “Chris Smith has been got at”. 
Less than a week later, the other shoe dropped. The Express 
reported that the licence fee would rise by £10, but that 
178 pensioners would get free licences in order to make the increase 
politically acceptable. “Ministers” were now quoted as saying it 
was easier to raise an existing fee than introduce a new one. Chris 
Smith, it was reported, “believes that a modest licence fee rise is 
the ideal solution, provided pensioners are exempt”. 
The Times carried a similar story as its front page lead. A DCMS 
minister was quoted as saying: “do Governments introduce new 
taxes before general elections? – no, successful Governments do 
not”. Both Chris Smith and his junior broadcasting minister were 
said to believe that “increasing the standard licence fee would be 
a more acceptable way of raising money for the BBC”, provided 
pensioners were not hit.
Another week, another set of headlines, as Chris Smith installed a 
team of auditors in the BBC to check whether its claims for extra 
digital funding were justified. Some saw this as a snub to Davies, 
though he had called for just such an investigation in his report. 
Chris Smith denied it was a prelude to dropping the digital licence 
fee. 
Two weeks later, however, the Chancellor of the Exchequer duly 
announced that pensioners over 75 would be granted free TV 
licences, at a cost over £300 million a year. This sum shocked the 
chairman of the Royal Commission on long­term care for the 
elderly. He felt that it was a gimmick which was “about as much 
use as toffee apples” for pensioners, who would be much better 
off if given the money directly and left to decide for themselves 
if free television was their priority. The announcement was also 
criticised as endangering the supposed independence of BBC 
domestic broadcasting from Government finance.
Nonetheless, the ground seemed to be prepared for dropping the 
most contentious and most important recommendation in the 
Davies Report. Davies himself claims that the issue is still open 
and that he will be personally involved in sifting all the responses 
to his recommendations, the deadline for which passed at the 
beginning of November. A decision will be made early in 2000.
179Meanwhile, the publication of the BBC’s response to Davies at 
last allowed us to see the scale of its ambitions. Astonishingly, it 
renewed its bid for a 30% increase in spending by 2006: over £700 
million a year. Cunningly, it buried its digital plans within an over­
all scheme for investing in all kinds of new content for existing as 
well as new services, under the headings of creativity, learning 
and citizenship. 
It completely ignored the question of why some of its new digital 
channels could not be subscription­funded, as was originally 
planned. Yet again, it falsely asserted that subscription services 
concentrate on films, sport and adult entertainment, ignoring the 
fact that 85% of viewing to subscription channels is not to those 
genres, and that two of the most popular subscription channels 
offer general entertainment – Sky One and UK Gold, which is 
scheduled by the BBC.
The document opposed a digital licence fee if the intention was 
to phase it out. As for its level, there was no reason why it should 
not be £48 a year rather than £24 – in fact, the implication of the 
BBC’s spending plans would put the level at £72, or £30 on the 
basic licence fee. With its talk of BBC Open Centres in every high 
street and banks of educational content, it seemed to assume 
that the best way of funding major public investments in the 
social fabric of the country was through a semi­accountable 
broadcaster funded by a flat­rate household tax. Not surprisingly, 
Ray Snoddy in The Times urged that “the BBC proposals should be 
rejected as outrageous”.
The Davies Report, fluent and intelligent though it is, seems to 
have been outflanked by the limitations of its remit. Unable to 
conduct a thorough investigation into the BBC, let alone public 
service broadcasting and the wider broadcasting industry, it 
could only follow a narrow logic which the BBC response sought 
to by­pass, saying that “the digital supplement recommended 
by the Panel…will clearly not even meet the current costs of the 
BBC’s services, let alone enable enhancements to them”.
180 A major inquiry, Chris Smith told Gavyn Davies, would not be 
appropriate till 2003/4, in advance of BBC Charter review. By 
then, of course, the die will have been cast as to what kind of BBC 
we have, and what part it will play in the digital future. The Davies 
Report, for all its merits, appears to have been an opportunity 
missed.
If the central recommendation of the Davies Report is rejected, 
it will join the four other major post­war Reports in such a fate. 
Beveridge urged retention of the BBC’s monopoly, Pilkington 
wholesale reform of ITV, Annan an Open Broadcasting Authority 
to operate the fourth channel and Peacock a switch to subscrip­
tion funding for the BBC. All the big ideas fell by the wayside, for 
good reasons or bad – though Davies was willing to concede that 
Peacock may yet prove right on subscription. 
Fifty years on from Beveridge, broadcasting policy is still deter­
mined more by the ebb and flow of politics, and the activities of 
determined pressure groups, than by ad hoc committees of the 
great and the good, however politically well­connected, and how­
ever cogent their recommendations. Indeed, it could be argued 
that the Hunt Report, skimpy as it was, was the most successful 
in seeing its ideas implemented – not least because they reflected 
the prejudices of the Government of the day. 
Of course, the fate of the Davies Report is not yet sealed, and 
many of its recommendations in relation to BBC accountability 
and fair trading may yet prove significant. Even if Davies loses 
the argument on the digital licence fee, the persisting injustice to 
analogue licence fee payers of funding the minority of house­
holds able to enjoy the BBC’s digital offerings may yet trigger a 
consumer revolt that causes the BBC and the Government great 
difficulty. 
Meanwhile, the BBC sails on, like a great ship of state, shrugging 
off the Davies Report arguments, bidding for vast increases in its 
already huge income, and preparing to be both school and cit­
izens advice bureau in the digital age. Perhaps in fifty years time, 
181its response to Davies will seem as other­worldly and anachro­
nistic as its evidence to Beveridge fifty years ago. From John Reith 
to Greg Dyke is a remarkable journey to have travelled. There is a 
long way to go yet.
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The long aftermath of the Davies Report coincided with a 
changing of the guard at the BBC. As ministers – and minis­
tries – debated the merits of the Davies conclusions, and as the 
commercial digital operators worked themselves to fever pitch in 
their opposition to a digital licence fee, the Governors embarked 
on the slow process of transferring power to a commercially­
astute multi­millionaire who had never spent a day working at the 
BBC. His would be the decisive voice in readying the corporation 
for the digital century: and his biggest challenge would be dealing 
with his formidable predecessor’s legacy.
At the end of January, 2000, when John Birt left the BBC, he had 
spent four years as Deputy Director­General and nine as Director­
General, the longest stint as DG since John Reith himself. Like 
Reith, but in some ways even more remarkably for having come 
in from the outside, he imposed his personality on the institution. 
Dissent from within became as absent as in Reith’s day. Like 
Reith, and like no other DG, Birt earned a knighthood whilst in 
office. Like Reith, he was eventually eased out of office, if only 
by a couple of months – and the peerage that induced his early 
184 departure, in being announced whilst he was still in situ, edged 
him a notch ahead of Reith, the only other DG to have reached 
the House of Lords.
Though he starts his career in the upper house on the cross­
benches, perhaps, like Reith, Birt dreams of a Cabinet post in due 
course. After all, his former co­editor of the ITV current affairs 
series World In Action, Gus Macdonald, has already secured a seat 
at that most elevated table, along with his own peerage. With 
so many media folk now cramming the New Labour benches in 
the Lords – Waheed Alli, Richard Attenborough, Melvyn Bragg, 
Clive Hollick and David Puttnam alongside Macdonald – it is not 
thought improper or even unusual for the former guardians 
of strict impartiality to serve the government of the day. Birt’s 
successor as editor­in­chief at the BBC personally donated over 
£50,000 to the Labour Party and its leadership less than five years 
before his controversial appointment to that position.
Like his two predecessors, Alasdair Milne and Michael Checkland, 
Birt was an Oxford graduate. All were awarded honorary fellow­
ships by their respective colleges whilst in office, thus sustaining 
the close relationship between the university and public service 
broadcasting: the President of Magdalen and the Master of 
Balliol have both served on the Channel 4 board, as well as being 
influential commentators on broadcasting policy.
Milne and Checkland shared another distinction: both were dis­
lodged by the same chairman – Marmaduke Hussey – in favour 
of their deputies. Checkland replaced Milne and Birt in turn 
replaced Checkland. Perhaps reflecting on these precedents, Birt 
subsequently pushed out the Deputy Director­General he had 
personally brought in from ITV, Bob Phillis, and ruled thereafter 
without a deputy. He also managed to survive a shoot­out with 
Hussey after their relationship deteriorated into hostility and 
lengthy silence. Hussey’s successor as chairman of the BBC 
was, conveniently, Sir Christopher Bland, who had been Birt’s 
chairman when he had been London Weekend Television’s 
185Director of Programmes in the 1980s. To complete the symmetry, 
Birt’s successor in the LWT job, Greg Dyke, now took over from 
him at the BBC.
Dyke dutifully paid tribute to Birt, not least for his supposedly 
“brilliant” positioning of the BBC for the digital age. Yet Birt’s 
legacy, after a near­decade of upheaval, is an equivocal one, and 
the claims made for his incumbency are already in question. In 
the context of this series of lectures, the issues of importance are 
not so much of internal structure but of legitimacy, of account­
ability, of funding, of distinctiveness: indeed, of the role and 
justification for the public sector in broadcasting – in particular, 
the BBC.
The first claim made on Birt’s behalf is that he saved the BBC 
from the privatisation a Thatcherite Conservative party might 
have desired. Even David Mellor, the broadcasting minister who 
steered the 1990 Act onto the statute book asserted this in a 
live BBC radio discussion of Birt’s reign two days before his final 
departure. Certainly, as a previous lecture has described, some 
of Mrs Thatcher’s more radical ministers were prone to rushes 
of blood to the head, as exemplified by Lord Young’s short­lived 
attempt to exile BBC2 to near invisibility in a purely satellite­
delivered distribution mode.
Equally beyond dispute is that Birt’s first priority as Deputy 
Director­General had been to impose strict editorial discipline 
on the BBC’s television current affairs output, culminating in that 
department’s merger with news, so re­creating the powerful 
internal empire that had been Hugh Greene’s stepping­stone to 
the top thirty years earlier. The control Birt exercised alienated 
a raft of long­serving BBC staff, as did his subsequent structural 
reforms, powerfully spun by Birt’s many dozens of corporate 
affairs publicists (or “thought police” in BBC vernacular) as 
evidence of the Corporation embracing the processes of the 
market. That it was Birt’s predecessor, Michael Checkland, who 
introduced the process of reform and cost­savings that became 
186 known as “producer choice” has long been air­brushed from 
history.
The heavy hand of Birt on the editorial tiller may have helped 
fend off Tory hard­liners in the late 1980s, but the fact is that 
Peacock had put paid to any privatisation agenda before Birt even 
joined the BBC, and by the time Birt became Director­General, it 
was John Major, not Margaret Thatcher, who was Prime Minister. 
The Secretaries of State in Major’s new Department of National 
Heritage were no threat to the BBC: Mellor himself, Peter Brooke, 
Stephen Dorrell and Virginia Bottomley. Birt certainly worked 
hard to persuade ministers to the BBC’s view of the world, 
securing renewal of the BBC’s Charter and regular increases in 
the licence fee: but there was little contrary pressure, and the 
BBC’s PR successes do not, in retrospect, seem all that clever.
For instance, the BBC lobbied hard – to the point of misleading 
Parliament – to “protect” (in BBC­speak) certain sporting events 
from exclusive coverage on pay television. A BBC­inspired 
Lords rebellion imposed a listed events clause on the 1996 
Broadcasting Act. But in the process, the BBC so alienated 
the cricket authorities – who were the prime financial victims 
of this unsought protection – that when Channel 4 mounted 
a determined onslaught on the Test Match contract, the BBC 
suffered an humiliating rejection. 
Similarly, the BBC’s obsession with gatekeeper issues in the 
digital pay­tv environment alternately irritated the government 
and provoked it into legislative action: but in the event no abuse 
materialised, and the public money spent by the BBC’s chairman 
on a cod video warning of likely BSkyB misbehaviour turned out 
to be an expensive own goal.
Even the BBC’s pressure for the launch of digital terres­
trial television – successful as it was in shaping policy – has 
proved partially counter­productive. The method of allocating 
frequencies so as to create six DTT multiplexes was designed to 
maximise short­term take­up of digital, but has in practice made 
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analogue terrestrial transmission system. The frequency spe­
cialists are still puzzling over a solution. And the huge expense 
of running a DTT system in parallel to analogue for twenty years 
will add billions to the cost of going digital, with only marginal 
benefits.
If hindsight has taken some of the gloss from the BBC’s successful 
management of its Whitehall relationships, there can be no 
doubting the skill with which the BBC has harnessed academic, 
political and editorial opinion in defence of the concept of public 
service broadcasting, and of the BBC’s role in providing it. Even 
here, though, the BBC’s short term success may prove to be a 
long­term error.
The most influential writer in this specialist area has been 
Andrew Graham, whose views were most fully outlined in the 
65­page pamphlet he co­authored in 1997 with fellow­economist 
Gavyn Davies, who subsequently chaired the government­
appointed Panel that reported on the funding of the BBC in 1999. 
In assessing the significance of this pamphlet in the previous 
lecture, attention was focused on the provenance of the case 
for a digital licence fee, which Davies rehearsed for the first time 
there, and on the proposition of spiralling absurdity that, the 
greater the danger that the BBC’s share of viewing might decline, 
the higher the licence fee needed to be raised to offset such 
danger. Shades of Reith’s “brute force of monopoly”! 
That it was Graham who contributed most to this formulation was 
confirmed when much of the pamphlet’s content re­appeared in 
1999 under his sole authorship in a set of essays by ten econ­
omists on funding the BBC. Both publications had been commis­
sioned and paid for by the BBC, so it is no surprise to find virtually 
near­unanimous belief that the market cannot be trusted, the 
public sector is vital, the BBC is the best defence against market 
distortions and the licence fee is the best way of funding public 
sector broadcasting.
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increases in the licence fee were wholly unrealistic politically, 
which may account for his ceasing to be a co­author with Graham. 
In any event, his chairmanship of the BBC funding panel would 
have made re­statement of his 1997 position somewhat awkward. 
But what is perhaps more significant is that the Davies Report 
nonetheless subsequently replicated in large measure Graham’s 
exposition of supposed market failure. 
Graham asks three questions of the market in broadcasting. 
How well will it serve the public interest? Will it help shape a 
democratic environment? And will it extend rather than diminish 
individual experience? No doubt, if Graham asked the same 
questions about the British press, he would conclude that, as the 
market clearly has weaknesses, there should be public sector 
newspaper publishing. That virtually any devotee of freedom of 
the press outside Beijing would recoil with horror at the thought 
of publicly­funded newspapers barely registers in the Graham 
approach. Nor is there any recognition of the fact that the public 
sector in broadcasting exists as a result of technical constraints, 
rather than a considered response to demonstrable market 
failure.
Most of the economists included in these publications subscribe 
to the truism that broadcasting is a public good, in the sense that 
one person’s consumption is not at the expense of any other 
person’s consumption. Some also go on to argue that quality 
broadcasting is a merit good, in that – without the right economic 
structure – consumers might buy less of it than they should. So 
a licence fee system of funding has the virtue of creating quality 
broadcasting that might not otherwise exist, in the absence 
of a mechanism that forces a flat­rate payment by consumers, 
and thereafter entails no further payment for additional 
consumption.
It is hard to see why the same arguments, again, should not 
apply to the press: the marginal cost of any additional copy of a 
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additional viewers. A newspaper of unimpeachable quality might 
well be created by public funding – even a forced flat­rate tax on 
all readers of newspapers. But no­one in a free society would 
have the foolhardiness to suggest such a course of action.
Indeed, the proponents of the licence fee, in their enthusiasm 
for what they describe as broadcasting free at the point of 
consumption, seem scarcely to notice that the first moment of 
broadcasting consumption is actually rather expensive, at over 
£100, even if all subsequent moments may be free. That it is 
broadcasting funded out of general taxation which might more 
accurately be described as “free at the point of consumption” 
does not diminish the general enthusiasm for the licence fee.
The sophistry of Graham’s line of argument becomes clear when 
his actual questions are examined. Not, “is the market relatively 
successful?”, but “will the market produce all that is desired?” – a 
question that could be asked of any number of markets without 
arriving at the conclusion that what is needed is high levels of 
public funding.
He adduces as a further example of market failure that broad­
casting can have adverse “external effects” – such as amplifying 
violence in society. Yet there is no evidence that BBC broad­
casting is immune from such effects itself, let alone that the BBC’s 
presence in the market diminishes the flow or consequences of 
such effects from other suppliers.
He believes that community feelings, cultures and values may 
be undermined by “the fragmentation of audiences that purely 
commercial broadcasting may produce”. Yet the intervention 
of licence­fee funded services in the market can only further 
fragment the audience – unless mathematics as well as logic 
is being stood on its head. Nor will everyone subscribe to the 
notion that mass audiences are inherently socially virtuous. 
That more people may have experienced and discussed certain 
transmissions simply because there was no other choice is 
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riences and discussions, were of some special higher value. That 
phenomenon was simply a function of spectrum scarcity.
Rather more alarming is Graham’s assertion that “in a dem­
ocratic society it is undesirable that the mass media should be 
entirely in private control”. Unless – which must be doubted – he 
is advocating state­funded newspapers, he is evidently using the 
phrase “mass media” where he means broadcasting, and also 
confusing the concept of private control with profit­maximisation. 
The Scott Trust controls The Guardian and The Observer, exercising 
a substantially more vigorous defence of the citizen than the 
state­owned BBC can muster, yet it operates in a market environ­
ment and displays impressive commercial skills.
Graham goes on to assert that “it is not the private market 
which has given the UK a broadcasting industry which is widely 
regarded as the best in the world”: a line of argument that 
Edmund Burke might have admired, but which is essentially 
deploying the accidental facts of history as if they were the 
outcome of many failed experiments succeeded by a single 
successful one.
Graham’s attempts to support his theoretical framework with 
practical arguments are undermined by his evident ignorance of 
the real world of broadcasting. Because the BBC is a particularly 
expensive producer of programmes, he believes all programme 
production must be very expensive, so creating a barrier to entry 
into the market­place. He is wrong. 
He believes the fixed costs of renting space on satellites is high, 
creating a further barrier. He is wrong. He believes the BBC 
spends more per capita on training than its commercial rivals. He 
is wrong. He believes the cost of rights and talent is inexorably 
rising, particularly in sport. Some costs are, but by no means 
all: he is wrong, again. He believes that because the biggest 
broadcast companies are growing larger and regularly merge, 
consumer choice is bound to diminish. In fact, there have been 
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and small, greatly enlarging choice: wrong yet again.
Graham is convinced that “gateway” systems, especially BSkyB’s, 
are a threat to choice – dishes, decoders, electronic programme 
guides, subscriber management centres and encryption 
technology. He likens the digital world to “being able to shop at 
Tesco, but only at Tesco”. In fact, successive investigations by the 
Office of Fair Trading having found no discrimination against Sky’s 
competitors, and the combination of regulatory requirements 
and market imperatives has made access to satellite broadcasting 
remarkably easy. 
Graham is not only wrong, but seems entirely ignorant – or for­
getful – of the stream of abuses of its dominant position that 
characterised the BBC’s behaviour for decades, and continues 
to linger. It is, moreover, somewhat ironic that the main current 
preoccupation of the government in managing the timetable for 
analogue switch­off is the multiplicity of choice for the consumer 
in the digital market­place, and the incompatibility of the hard­
ware used by different populations across the different digital 
platforms – satellite, terrestrial and cable.
Graham also ignores all the evidence that every expansion of 
the broadcast market has led to improvements in quality as well 
as in choice. His version of broadcast economics allows him to 
imagine that, because “more channels fragment audiences”, 
so the average cost of programmes must rise. By this syllogis­
tic means, he concludes that “choice has a cost in broadcasting” 
and that “under free market conditions, consumers will face a 
choice between a narrower range of cheaper (and yet still high 
quality) broadcasting and a broader range of more expensive 
and yet lower quality programming”. He even offers a technical 
explanation for the process: the problem of “externalities” – 
caused by fragmentation, in that “the person who migrates away 
from existing channels in favour of others imposes a cost on all 
those who do not move”.
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bears no relation to its income, and therefore has no impact on 
its costs. Departing BBC viewers impose no costs on remaining 
ones. And the argument even fails to apply to the commercial 
market.
In fact, the expansion of the market has brought new money 
into broadcasting: more advertising revenue and – for the first 
time – subscription funds. Just as has happened in the US, the 
declining audience share of the networks has been accompanied 
by an increase in their advertising revenues (as advertisers better 
understand the value of network airtime) and so an increase 
in their programme investment. ITV has lost a quarter of its 
audience in the last eight years, but its revenue increases have 
accelerated: though, to be fair, ITV is cushioned from the full 
impact of market forces by a protective regulatory framework. 
The market has delivered to the consumer more choice of pro­
grammes, more high­cost programmes as well as more low­cost 
(and recycled) programmes, more choice of levels of spend, and 
more value at every level of spend. Reality could not be more dia­
metrically opposed to Graham’s imagined outcome.
Graham believes that, because of their intrinsic quality, the UK’s 
television programmes achieve export sales levels above those 
of the US – whereas in fact they trail far behind. And, far from the 
UK’s exports – such as they are – being led by the BBC’s public 
service ethos, the single most important factor underpinning 
UK sales is actually the very success of the Americans, who have 
created a powerful demand for English­language programming, 
thanks to the well­developed facilities for dubbing English sound­
tracks that US dominance of the market has generated.
He also seems to believe that the BBC is more trusted as a news 
source than its competitors – whereas many years of research by 
the IBA and ITC have established that the BBC is less trusted than 
ITN and even Sky News. And he suggests that television viewers 
are prone simultaneously to be ignorant of what is available and 
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asserts that “it is difficult to see how both profitability and 
responsibility can be constant strategic aims at the same time”. 
The notion that profitability (let alone survival) might depend 
upon responsibility seems never to have occurred to him. 
Graham concludes that he has provided “a strong case for 
thinking that broadcasting should not be left just to the market”. 
Others might disagree. Not that no such case for public inter­
vention in the market can be made: only that his version weakens 
rather than strengthens that case. But the worst consequences of 
Graham’s spreading influence in policy circles are that his faulty 
demonstration of market failure has been allowed to serve as 
a given, and that he has further woven into the case for public 
service broadcasting the doubtful proposition that its essential 
funding mechanism is the licence fee. 
Indeed, just as the BBC has, under John Birt, hardened its 
opposition to any other form of funding than the licence fee, so 
a cadre of well­meaning economists – by no means all Labour 
sympathisers like Graham – have followed Graham in assessing 
(however inadequately) the various forms of funding and 
plumped for the licence fee.
It was not until the Davies Panel assembled the market failure 
arguments in Annex VIII of their Report that finally the emperor’s 
clothes were exposed to comprehensive challenge. Davies had, 
by his own admission, failed to provide any proper analysis of 
the case for public service broadcasting, blaming lack of time. He 
relied entirely on the premise that “some sort of market failure 
must lie at the heart of any concept of public service broad­
casting”: indeed, “it is impossible to argue for a public service 
broadcaster unless market failure can be shown”.
What Davies could not do was just that. Annex VIII lists the six 
different reasons why market failure arises in broadcasting, but 
at no point showed why the provision of public service broad­
casting by the BBC, let alone on the current scale and at the 
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of curing potential market failure.
The only one of the responses to the Davies Report published in 
November 1999 that addressed the issue of market failure was 
that from BSkyB. But even BSkyB did not issue a detailed critique 
of Annex VIII until December 1999. It clearly carries the imprint of 
the research consultancy led by Bill Bishop, co­author with Cento 
Veljanovski of the robust paper from the Institute of Economic 
Affairs that had excoriated the weak logic in the 1982 Hunt Report.
The critique carefully refutes the six Davies arguments for 
market failure in turn: that broadcasting is a public good; that 
quality broadcasting is a merit good; that consumers are not 
fully informed; that broadcasting produces externalities; that 
economies of scale exist in broadcasting: and that there is spec­
trum scarcity. The document persuasively shows that either the 
supposed failure is immaterial; or that it appears in many other 
contexts without harmful consequences or state interference; or 
that there are ways of correcting potential market failure without 
the need for a publicly funded broadcaster, especially on the 
scale of the BBC; or that extra funds for the BBC will not correct 
the failure; or that the Davies Report is simply factually incorrect.
The document’s conclusion is low­key, but nonetheless devas­
tating: “the analysis of market failure included in the Panel’s 
Report simply shows that the conditions required for a market to 
function optimally might not hold in relation to the provision of 
broadcasting services – this is not normally, however, considered 
to justify government intervention, particularly in the form of 
publicly funded service provision”.
Deprived of its patina of academic credibility as the necessary 
answer to market failure, the BBC’s difficulties in demonstrating 
its legitimacy become all the more apparent. In the age of spec­
trum scarcity, it had been a commonplace that precious transmis­
sion frequencies should be managed by government, and only 
handed out to reputable and regulated broadcasters, accepting 
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characterised ITV – and that had so dismayed the commercial 
lobbyists of the 1950’s – eroded the exclusive claim of the BBC to 
public service status. The launch of Channel 4 in 1982 posed an 
even greater challenge.
Here, after all, was a commercial broadcaster, entirely funded 
by advertisers, but which had no private shareholders, paid no 
dividends, sought no profits that could not be ploughed back into 
programmes, and consciously addressed minority audiences in a 
way that BBC1, in particular, could not match. And for all Channel 
4’s outspokenness, it was consistently perceived by the public – 
according to ITC research over the years – as less biased than the 
BBC.
Indeed, the BBC’s reputation for impartiality – especially in 
dealing with its own affairs – has suffered a series of blows. A 
recent documentary series on its history, made by an indepen­
dent producer, concluded with an extended paean of praise for 
the licence fee from one of the BBC’s own presenters, Sue Lawley, 
all the more puzzling for having no connection to the preceding 
narrative. When the BBC launched its pay­television joint venture, 
UK TV, its own media correspondent reported as fact – not just 
as the BBC’s claim – that licence revenue was not involved: a con­
tentious and almost certainly untrue statement.
The BBC was also fiercely partisan in lobbying for the listed sports 
events legislation – an approach that spilled over into its own 
coverage of an issue it had almost single­handedly created. More 
recently, a group of BBC journalists published a letter deploring 
BSkyB’s attacks on the BBC’s News 24 service: a doubtful exercise 
of their obligations to impartiality made all the more rep­
rehensible for slavishly reproducing the misleading arguments 
invented by the BBC’s own corporate publicists. Perhaps most 
controversial of all has been the lavish spending of licence fee 
funds on publicity campaigns, on and off air, falsely describing 
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programming.
Another of the BBC’s claims for special public service status was 
its commitment to universality – the availability of BBC services 
to the whole of the UK, free at the point of use. This has become a 
particular BBC mantra, deployed as much to justify the licence fee 
as to define the BBC’s public service role. As we have seen, the 
Annan Committee saw a clear link between universal availability 
and the licence fee, and opposed the BBC’s local radio strategy 
because a significant proportion of licence fee payers would be 
unable to gain access to local services.
Yet universality of availability of signal applies as much to the 
ITV system and Channel 4 as to the BBC: the differential costs of 
transmission to remote areas are absorbed into the economic 
arrangements for the commercial broadcasters, effectively as 
part of their licence obligations. Channel 5, as it happens, is 
excused such an obligation because suitable frequencies cannot 
be made available: but those cable companies that wish to enjoy 
exclusivity in given franchise areas must commit to building out 
their systems in a set time­frame as the price of local monopoly.
What emerges is that previous definitions of public service status 
– universality, impartiality, absence of the profit motive and 
special content – are not the BBC’s exclusive preserve. Not sur­
prisingly, in the early years of the Birt incumbency, a determined 
effort was made by the BBC to find other ways of describing its 
distinctiveness. After all, if the market was obstinately declining 
to exhibit the standard symptoms of market failure, the BBC 
needed to demonstrate what the audience would lose if it were 
less well or securely funded, or if it disappeared.
The problem with this approach was that great swathes of 
BBC television output – excellent as it might be – were indis­
tinguishable from the offerings of the commercial players. This is 
not surprising: after all, the creative community is not a BBC pre­
serve, and the emergence of the independent sector has allowed 
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with broadcasters.
The BBC has had to fall back on certain types of programmes 
and peak­time scheduling of minority­interest material as its 
definition of its distinctiveness. Yet consumers are rarely asked 
whether they believe that the difference between having forty 
minutes of Panorama at 10pm on a Monday, rather than fifty 
minutes of Tonight With Trevor Macdonald at 10pm on a Thursday, 
is worth £2.2 billion per annum of public money.
Radio, of course, is different: the BBC, out of the television 
licence, invests in its radio services 85% of all radio spend in the 
UK. The commercial sector, whilst growing, cannot compete with 
this non­market behaviour. But it is not its radio distinctiveness 
that can legitimise the BBC’s exclusive access to a licence fee that 
falls as a compulsory flat charge on all television households.
Briefly, Birt flirted with a high ground approach, aiming to drive 
the quality of BBC television out of reach of its competitors, even 
at the expense of audience share. But this Himalayan option was 
quietly discarded as the reality was confronted: a precipitate 
decline in viewership would threaten the BBC’s funding. After all, 
if everyone was obliged to pay the licence fee, they were entitled 
to the full range of programmes – popular as well as minority, 
EastEnders as well as Horizon, the National Lottery as well as 
Omnibus. And if audience share dropped too far, then viewers 
might revolt against the licence fee system. The BBC had to tread 
a delicate line: distinctive enough to justify a licence fee, but not 
so distinctive as to undermine it.
Indeed, the licence fee, which the BBC has justified as the least­
worst way of providing secure funding as well as operational 
independence, is a tricky beast to ride. It is, by definition, regres­
sive: charged at a flat rate, irrespective of ability to pay or the 
number of television sets in a household. Its level and its impact 
are immune to consumers’ views as to the worth of BBC output. 
It gives viewers no choice, yet imposes on the BBC imagined 
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pay it. Not surprisingly, independent surveys show that only 
about a third of viewers are content with the licence fee system.
A further difficulty is that the licence fee implies a degree of 
accountability that the BBC fails to deliver, despite a constant 
flow of supposed surrogates for accountability. There are public 
consultations on possible changes of policy or new initiatives: but 
these are skimpy and unconvincing, and no single example exists 
of a change or initiative being abandoned as a result of such 
consultation.
Town hall meetings, appearances by top executives before Parlia­
mentary committees, lengthy negotiations with ministers and 
civil servants, annual reports and annual pledges: all these exist, 
yet the trappings of accountability fail to convince. The BBC’s 
Governors are overwhelmingly seen as both too close to the 
corporation’s executive decisions and too little able to influence 
them.
The Davies Report recommended a range of measures to impose 
more financial accountability on the BBC, and re­opened an issue 
identified fifty years ago by the Beveridge Committee in call­
ing for a secretariat solely serving the Board of Governors so as 
to enable them to scrutinise the actions of the executive in an 
informed manner. Whether there is such an inclination, of course, 
must be open to doubt. The BBC’s annual reports offer numerous 
examples of individual governors risking ridicule by solemnly 
reciting BBC nostrums, such as that licence fee funds are not 
put at risk in BBC commercial ventures, or that the BBC operates 
strictly according to meaningful fair trading rules. 
Not surprisingly, despite many years of trying to persuade the 
public of its commitment to accountability, the BBC was forced 
to admit in its 1999 annual report that just 34% actually believed 
it to be an accountable organisation – though that fact was so 
deeply buried in the text, and so devoid of comment, that only 
the most eagle­eyed reader would have spotted it. Far greater 
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as vacuous as they were beyond measurement – such as “we 
promise to offer the best value for money”; or “we promise to 
provide programmes that are valued by everyone”; or – most 
amusingly – “we promise to be open and accountable”.
That there is an obvious financial mechanism for delivering real 
accountability has not eluded the BBC. As subscription and other 
forms of transaction funding spread their way into the broad­
casting market­place, the BBC is inexorably reminded of the 
licence fee’s origins: as a subscription paid only by those using 
the BBC’s services. It was the introduction in 1955 of non­BBC 
services that broke this simple, logical link. The BBC’s rhetorical 
assault on the notion of subscription funding has intensified as 
the case for switching to it has strengthened.
The main argument used is that subscription funding would 
undermine the BBC’s universality. But this would only be 
meaningful if the licence fee inflicted no cost on the consumer. 
The BBC’s universality is a function of its transmitter system and 
the legal requirement for any consumer of any television services 
to pay a subscription – sorry, licence fee – to the BBC. Not forcing 
people to pay for services they might choose to do without in no 
way reduces the universal availability of the BBC: only, potentially, 
its universal take­up.
Some economists criticise subscription in theoretical terms 
because, almost by definition, whatever level of charge is set for 
a subscriber service, there will be some consumers excluded 
by price, even though their willingness to pay for the service 
may exceed the marginal cost of supplying it. This technical 
inefficiency is shared, of course, by virtually all products in the 
market place. By comparison, the licence fee is efficient in eco­
nomic terms, but only if the compulsion and inequity involved 
in the licence fee system are ignored, let alone the high costs – 
some £250 million per annum – of collection and evasion, which 
in turn compound the unfair impact on honest households of 
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without.
It is not just the lack of choice and accountability which make the 
licence fee so suspect. In his first formal interview as Director­
General, Greg Dyke had told Sir David Frost that he supported 
the licence fee because it favoured the poor, guaranteeing them 
– and not just the rich – quality services. He later amplified this 
notion: “at one time, I believed that once subscription was avail­
able in every home, it would be difficult to justify the licence fee; 
however, over time, I have come to the conclusion that making 
some services universally available to all, rich or poor, is more 
important”.
Just three years earlier, in fact, Dyke had described the licence fee 
as “a poll­tax difficult to justify when there are literally dozens of 
channels available” – but that was before he became a candidate 
for Director­General. To that end, it is understandable that he 
should, for instance, acknowledge the likelihood of medium­
term survival of the licence fee when being interviewed by a 
selection panel with well­established prejudices. But to abandon 
the clear superiority of subscription as a method of funding the 
BBC in favour of the licence fee, for such inadequate and illogical 
reasons, is disappointing.
After all, it is the poor – especially the honest poor – who bear 
the heaviest burden of the licence fee’s unfairness. Subscription 
systems typically charge on a per­set, not a per­home basis. 
The average number of sets per UK home is just under three. 
If payment for the BBC’s services were charged per set – which 
would be possible if all homes received BBC television through 
a decoder – then homes with just one set could expect a sub­
stantial reduction in the fee paid. Far from the licence fee 
protecting the poor, it forces them – under penalty of prosecution 
– to subsidise the rich, who not only are better able to afford the 
uniform flat fee, but are far more likely to possess several sets. 
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taken by technological advances. Universal availability through 
an aerial (rather than a cable or a dish) is only possible for four 
channels distributed by analogue signals. All other channels 
must depend upon multiple distribution mechanisms to reach 
anywhere near the 99.4% coverage enjoyed by those four. By the 
same token, however, all the additional channels have similar, if 
not quite total, coverage. Some are free­to­air, some are sub­
scription or even pay­per­view funded: but all are equally avail­
able to the population at large, provided households are willing to 
pay whatever is required to receive them.
In that context, the BBC’s services are no more universally avail­
able than any others, and reception of them is similarly con­
ditional upon payment of the correct fee. That this fee is also 
payable by those households choosing additional pay services 
does not alter the principle involved. The refusal to allow the 
option of just choosing free­to­air advertising­funded services – 
which a subscription­funded BBC system would permit – further 
discriminates against the poorest homes.
The BBC’s response to this is that allowing people to opt out 
of paying for and receiving BBC services would inhibit partic­
ipation in collective viewing experiences; would deprive people of 
socially­valuable programming; and would undermine the BBC’s 
finances.
Whatever value there might be in “collective viewing experiences” 
– a matter of some dubiety – it is hard to believe that it outweighs 
the right to opt out of a compulsory payment for an unwanted 
service. As for social deprivation, if governments really believe 
that BBC output has such positive social benefits, there can be 
no excuse for failing to supply such output through the general 
taxation system, as is done with some other “merit goods”, such 
as education and health. 
In terms of the BBC’s finances, there is little doubt that a 
proportion of households – perhaps as high as 15% – would 
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However, there is also abundant evidence that BBC services are 
entrenched in people’s viewing habits – taking up more than 
10 hours a week of viewing, on average – and that a substantial 
part of the population would pay more for them than the current 
cost of the licence fee. Indeed, the sheer political inflexibility of a 
flat­rate charge that bears most heavily on the poorest has held 
back the BBC in two ways: it cannot expand the number of its 
services as it sees fit, nor can it offer flexible packages of services, 
let alone an a la carte choice. Nor can it seek – as it would in a 
rational broadcast market – to vary its prices in accordance with 
consumer demand.
To imagine – as some Cassandras do – that the BBC would 
collapse if people could choose to do without its television 
channels is remarkably pessimistic in the light of the constant 
reminders from the BBC of the tremendous value the licence fee 
represents. Indeed, the BBC regularly claims to be much better 
value than cable and satellite packages, contrasting a licence fee 
of just over £100 with a typical pay television bill of £300 a year. In 
truth, such a comparison between the purchasing power derived 
from a compulsory charge levied on 22 million households and 
that derived from a voluntary charge on 7 million households is 
profoundly misleading. But unless the BBC has been deliberately 
churning out false propaganda, it must surely be reasonable to 
conclude that the BBC would do well in the open market, and 
knows that it would.
However, even when embracing that likelihood, the BBC tends 
regretfully to pronounce that it would be wrong in principle 
to exclude – even by their own choice – that proportion of the 
population who might drop out if allowed to – however regres­
sive and anti­social the mechanism for forcing them to stay in. 
But then, few organisations would willingly give up a guaranteed 
annual income of billions of pounds in order to submit 
themselves to the verdict of the consumer. Only technological 
advance may force the BBC’s hand.
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as essentially a single charge for two channels. But as spectrum 
scarcity disappears in the digital age, and as the BBC’s ambitions 
expand, the “one size fits all” approach is coming apart at the 
seams. The House of Commons Culture Committee – perhaps 
without realising it – put its finger on the key issue of the BBC 
in the digital age, in its comments on the most expensive new 
BBC channel, BBC Choice. “Original programming for BBC 
Choice poses a simple but fundamental question: why is such 
programming funded by the universal licence fee not available 
first on the BBC’s universal channels?” 
The debate over the digital licence fee has been exacerbated by 
the fact that it is an argument over different forms of unfairness 
which excludes the only fair solution – that all BBC television 
services should be individually priced and open to consumers to 
choose to pay for or not.
The paradox is that some BBC services are already operating 
in such a fashion. The BBC’s joint venture with Flextech, UKTV, 
offers a number of public service channels, essentially made up 
of BBC repeats and assorted bought­in programmes. The most 
successful is UK Gold, originally set up in 1992 by an American 
cable company, Cox, along with the BBC and Thames Television. 
Interestingly, its launch straddled the Checkland/Birt handover, 
and the BBC’s enthusiasm for this first venture into pay television 
visibly diminished as Birt took control. Indeed, the BBC declined 
to take up an offer of free equity at the same 20% level in a sister 
proposition, UK Living, shortly afterwards: a failure that has cost 
the BBC tens of millions of pounds.
When the oil exploration company, Flextech, moved into the 
cable and satellite business, taking over an increasing number of 
channels, it proposed to the BBC a broad joint venture, into which 
UK Gold (which it by then controlled) would be injected. Flextech 
would provide the cash to launch UK Horizons (a factual strand), 
UK Play (formerly UK Style, but now concentrating on comedy) 
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as UK Drama).
All four channels are funded by a mixture of subscription and 
advertising, but are scheduled by the BBC, which also provides 
much of their content. Whether they constitute public service 
broadcasting is a moot point: but they demonstrate that Birt’s 
early hesitations about possible compromising of the BBC’s 
licence­funded purity were ill­judged.
More importantly, their very existence sharply inhibits the 
BBC’s case for extra funding to launch new free­to­air channels. 
If channels with substantial public service content can be 
commercially funded, with consumers left to choose whether or 
not they wish to subscribe, what is so compelling about the BBC’s 
other digital propositions that requires compulsory funding, 
either of all television viewers through the licence fee, or of all 
digital viewers through a digital licence fee, or – perhaps – all 
taxpayers through a direct grant, as with the World Service?
The free­to­air digital services the BBC has already launched 
provide little ammunition. The costly BBC Choice is a modest 
adjunct to BBC1 and BBC2, sometimes taking overspill coverage 
of sporting events licensed by the BBC. BBC Knowledge is an 
education service, but would­be providers of commercial edu­
cational services, like Granada, do not understand why the BBC 
should have any, let alone exclusive, access to public funds to pay 
for it. BBC Parliament – which essentially offers live coverage of 
proceedings at Westminster – is as close to pure public service 
as anything on offer: but, even at £4 million per annum, is surely 
more appropriately funded by the Treasury than by the licence 
fee.
BBC News 24 is the longest established of these new services. 
It has attracted fierce criticism, not least from the Commons 
Culture Committee, which could not understand how a channel 
provided at the margin of an already hugely expensive news 
operation could cost nearly £54 million a year, when an editorially 
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million a year. Greg Dyke has suggested that Sky understates 
the true cost of its news channel, and that News 24’s costs may 
have been over­stated: but anyone with knowledge of both 
organisations would strongly incline to the view that the opposite 
was the case.
BSkyB has shrewdly pointed out that News 24 fails all the tests 
the BBC itself laid down for providing new digital services: that 
they be widely accessible, that they have wide appeal, that they 
fill a market gap and that they be cost effective. If the BBC had 
simply decided to fill its empty late­night hours on BBC1 or BBC2 
with rolling news, no­one – even Sky – could have objected. But 
launching a dedicated limited­circulation news channel, in det­
rimental competition with pre­existing commercial services one 
of which consistently out­rates it head­to­head, and at enormous 
marginal cost, has earned the BBC the most scathing criticism 
from the Commons Culture Committee: “we find it difficult to dis­
cern the justification for News 24 in view of its huge cost and small 
audience – the BBC has failed totally to explain why the costs of 
News 24 are so high in the context either of other news broad­
casters or in the context of its total news budget”.
The Committee’s overall conclusions were deeply dismissive of 
the BBC’s digital efforts and its role in the digital world. Other 
than praising BBC Online, which the Committee recommended 
be converted into a commercial service, there was scarcely a 
positive note in the Report it published in December 1999. The 
Committee’s view was that the BBC “had singularly failed to make 
the case for a much expanded role in the digital era and con­
sequently for additional external funding”. The Report sharply 
rejected not just a digital licence fee, but any increase in the main 
licence fee outside the 5­year settlement that ran till 2002. 
Additional scorn was poured on the BBC’s inept attempt to switch 
from the bid for £700 million a year for new services it submitted 
to Davies, and the call for £730 million a year it made after the 
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extra expenditure on existing services.
That the BBC had made such a woeful hash of its digital strategy 
– the “brilliant digital positioning”, as Greg Dyke described his 
inheritance – must surely be blamed on John Birt. The assurances 
that all the BBC’s digital plans could be funded from within the 
5­year settlement; the promise that new digital services would 
cost the licence fee payer nothing extra; the repeated dismissal of 
a digital licence fee as a tax on innovation; the painfully uncon­
vincing U­turn to endorse the digital licence fee; the poor quality 
and high cost of the free­to­air services launched; the grandiose 
and ill­thought­through proposals to Davies; the hubristic 
demands for money and status post­Davies – all these must be 
laid at his door.
Even the Internet strategy has been confusing: a commercial 
venture with ICL – beeb.com – has been outflanked by the BBC’s 
own public service offering – BBC Online; a service funded 
primarily by the licence fee is used primarily by foreigners; a 
service claimed as an extension of public service broadcasting, 
free at the point of use, involves every customer in paying either 
a telephone company or an Internet service provider according 
to level of use; content is funded at a level which could not be 
justified by all its domestic commercial competitors combined. 
These competitors have accused the BBC of using licence fee 
funding to mark out new territory in its familiar imperial fashion, 
crowding out commercial efforts in the process. Why was the 
licence fee being used for this purpose?
And yet all the time an alternative funding model was at hand, 
which the BBC rejected with increasing vehemence. And all 
the time the logic of digital technology is rendering the BBC’s 
limpet­like attachment to the licence fee increasingly redundant. 
Sometime in the second decade of the 21st century, all televisions 
will be equipped with digital equipment that allows transmission 
signals to be decoded. Analogue broadcasts will be ended. And it 
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to channels for which payment had not been made.
Is it conceivable that in the digital century we will still have an 
army of detector vans, and millions of paper forms, when a smart 
card can do the job more efficiently? Will we still insist on a £250 
million a year cost to the BBC of collection and evasion of the 
TV licence, when an electronic database controlling payments 
for BBC services would not only be fairer (in penalising evaders) 
and more cost­effective, but would also constitute a substantial 
business asset?
Once there is a mechanism for differentiating between consumer 
willingness to pay for different BBC services, we will find that 
they are correctly priced without our having to be told they are 
excellent value for money, and that the BBC can launch a whole 
series of targeted services without having to ask Flextech’s – or 
the Secretary of State’s – permission.
Basic BBC content will be cheaper for the poorest households; 
there will be no free­riders; the creative resources locked up 
inside the BBC will be released to their full potential; and without 
any need for privatisation, or profit­making – or even advertising 
between programmes – the BBC would flourish and be truly 
accountable. 
The BBC has tried and failed to contain its ambitions for the 
digital age within its historic licence fee level of income. It has 
botched the case for a digital licence fee. It has been derided 
for its digital offerings and its huge claims for more cash. It 
has united virtually all its competitors in fierce opposition, in 
unprecedented fashion. It has been savaged mercilessly by a 
cross­party group of well­informed MPs. 
The licence fee is with us for at least another decade. It has 
served the BBC well, for longer than many expected. But it is not 
a totem­pole to be worshipped. It works because the BBC works, 
208 not the other way round. And the BBC’s ability to work at any 
politically realistic level of licence fee is increasingly in doubt.
In that context, the alternative method of subscription funding 
– which technology invites and compels, and which would 
confer on the BBC legitimacy, accountability and true indepen­
dence – must surely soon find its way to the top of the agenda: in 
particular, that of the committee which, in the next two years, will 
be appointed as perhaps the last of the great post­war inquiries 
into broadcasting of which the first, by Lord Beveridge, reported 
half a century ago.
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